Iran has not yet formally responded to US President Donald Trump’s renewed push for nuclear negotiations. Trump has made it clear that rejecting talks could result in a reinstatement of his “maximum pressure” strategy — potentially leading to military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Tehran has consistently resisted negotiating under duress, viewing compliance with external threats as a sign of weakness that could destabilise the regime and further diminish its regional influence.
From Tehran’s perspective, the cost of capitulating may outweigh the benefits of sanctions relief, a revived nuclear deal, or improved ties with Washington. At the same time, outright rejection of Trump’s overtures carries its own risks. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran is enriching uranium to 60 per cent purity, placing it within weeks of acquiring the material necessary for a nuclear weapon if it chooses to proceed.
For the US and Israel, the prospect of Iran obtaining nuclear capabilities is unacceptable. As a result, Trump has framed the situation as a stark choice: return to negotiations or face possible military confrontation. But Iran’s hardline factions are rejecting what they see as an ultimatum. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has categorically dismissed negotiations under threat. Without directly naming Trump, he accused Washington of using nuclear talks as a pretext to demand broader concessions, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and diplomatic alliances.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran will certainly not accept their expectations,” Khamenei declared. “For coercive governments, negotiations are a means to impose new demands. Iran will definitely not fulfil these new demands. They make new demands regarding the country’s defence capabilities and dictate our international relations. Telling us not to do this, not to meet that person, not to go there, not to produce this, and to limit the range of our missiles to a certain extent. How could anyone accept such things?” he said on X.
Khamenei further criticised European signatories of the 2018 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): “You say Iran has not fulfilled its nuclear obligations — well, have you fulfilled yours?” he asked.
Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, have echoed Khamenei’s position, refusing to engage in direct negotiations while the US continues its pressure campaign. “As long as the US policy of maximum pressure and threats continues, we will not engage in direct negotiations with the United States,” Araghchi stated.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohamed Bagher Qalibaf reiterated the same sentiment.
Iran’s strategy has been to focus on negotiations with European nations, Russia and China, rather than Washington. Tehran insists that any discussions with the US must be on an equal footing and free of coercion. But these statements by senior Iranian officials do not signify an outright rejection of direct negotiations with the Trump administration. Instead, they set clear conditions that Iran expects to be met before engaging in talks. Trump’s abrasive approach to diplomacy — even with allies such as Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Ukraine, Panama, and Mexico — has probably reinforced Iran’s resolve to establish firm red lines and negotiating terms before considering discussions with Washington.
“The Pezeshkian government faces a stark dilemma: accept negotiations on Trump’s unacceptable terms — an approach almost certain to fail, potentially leading to harsher sanctions or even military escalation — or insist that Washington should meet Tehran’s conditions, such as delinking the nuclear issue from broader regional disputes. A third option, of course, is to reject negotiations with Trump altogether. Pezeshkian’s government favours the second path: engaging with Washington, but only on terms that safeguard Iran’s interests,” a reformist politician closely aligned with President Pezeshkian’s government told Al-Ahram Weekly.
Amid ongoing power dynamics within Iran’s establishment, the Iranian mission to the United Nations in New York stated: “If the goal of negotiations is to address concerns over potential militarisation of Iran’s nuclear programme, such discussions may be considered.” However, it firmly asserted that “negotiations will never take place” if the objective is to dismantle Tehran’s nuclear programme.
Despite Khamenei’s hardline stance, the Pezeshkian government is walking a fine line. The Iranian president is more of a pragmatist than a reformist, aiming to revive the nuclear deal and ease sanctions — his most significant electoral promise. However, tensions between reformists and conservatives have become more pronounced, with some reformist politicians indirectly criticising Khamenei for blocking diplomatic engagement, arguing that his stance obstructs the president’s ability to fulfil the electoral promises he made to the Iranian people. Some reformist commentators have even questioned, with biting sarcasm, the significance of elections in Iran if ultimate authority rests solely with the Supreme Leader.
Yet despite these tensions, Khamenei’s relationship with Pezeshkian remains strong. Pezeshkian has refrained from defending certain reformist figures in his government who have been ousted by conservatives, perhaps to reassure Khamenei and hardliners.
The conservatives have successfully removed key reformist officials from Pezeshkian’s government, including economy minister Abdolnaser Hemmati, whom the parliament voted to remove from office earlier this month following a no-confidence motion, citing economic mismanagement and the sharp decline in the national currency. Hemmati faced criticism as the Iranian rial lost nearly half its value against the US dollar during his tenure.
Hemmati had prioritised lifting US sanctions and removing Iran from the Financial Action Task Force’s blacklist, but opponents argued Tehran should focus on circumventing sanctions rather than seeking their removal. The economy remains a critical challenge for Iran’s leadership, with fears of renewed protests over worsening poverty.
This internal power struggle highlights the complexity of Iran’s decision-making process. While Pezeshkian seeks diplomatic engagement, he must do so within the limits set by Khamenei and the conservative establishment.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has wasted no time in ramping up pressure on Tehran. Adam Boehler, the White House’s chief hostage negotiator, suggested that the US and Israel could collaborate to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme.
“It’s not so hard for us to partner with Israel and take out Iran’s nuclear capability,” Boehler stated on FOX News Sunday. “We probably should do it. Trump might make it seem like an empty threat until he carries it out,” Boehler warned, reinforcing the administration’s willingness to take military action.
The United Nations Security Council is set to hold a closed-door session on Wednesday to discuss Iran’s growing stockpile of highly enriched uranium. France, Greece, Panama, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the US have called for the meeting, urging the council to investigate Iran’s failure to provide the IAEA with information about undeclared nuclear materials.
Although Iran denies any intention to develop nuclear weapons, the IAEA has expressed alarm over its rapid uranium enrichment — dangerously close to the 90 per cent threshold required for weapons-grade material. Western nations argue that such levels of enrichment are unnecessary for civilian purposes and point out that no other country has pursued this path without ultimately producing nuclear weapons.
Britain, France, and Germany have also informed the Security Council that they are prepared to trigger the “snapback” mechanism to reinstate international sanctions on Iran if necessary. However, this option expires on 18 October, when the UN resolution supporting the JCPOA lapses. Trump has instructed his UN envoy to work with allies to enforce sanctions before the deadline.
The US has also blocked Iraq’s electricity imports from Iran, revoking a sanctions waiver that had allowed Baghdad to pay Tehran for electricity since 2018. This move is part of Washington’s broader “maximum pressure” campaign, prompting Iraq to seek alternative energy supplies from Qatar and Oman.
For Khamenei, rejecting Trump’s overtures is more than just a policy decision — it is an ideological stance. He believes Iran can withstand US hostility while negotiations risk compromising the Islamic Republic’s core principles. Past experiences, from the 1953 coup to the downfalls of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, serve as stark reminders of the risks of trusting American promises.
Meanwhile, Russia has distanced itself from mediation efforts, making it clear that Iran alone will determine its course in dealing with Washington. This complex dynamic places Khamenei in a delicate position. As tensions escalate on the global stage and Europe increasingly aligns with Trump in pursuit of broader geopolitical gains, the Supreme Leader must navigate both external pressures and the risk of internal dissent. The threat of simultaneous domestic unrest and an escalating standoff with the West adds another layer of uncertainty, making Iran’s next move a high-stakes calculation.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 March, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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