The Syrian National Dialogue Conference (SNDC) convened on 24-25 February at the Presidential Palace in Damascus, having been postponed several times in the face of widespread criticism over the selection of the SNDC preparatory committee, the preparation process, the agenda, and the prospective invitees.
Around 600 Syrian figures were invited who had been selected based on diversity, professional qualifications, and other criteria set by the preparatory committee that consisted of individuals close to Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and some civil society activists.
The committee had earlier visited Syria’s various governorates, meeting with local community representatives to solicit views on the proposed agenda for the conference before sending out invitations.
However, this occurred only 24 hours ahead of time, and some Syrian opposition figures abroad, particularly in Europe and the US, were forced to decline their invitations due to the impossibility of making travel arrangements at such short notice.
Others managed to participate, with some praising the organisers’ efforts despite the time constraints and Syria’s lack of experience with such conferences.
The SNDC concluded with an 18-point statement that in addition to establishing the guiding principles of the transitional phase in Syria, reaffirmed the country’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and condemned the Israeli incursions into Syrian territory.
It underscored the need to ensure the state’s monopoly of legitimate arms and to build a unified army. It called for the rapid drafting of an Interim Constitutional Declaration, the formation of an Interim Legislative Council, and the establishment of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution.
The participants also reaffirmed the need to strengthen freedom, guarantee respect for human rights, promote the roles of women and youth, and protect the rights of children and people with special needs.
The statement reaffirmed the principles of equal citizenship, equal opportunity, peaceful coexistence, social harmony, and the rejection of discrimination and violence, and it underscored the need for transitional justice and for fair criteria for any political exclusion in this framework.
It did not contain the terms “democracy” or “rotation of power,” although it did call for “political development that guarantees the participation of all segments of society.” In this spirit, it called for the reform of state institutions, building a dynamic civil society, educational development, and fostering a culture of dialogue.
It urged a focus on economic development and stimulating investment and appealed for the lifting of international sanctions on Syria to facilitate reconstruction and the return of displaced persons and refugees.
The predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), excluded from the SNDC, hastily organised a counter conference, generating an alternative narrative to that of the Transitional Government in Damascus.
The SNDC preparatory committee argued that the event it had organised was intended for Syria’s political, cultural, and intellectual elites, as well as legal experts and activists, saying a separate mechanism under the Ministry of Defence would engage with the militant factions. However, talks began between the SDF and Damascus two months ago.
Meanwhile, critics of the official SNDC charged that it had been hastily organised and sidelined major figures, especially those abroad. Two days, the time allotted for the SNDC, was not sufficient for the meaningful exchange of ideas to take place, they said.
Some said that the final statement had been drafted in advance, presumably according to Syrian Transitional President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s dictates, and that the attendees were there merely to give the SNDC the stamp of popular legitimacy.
The SNDC coincided with an EU meeting in Brussel to discuss the fate of EU sanctions on Syria, and it appears that the EU was reassured by its results as it approved the lifting of sanctions on the Syrian energy, transport, and construction sectors, as well as on Syrian Airlines and four Syrian banks.
The EU also eased restrictions on the Syrian Central Bank. Sanctions remained in place against certain dual-use goods and equipment with civilian and military applications.
While there were criticisms, many commended the SNDC despite some organisational flaws. It had brought together representatives of a broad spectrum of ideological, regional, and sectarian backgrounds, they said, and the discussions, divided into the six themes of civil society and political participation, transitional justice, constitutional development, institutional reform, personal freedoms, and the economy, had been uniformly serious.
But while some sessions were described as constructive, others were reportedly hampered by sharply different outlooks, especially between Salafis and more secular-oriented participants. Critics of the final statement said that it had confined itself to loosely worded general principles and there had not been opportunities for debate on contentious issues.
However, a general view was that this was still an early stage in the political transition in Syria and that establishing common ground should take priority so as not to jeopardise national unity.
Syria’s Transitional Government had another reason for wanting to strengthen the image of national unity because of the Israeli incursions into southern Syria. While the SNDC was convening in Damascus, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared his intention to turn the whole of southern Syria into a demilitarised zone, stating that he would not allow the entry of the new Syrian Army into the area.
In mid-February the Transitional Government Ministry of Defence announced that it had reached an agreement with southern factions in Syria for their integration into the new Syrian Army. They would be incorporated into four brigades, with a total of 15,000 fighters recruited from local populations and garrisoned in Daraa, western Daraa, Quneitra, and Suwayda, it said.
Following a recent sectarian flare up in Jaramana, a suburb of Damascus, Netanyahu declared that the Israeli Army was ready to “defend” Syria’s Druze community, especially in Jaramana, which lies 10 km south of the capital.
Tensions in Jaramana spiked when members of a local armed group who were manning an unauthorised checkpoint abducted and killed two security personnel affiliated with the government. This led to a clash between the local militants and government security forces, who were driven out of the local police headquarters.
According to some observers, the government’s security forces have acquired a reputation for aggressive and heavy-handed policing in minority areas.
There have been reports of arbitrary executions targeting Ismailis and Alawites in rural Hama, Homs, and Latakia in recent weeks, which have sparked fears in other minority majority areas, aggravated tensions between the authorities and the minority communities, and fuelled an aversion to government security personnel.
The government has dismissed the events as “isolated incidents” and vowed to bring those responsible to account.
Syria’s Transitional Government is working to rally Arab and international support to compel Israel to withdraw from southern Syria and respect the conditions of the 1974 Armistice Agreement.
However, many Syrians warn that Netanyahu will continue to exploit incidents like those in Jaramana and therefore urge the new authorities to work harder for national unity.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 6 March, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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