On 14 March, Syrian Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa signed into law the Constitutional Declaration that will govern the transitional phase in Syria.
Drafted by a committee of legal experts selected by the president less than a month ago, the document has sparked widespread criticism. Critics charge that it is one more step towards concentrating power in the person of the interim president while it excludes key Syrian opposition figures who spent 14 years studying the best forms of government for their country in the post-Bashar Al-Assad era.
They cite the appointment of the interim government, the militia factions’ “victory” conference that installed Al-Sharaa as interim president, and the formation of the National Security Council as steps in consolidating power in Al-Sharaa’s hands.
The members of the council, hand-picked by Al-Sharaa, have the power to declare a state of emergency and war.
The 53-article Constitutional Declaration is relatively long and is therefore unlike other such declarations that contain few articles as they are designed for shorter transitional phases.
In Syria’s case, the five-year transition seems to have warranted greater detail on the structures, processes, rights and principles that will govern this period. Many have criticised the length of the transitional period, fearing that it will further entrench the new Islamist ruling elite in Syria and hamper broader political participation.
Others counter that a relatively lengthy period is required to conduct a comprehensive census and prepare the country for elections after nearly a decade and a half of devastating war.
The declaration defines Syria as a republic with an Arab national identity and Arabic as its main language. It states that the president must be Muslim, and that Islamic Law (Sharia) is the main source of legislation. The identity provisions have drawn ire among Syria’s many minorities, not least the Kurds who hold that the “Arab” designation of the republic’s identity ignores its multiethnic character.
Syria also has sizeable Syriac, Assyrian, Turkmen, and Armenian communities. They also consider Articles 7 to 10 of the declaration, which address cultural diversity and provide a guarantee for cultural and linguistic rights for all Syrians, to be vaguely worded and insufficient to protect ethnic and religious minorities.
The provision stating that only Muslims can serve as president has been criticised for ignoring the country’s multi-faith demography, even if Sunni and Shia Muslims make up around 90 per cent of the population.
Others are concerned that Islamic jurisprudence is identified as the main source of legislation, as opposed to a source among others. The drafting committee has countered that such contentious provisions could not be altered by an unelected committee and that it has retained them as they stood in previous constitutions.
It added that the Constituent Assembly, which will be responsible for drafting the new constitution, will have plenty of opportunity to deliberate on these provisions. Apart from Syria’s short-lived first constitution under King Faisal in 1920, all of Syria’s previous constitutions, whether under the Al-Assads or before, have stated that Sharia is “a” source of legislation if they have included a role for religion in legislation at all.
On the other hand, many have praised the section on rights and freedoms in the declaration, especially Article 12, which renders all international human rights treaties and conventions to which Syria is a party an integral part of the declaration. Sceptics say that the proof of this will be in the implementation.
Articles 48 and 49 have been well received. The first abolishes extraordinary laws and procedures that restrict human and political rights, while the second calls for the creation of a Transitional Justice Commission responsible for investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators of human rights crimes under the former regime and bringing justice to the victims and survivors.
Hopes are also vested in Article 2, which addresses women’s rights. Its reaffirmation of women’s right to work and education, their economic, social and political rights, and their right to be protected from gender-based violence offers reassurances that Syria will not become another Afghanistan.
The Constitutional Declaration includes many general principles that originally inspired the revolution in 2011: the separation of powers, respect for human rights, social justice, protection of fair economic competition, and the prohibition of penalties undefined by law. It also commits the state to protecting private property, safeguarding personal privacy, and banning torture and enforced disappearances, which were among the abuses of the former regime.
However, the considerable powers vested in the president cast a shadow over the implementation of the stipulated principles. He will appoint the committee responsible for selecting two-thirds of the People’s Assembly members, and he will personally appoint the remaining third. Although he will not have the power to dismiss the appointed parliament, that body will not have the power to dismiss him either.
Similarly, the president is empowered to appoint the members of the constitutional court. Effectively, the declaration has rendered both the legislative and judicial branches subordinate to the president, in contradiction to the separation of powers and adequate checks and balances. As there are no provisions for a prime minister, all the powers of the executive will be concentrated in the president.
Some members of the civil Syrian opposition had hoped that Al-Sharaa would choose a figure from among its ranks to serve as prime minister, in recognition of the fact that the overthrow of the Al-Assad regime was not a purely military achievement by the militia factions.
Reports had indicated that Ayman Asfari was a likely candidate for the post. Asfari founded Madaniya, a network of more than 180 Syrian civil society organisations to promote inclusiveness, human rights, and stability. The Constitutional Declaration abolishes the position of prime minister, which had existed in almost all previous Syrian constitutions, even if the powers of the prime ministers varied.
The composition of the next government will set the course for the transitional phase. If it draws on professionals of different backgrounds, it will inspire confidence in the transition, whereas a homogeneous and ideologically exclusive Islamist one will feed suspicions that Al-Sharaa intends to monopolise power.
The recent agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in accordance with which these forces will be incorporated into security and defence institutions, had inspired optimism. This has now been tempered by the contentious articles in the Constitutional Declaration.
Someone from a militant jihadist background who only recently shifted to the discourse of pluralist constitutional government may falter in his new role. This makes it all the more crucial for Al-Sharaa to bring on board technocrats with the requisite expertise to help him navigate the difficulties that lie ahead.
Al-Sharaa’s next steps will also be telling. Will he form a pluralist government representative of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic communities? Will the procedures for establishing a small-scale parliament allow for the adequate representation of its diversity? Will the investigations into the recent atrocities committed in the coastal provinces bring those responsible to justice regardless of their connections to the new regime?
Syrians at home and abroad will be asking such questions in order to determine whether their country is on course to unity and whether all citizens will be endowed with equal rights under the law.
Meanwhile, the ceremony of the promulgation of the Constitutional Declaration was far from encouraging. In addition to the interim president, the foreign minister, and the members of the drafting committee, the event was attended by a group of religious scholars closely connected to Hayaat Tahrir Al-Sham, as well as other conservative Sunni clerics.
As their official capacities were not clarified, it seemed as though they were a kind of supra-constitutional religious authority whose presence was needed to bless the document.
Sceptics see this as a sign of an intention to establish a theocratic body in Syria, a Sunni Islamist equivalent of Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council. Others read it differently, saying that the religious figures were present to give the adoption of a constitutional republican system of government a religious wrapping for the coalition of radical Islamist militias that appointed Al-Sharaa as president.
According to this view, the presence of Sunni religious figures at the ceremony was a tactical move intended to contain the militias and prevent insurrection.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 20 March, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: