Among many foreign diplomats, analysts, and policy researchers, the Muslim Brotherhood is often discussed in the narrow framework of political engagement, electoral competition, or civil liberties jargon. Yet such a framing fails to grasp the true nature of the threat the Brotherhood poses, not as a political entity, but as an ideological ecosystem that is methodologically structured and deeply embedded in the sociopolitical fabric of many Muslim-majority societies.
We do not view our conflict with the Brotherhood as a political disagreement, but rather as a deep intellectual, methodological, and epistemological dispute. Reducing it to politics alone trivialises the real danger. This thesis must be taken seriously, especially by international actors engaged in regional policy, counter-extremism, or religious reform, for it underscores a strategic reality that is often overlooked: the Brotherhood is not merely a group – it is an idea. And ideas, unless systematically countered, do not die.
Founded in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood has always presented itself as a social and religious revivalist movement, strategically cloaked in religious garb but deeply political in aspiration. Its literature, organisational discipline, and long-term objectives reflect a structured ideological framework that blends elements of Islamic terminology with the political goal of re-establishing a transnational Islamic order, often at the expense of national cohesion and institutional legitimacy.
This is not Political Islam in a general sense. It is a specific doctrine that subverts the moderate, historically rooted traditions of Sunni Islam, such as those espoused by institutions like Al-Azhar, and replaces them with a revolutionary vision of Islam as a vehicle for regime change, often through gradual infiltration rather than open confrontation.
What does this mean for foreign observers? It means that engagement with the Brotherhood as a political party misses the deeper, systemic challenge: it is a movement that seeks to monopolise religious legitimacy and reinterpret Islam to fit its ideological ends. This is not theological pluralism. It is religious appropriation.
The enduring threat lies in the Brotherhood’s intellectual infrastructure. Its worldview is predicated on a binary vision: the jamaa (the group) versus the jahiliyya (ignorant society) and the true believers versus the compromised or corrupted other. This generates a radical epistemology that delegitimises all dissenting voices, not only political opponents, but also religious scholars who refuse to align with the Brotherhood’s revolutionary interpretation of Islam.
Such an ideology does not fade with the imprisonment or exile of its leadership. It is propagated through educational cells, digital content, diaspora networks, and sympathetic NGOs. The ideology continues to circulate, rebranding itself for new contexts (e.g. social justice, anti-corruption, or human rights), while maintaining the core goal: the replacement of the nation-state model with a quasi-theocratic system ruled by the group’s interpretation of Sharia Law.
This is why it is important to note that ideas do not die. Unless they are exposed and countered in the public arena of thought, they can adapt, survive, and eventually return, often under different names or with more palatable slogans.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been a cause of destruction for both religion and worldly affairs. This statement is not hyperbole. In nation after nation where the Brotherhood has gained influence, whether through elected office or shadow networks, it has left behind institutional dysfunction, societal division, and religious polarisation.
In Egypt, the Brotherhood’s brief tenure in power in 2012-2013 saw it attempt to reshape state institutions, undermine judicial independence, and stoke sectarian fears. In Gaza, Hamas (a Brotherhood offshoot) has created a situation of one-party rule through the use of deep social-control mechanisms. In Tunisia, the Ennahda Party’s political manoeuvering contributed to a polarised landscape despite its outward moderation.
Perhaps even more dangerously, the Brotherhood’s discourse weaponises Islam itself, transforming it from a unifying civilisational tradition into a mobilising tool for political confrontation. This not only damages social cohesion but also undermines the credibility of mainstream religious institutions tasked with promoting moderation.
We must contain, warn against, and expose the flaws of this ideology so that its followers diminish. Containment here should be understood not solely in terms of surveillance or security apparatuses, but as a comprehensive intellectual and cultural strategy that includes public education campaigns highlighting the theological distortions of Brotherhood ideology, support for independent religious institutions such as Dar Al-Iftaa and Al-Azhar in reclaiming Islamic discourse, international cooperation to monitor and regulate transnational networks that facilitate ideological exports, and investment in youth programmes that offer alternative narratives of purpose, belonging, and ethical engagement.
Western partners must avoid the temptation of short-term alliances with such groups under the banner of “inclusive governance.” History has shown that the Brotherhood exploits democratic platforms only to dismantle them once power is secured.
This is a call to recalibrate to foreign diplomats and policy analysts in Egypt. The challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood is not about political opposition. It is about ideological subversion, cloaked in religious legitimacy, and deployed with a long-term strategy. Countering this requires more than military might or political marginalisation; it demands a sustained ideological effort backed by both local religious authorities and international partners who understand the stakes.
In short, the Muslim Brotherhood is not simply an Egyptian issue. It is a transnational phenomenon. And unless its intellectual foundations are dismantled, its resurgence, though delayed, is always a possibility.
The writer is a senior adviser to the Grand Mufti of Egypt.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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