US President Donald Trump has confirmed that the US will continue to barrage Yemen with missile strikes until the Houthis cease their attacks on Israel and ships in the Red Sea. US officials insist the attacks, which began on 15 March 2025, have met with considerable success. They say they have killed experts connected with Houthi missile capacities and destroyed firing platforms and weapons depots. However, many observers question the efficacy of the campaign. While less restrained than the bombings carried out by the Biden administration, the Trump administration’s strikes have failed to eliminate senior Houthi leaders or undermine Houthi mobile missile capacities. Meanwhile, the Houthis have continued with their strikes against Israel and Israel-linked shipping, tangibly confirming the limited efficacy of the US operation in accomplishing its stated objective.
Many observers believe the US should intensify its operation, targeting vital infrastructure connected with the Houthis’ military capacities. The recent bombardment of Ras Isa Port, which claimed over 80 civilian lives, including rescue workers, may mark the beginning of a new phase. But experts question whether the US can sustain such an operation, which has come under bipartisan criticism for its lack of strategic results and for its material costs, an estimated $1 billion in the first two weeks alone. Some Democratic and Republican lawmakers have also charged that the operation in Yemen violates the War Powers Act, which prohibits extended deployments of US forces abroad without congressional authorisation.
Pentagon officials have also expressed concern over the heavy use by US Central Command (CENTCOM) of long-range Tomahawk and cruise missiles in Yemen, warning that it could further deplete US stockpiles in the event of a future military confrontation with China.
The Houthis, for their part, have a decade of experience in weathering heavy and sustained bombardment, whether from the Saudi-led coalition since 2015 or from the US directly under Biden. Neither attained their main strategic objectives. In addition, prolonged strikes could generate political pressure on the US due to the civilian toll against the backdrop of the worsening humanitarian conditions in Yemen. The Trump administration’s strikes against Yemen have killed at least 160 civilians, including many children, since they began a month ago.
The aforementioned drawbacks of escalating the campaign, coupled with pressures on Washington to achieve results quickly, suggest another possibility, which is to turn to the Yemeni army. Theoretically, a local ground force could confront the Houthis on multiple fronts, especially in their coastal provinces where the aim would be to dismantle the Houthis’ military capacities in that direction and secure Red Sea navigation.
Earlier this month, the chief of staff of the Yemeni Army met with the commander of CENTCOM to discuss joint military concerns and efforts to counter the Houthis. CNN, citing regional diplomatic sources, reported that a ground operation against the Houthis is being prepared from the south. The coordinated attack would be backed by Saudi and US naval support and aim to dislodge the Houthis from the port of Hodeida. According to Yemeni sources, a force of 80,000 troops is being mustered for this purpose.
So far, there has been no official confirmation that the US backed Yemeni Army offensive is in the works. This option, in fact, faces a number of practical challenges, not least of which are structural issues related to the internationally recognised Yemeni government’s military apparatus.
Certainly, the official Yemeni Army has received significant military support in training and equipment since 2015. Local militias were also formed to reinforce the army. Nevertheless, it has remained weak and ineffective due to outdated weaponry inherited from pre-war stockpiles, limited air defence capabilities, ammunition shortages, and inadequate training and maintenance. Other problems include disparities of pay between soldiers from different factions and the proliferation of “ghost soldiers” – names added to payrolls to embezzle funds.
The Yemeni Army is internally fragmented. It is drawn not from individual conscripts but from political and tribal factions that sometimes have conflicting regional, ideological, political and even external allegiances. This is a chief reason for poor cooperation and coordination and for the lack of a unified and unifying command. A joint security and military committee was formed several years ago to restructure and unify the armed forces under a centralised command, but key factions – most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC) – have resisted such efforts, preferring instead to retain their autonomy.
To further complicate the matter, the Presidential Leadership Council is riddled with factional tensions and rivalries, the STC still harbours secessionist aspirations, and the country is economically crippled after years of Civil War. Not only would these problems hamper a military drive against the Houthis, they would also potentially derail the UN-sponsored peace process. Even barring such concerns, overcoming the structural problems would require massive military and financial support from regional and international actors, an extensive period of training and provisioning, and measures to close the gaps in the sanctions regime.
The US and Iranian talks over Iran’s nuclear problem are expected to address the question of the Iranian role in the Middle East. In this context, Washington would probably press Tehran to persuade the Houthis to halt their attacks on Israel and Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea. This approach hinges on the extent of Iranian influence over the Houthis, on the one hand, and on progress on other issues such as the nuclear file, missile capacities, and sanctions, on the other hand.
The two sides would gain from an agreement. Iran wants to avoid a war that could cost it much of its remaining strength and influence – especially after losing most of its military proxies in the region – and possibly bring down the regime. The US wants to avoid depleting more of its military assets in the Middle East, preferring instead to save them up for its extended conflict with China, which remains a top priority for the current administration. Still, it is difficult to assess the prospects of a successful negotiated resolution to the Houthi challenge, given how it connects with many other crucial issues.
Each of the three options discussed has significant downsides. But none can be ruled out. The failure of one could lead to another, or two alternatives could be pursued in tandem. In the long run, the Houthi attacks will probably end. The question is how and under what terms and the impact this will have on the Yemeni crisis as a whole. If the Houthis are forced to stop as a result of a ground offensive, this would strengthen the legitimate government and either force the Houthis into a peace process or unseat them in Sanaa, reinstating the legitimate government. Conversely, if the Houthis are brought to heel through an understanding with Iran, this would entrench Houthi control in northern Yemen.
The writer is an expert on security and conflict resolution
* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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