Proclaiming “Liberation Day” and the “end of globalisation,” US President Donald Trump slapped a 10 per cent tariff on goods imported into the United States regardless of provenance. And this was just for starters. He then introduced a graduated tariff system, with rates varying for different countries and blocs. China faces the stiffest tariffs, amounting to 54 per cent and likely to increase. The EU, the US’ neighbours Canada and Mexico, and major trading partners such as South Korea and Vietnam follow close behind.
In taking these steps, Trump sharply deviated from the course of US history. The first eight decades of the 20th century witnessed the US’ entry onto the international stage and its expanding global engagement in both hot and cold wars. The leadership of this trajectory alternated between Democratic and Republican administrations, from Theodore Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan. The next quarter-century, starting in the 1990s, was characterised by US-led globalisation. This era began with Republican President George H W Bush and Democratic President Bill Clinton. Their administrations aimed to reshape the world order following the collapse of the Soviet Union, reorder Europe (especially the Balkans), and set the Middle East on a path to peace starting with the Madrid Conference.
The entire world gradually embraced the traditions of free trade. This was epitomised by the establishment of the World Trade Organisation, and Russia’s and China’s integration into it. Capital flows were regulated to remedy international financial crises. The world became a “small village” overseen by the American “sheriff”, with its satellites and transcontinental forces on hand to ensure security. In the next four US presidential terms, globalisation progressed on the premise that the 21st century was the “American century.” This vision was ushered in by the neoconservatives of the George Bush Jr. administration; it imploded with the 2008 global economic crisis. Barack Obama’s two terms continued to pursue this vision through a liberal democratic approach that aimed to translate globalisation into the “end of history,” as heralded by Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s.
This huge wave of globalisation, which was at once a cause of the Soviet Union’s collapse and of China’s rise, held the promise of a unified world starting with the various economic dimensions but not ending with values. These seized on the space for international civilisational interaction made available by new technologies at a time when that space seemed poised for Samuel Huntington’s predicted “clash” of civilisations. The resulting duality is epitomised by the surge in terrorism and the “global war on terrorism”, which led to unprecedented levels of international cooperation in security and, in turn, to the decline in terrorism following the 11 September attacks in New York and Washington, culminating in the defeat of the IS “caliphate” at the Syrian-Iraqi border.
Dialectical philosophy posits that everything, whether material or abstract, contains its own antithesis. Globalisation is bearing this out. Indeed, its demise is coming from within the US, the very nation that spearheaded universal globalisation and was often accused of using it as a cover for a new form of imperialism.
Globalisation brought unprecedented growth in the global economy thanks to its open interactions and technological advances. Discussions of the state of the world became worldwide, addressing the planet’s concerns and pains from its landmasses to outer space. Globalisation accelerated at such an unprecedented pace that it became difficult to grasp universally. For example, traditional conservative ideas about the state’s role in the economy and society found themselves at odds with globalisation and even the globalised system of free trade. Conservatives and ultraconservatives are inclined to isolationism and insularism. They favour recoiling into the cocoon of the nation state from which they eye other countries with suspicion, including allies and fellow members of regional cooperation and integration arrangements.
Before long, mounting isolationism and xenophobia took on practical form, as manifested in Britain’s departure from the EU, known as Brexit. The election of Trump in 2016 was more than just a swing to a right-wing administration. His first term — “Trump 1” — represented a more sweeping phenomenon, which we could term “Amerexit.” With the anti-globalisation trend, be it British or American, came the push to withdraw from international organisations and arrangements viewed by wealthy and predominantly white nations as “unfair.” This withdrawal went beyond globalised economic organisations to security and other institutions, as exemplified by Russia’s exit from the International Criminal Court and the US departure from the World Health Organisation.
Trump 2 intends to complete the process, but does that mean globalisation will end?
* A version of this article appears in print in the 10 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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