Washington’s moves to resolve the war in Ukraine had given the impression of a thaw and possible rapprochement with Russia. The diplomacy included a phone call that lasted more than an hour and a half between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on 18 March 2025. However, on 19 April, Trump suggested that the US might abandon its mediating efforts in Ukraine if Moscow or Kyiv make negotiations too difficult. “If for some reason one of the two sides makes it very difficult… we’re just going to take a pass,” he said.
This statement was made shortly after US Secretary of State Mark Rubio told journalists in Paris, “we need to determine very quickly now, and I’m talking about a matter of days, whether or not this is doable.” Addressing the press following talks with European, Ukrainian and Russian officials, he added that his government would not let talks “drag on for weeks or months” as it had other priorities to attend to.
Trump had campaigned on a pledge to end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours.” His and Rubio’s statements reflect a growing impatience that US efforts have yielded no results. They also suggest an awareness that Trump had been overconfident in his vaunted ability to shape events by making deals, applying his business acumen to the complex world of politics.
As commentators have pointed out, the US stance is not yet definitive; in fact, the threat to withdraw as mediator could, itself, be a ploy. However, whatever decision it takes – whether to give mediation “a pass” or to remain engaged – will hinge on various, contradictory factors.
As developments related to the Ukraine conflict suggest, Trump lacks sufficient leverage over Russia. The sanctions the Biden administration imposed on Russia before 2022 failed to deter Russia from recourse to a hard power strategy to pursue its core national interests, and the massive sanctions the West has imposed since then have likewise failed to cripple the Russian economy or diminish Russia’s ability to sustain its operation in Ukraine and turn the battle on the ground in its favour.
However, Trump remains opposed to open-ended military support of Ukraine, a position reflected in his decision in early March to halt US military aid to Kyiv. The announcement of that decision, which temporarily suspended deliveries of ammunition, military radars, and intelligence services, came on the heels of the widely covered “dressing down” of Zelensky in the Oval Office in late February. Some reports have suggested that the US might push Kyiv to hold elections to bring in a leadership more amenable to negotiating a peace deal with Russia. Zelensky’s term expired almost a year ago, and elections have been deferred indefinitely.
Ukraine is rich in raw materials, especially critical mineral wealth. Trump may up the pressure on Kyiv to conclude a Ukrainian minerals deal with the US, which he sees as a way to recover some of the billions the US has spent on financial and military aid to that country. However, peace is a prerequisite for mineral extraction, as it is for any stable economic activity.
Washington is clearly frustrated with the lack of progress in peace negotiation. A meeting took place between the US and Ukraine in Jeddah on 11 March 2025. Hosted by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, it was attended by US National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, while Ukraine was represented by the Director of the President’s Office Andriy Yermak, his deputy Pavlo Palisa, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Defence Minister Rustem Umerov.
The talks produced little, apart from a Ukrainian expression of “readiness to accept an immediate, interim 30-day ceasefire,” as the joint Ukraine-US statement put it. Russia agreed in principle to the proposal but raised concerns about verification mechanisms and other operational details that would need to be negotiated. Shortly afterwards, a Russian missile strike on the northeastern Ukrainian city of Sumy killed 35 people. Trump called this “a mistake,” but Washington has since become increasingly sceptical of Putin’s intentions.
Putin may have deepened suspicions with his recent comments on the Jeddah negotiations, stating that there were “subtle disagreements” and “serious questions” that still needed to be addressed in communications with the United States. These remarks were interpreted in the equivocation on the possibility of a truce raised in the Saudi-brokered talks between the US and Ukraine. Putin also reiterated Russia’s core demands: that Ukraine should renounce its bid to join NATO, undertake de-Nazification, scale back its military, and recognise Russian control over the breakaway territories in the Donbas. To Kyiv, such conditions are tantamount to surrender.
Trump’s overtures to Moscow had triggered alarm and anger among Washington’s European allies. But now that his hopes for a quick solution to the conflict have been dampened, Trump seems eager to ease tensions with Europe. This is reflected in the recent meetings between US Vice President JD Vance and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and between Rubio and European leaders in Paris. While in Paris, Rubio expressed the hope that Europe would remain involved in the US-led efforts to end the war in Ukraine, adding, “I think the UK, France and Germany can help us move things forward. I found their ideas useful and constructive.”
In light of these developments, and amid the international fallout from Trump’s tariff policies, Washington may pursue several possible courses on Ukraine. First, it could continue with the peace-making drive, pressuring Kyiv to make key concessions to Russia, including possible recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, in return for an end to the war. Secondly, it might follow through on its threat to disengage entirely and to focus its attention on domestic issues or foreign policy in the Middle East or Asia. Thirdly, it could opt for a middle path: a more calibrated approach to resolving the Ukraine conflict that safeguards its interests in Ukraine and Europe without risking a direct confrontation with Moscow.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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