Most countries worldwide and in the region welcomed the launch of a negotiating track between the United States and Iran a few days ago on what has been labelled for decades the “Iranian nuclear file” on the agenda of international relations.
Hosted by the Sultanate of Oman, the negotiations are seen as potentially contributing to reducing the level of tension in the region, as well as the sharp increase in it that has taken place particularly since the last quarter of 2023.
However, this positive welcome should not be interpreted as reflecting optimism about the outcome of these negotiations or as a guarantee of their success. Rather, the welcome was marked by caution by most of those who expressed it. The focus, at least at this early stage, should be on achieving the continuity of the negotiating process and avoiding any factors that might lead to its failure, either through a complete collapse or a freezing of it, before it reaches an advanced stage of maturity and sustainability.
The hope must be that this process can eventually reach a final settlement on this complex file, which has lain unresolved on the international agenda for decades.
The international and regional environments surrounding the negotiating process do not seem encouraging from the Iranian perspective for several reasons. The first is that the tensions resulting from the direct and indirect confrontations between the US and Israel with Iran over recent months, particularly since the outbreak of the war in Gaza in October 2023, cast heavy shadows over the situation.
The Iranian side generally mistrusts the intentions of the other side. Additionally, there are regional actors who may not wish to see the negotiations succeed and may prefer them to fail in order to push the current US administration into adopting more confrontational options, including the possibility of a military option, to bring an end to the Iranian nuclear programme.
The regional scene is also going through a series of developments that may not be in Iran’s favour during the negotiating process, such as the recent regime change in Syria leading to the fall of the Al-Assad regime, a key ally of Tehran. In addition, the military strikes that both Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, Iran’s allies, have suffered at the hands of Israel have been impactful and effective, leading to the loss of a good part of their leaderships and the destruction of a significant part of their infrastructure.
The general impression left by the actions of the US administration since President Donald Trump took office in January also suggests that it will be difficult to predict its next steps or future direction in any file it handles.
On the other hand, there are other factors that seem to point to the success of the negotiating track that started in Oman between Washington and Tehran regarding the Iranian nuclear file. One of these is the fact that the US administration, despite all the criticisms it has faced both domestically and internationally, has proven to have a mindset that in some ways resembles the “bazaar” mentality familiar in Iran and other parts of the Middle East.
This means that regardless of the exaggerated positions it initially announces when it starts dealing with any file, it appears ready to sit down and negotiate with the other party to reach solutions that are less than the initial goals it declared. The recent tensions between Israel and Turkey due to the Turkish military presence in Syria and Israel’s view of its continuation and possible expansion as a threat, as well as the harsh statements made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan against Israel regarding its responsibility for the humanitarian situation in Gaza, add a new and volatile dimension to the situation in the Middle East. It is one that requires all the parties to show flexibility in attempting to find an agreed settlement on the Iranian nuclear file.
There is also the precedent of the agreement on the Iranian nuclear file reached in 2015 during the presidency of former US president Barack Obama. It is true that Trump then led the United States to withdraw from this agreement during his first presidential term, but he may now want to credit himself and his administration with reaching a more sustainable agreement, one which could be achieved through the ongoing negotiations in Oman.
It is unlikely that the US-Iranian negotiations on the Iranian nuclear file will avoid extending to other topics, particularly those that the US has raised on several occasions. Some of these topics relate to Iranian policies, while others relate to regional issues. The first includes the possibility of the US again raising the accusations that it has consistently directed towards Iran, such as Tehran’s continued strengthening and development of advanced military capabilities which Washington sees as a threat to its allies in the region.
The second includes the continued US efforts, made during successive administrations, to pressure Iran either to sever its ties with some of its allies in the region, whom Washington accuses of terrorism, or to pressure those allies to adopt positions that the US administration considers to be “moderate.” These allies include Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, the Houthis in Yemen, and pro-Iranian armed Shiite organisations in Iraq.
The question that arises here is whether the Iranian side will also want to put demands on the negotiating table, not only to lift US sanctions on Iran but also to address regional issues such as demanding an Iranian role in rearranging the domestic situation in Syria or the US acknowledgement of Iran’s key role in any future settlement of the Palestinian issue in the long term or in addressing the situation in Gaza after the end of the Israeli war in the short term.
It is certain that Israel will be a factor in the US-Iran negotiations on the Iranian nuclear file. Since the victory of the Iranian Revolution in February 1979, successive US administrations have consistently accused Iran of targeting the destruction of Israel and have always sought, in any public or secret contacts, whether direct or indirect, with the Iranian side to ensure guarantees going in the opposite direction.
Some observers even expect that this time around the Trump administration might go as far as to demand Iran’s accession to what are called the “Abraham Accords” that it negotiated during Trump’s first term in office between Israel and the four Arab countries of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. However, this seems unlikely in the light of the current regional situation and domestic circumstances in Iran.
Each side has an interest in the success of the current negotiations. The US side wants to see the resolution of a crisis that it perceives as regional and international, hoping that the negotiations will not only settle the Iranian nuclear file but also the “Iranian issue” in general that has been a concern for Washington since 1979. This could be done either by the modification of Iran’s regional and global positions, or at the very least by neutralising the Iranian role.
Iran, on the other hand, wants to avoid any direct or proxy military confrontations with the United States, while at the same time trying to regain its regional standing after recent losses and focusing on its domestic affairs. It also seeks to use the success of the ongoing negotiations to inject new life into the Iranian economy, which is suffering from problems that are related in part to sanctions and strict restrictions on Iran’s imports of goods and technology from abroad.
The writer is a diplomat and commentator.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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