Europe is facing a defining moment.
The return of Donald Trump to the US Presidency has upended long-standing assumptions about transatlantic security. His repeated questioning of NATO’s Article 5 commitments, disdain for multilateralism, and rhetorical sympathies with aspects of Russia’s worldview have forced European leaders to grapple with an uncomfortable truth: the American security umbrella can no longer be taken for granted.
At the same time, Russia’s war in Ukraine is grinding into its third year, becoming a war of attrition with no clear end in sight. European intelligence agencies warn that Russia could reconstitute its forces by 2028 to levels capable of threatening EU territory directly. This long-term challenge is now central to European security thinking. The question is no longer whether Europe needs autonomous defence capabilities but how fast they can be built.
The challenge, however, is structural. Defence policy remains the domain of individual EU member states, each with its own threat perceptions, military cultures, and procurement priorities. Meanwhile, key tools for coordination – industrial policy, financing, and regulatory authority – lie with EU institutions. This mismatch between political authority and policy instruments has produced fragmented capabilities, inefficient spending, and a persistent reliance on US and Israeli defence systems.
Earlier this month, the European Commission launched an ambitious effort to reverse this trend. Under the banner of its “Ready by 2030” initiative, High Representative Kaja Kallas unveiled a €40 billion assistance package for Ukraine, while Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed an €800 billion plan to build an integrated European defence market.
The initiative identifies seven priority areas: air and missile defence, drones, long-range precision missiles, cybersecurity, artillery, secure communications, and integrated command systems. Projects must include at least 65 per cent EU-origin components to qualify for support. This requirement aims to boost domestic production and reduce dependence on non-European suppliers.
Two major funding instruments underpin the strategy. The Strategic Autonomy Fund for Europe (SAFE), valued at €150 billion, would support industrial expansion, innovation, and R&D. The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), worth €1.5 billion, is designed to co-finance joint procurement efforts among member states. To encourage investment, the plan proposes temporary flexibility in EU fiscal rules, allowing defence spending up to 1.5 per cent of GDP outside the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact. Joint defence procurement would also be exempt from VAT, removing bureaucratic barriers to collaboration.
Despite its ambition, the plan required unanimous approval. While most EU member states have supported the proposals in principle, political divisions have prevented concrete decisions. At the 20 March European Council meeting, Hungary vetoed both the Ukraine aid package and the broader defence initiative. The council’s final communiqué reiterated the urgency of action but failed to produce any binding outcomes.
In response to this deadlock, alternative arrangements have begun to form outside the EU’s institutional framework. France and the United Kingdom, long-time proponents of strategic autonomy, are leading the way. The UK hosted a summit in Northwood on 20 March with 31 other countries to plan a reassurance or peacekeeping force for Ukraine.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer emphasised the need for credible post-ceasefire enforcement. France and the UK pledged troops; Canada, Australia, and Finland expressed interest. On 27 March, French President Emmanuel Macron hosts a summit in Paris with Ukraine, the UK, Sweden, Canada, and Turkey to discuss immediate military assistance and post-war security structures.
The group has bypassed EU mechanisms, favouring flexibility and rapid coordination. However, limitations remain: Russia has rejected any NATO-affiliated presence, and the US has declined to serve as a guarantor. Meanwhile, the United States continues to shape the diplomatic landscape. On the same day as the Northwood meeting, Trump brokered a partial ceasefire between Kyiv and Moscow focused on halting strikes on civilian infrastructure.
Europe’s limited ability to shape outcomes, even within its own neighbourhood, remains glaring. One of the EU’s core vulnerabilities lies in its fragmented defence industrial base. France is the only major member state capable of producing most of its defence needs domestically. Germany, Italy, and Poland remain dependent on foreign licences. More than half of EU countries have minimal or no defence production capacity. Disputes over what counts as “European content” further complicate efforts, with France favouring a restrictive definition and Germany pushing for flexibility to include trusted non-EU suppliers.
These differences reflect deeper strategic divergences. Paris views industrial sovereignty as essential to strategic autonomy. Berlin and smaller EU capitals prioritise operational effectiveness and cost-efficiency. These tensions are unlikely to disappear, especially as Europe faces immediate capability shortfalls.
Ultimately, Europe’s dilemma is more political than material. Without bold, collective action through joint investment, shared planning, and a broader conception of sovereignty that includes defence, the EU risks becoming a bystander in its own security arena. If Europe does not act, others will shape its strategic future.
* The writer is a professor of politcal science, New Giza University.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 27 March, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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