Can Trump beat the Houthis?

Haitham Nouri , Friday 25 Apr 2025

Washington’s intentions for the Houthis remain unclear, but a plot twist in the decades-long story is inevitable.

Can Trump beat the Houthis?

 

Over the past three decades, the Houthis have become a pressing political and security concern for the Gulf region, the Horn of Africa, and maritime navigation through the Red Sea.

Yet major international powers, foremost among them the US, appear to have no definitive resolve to eliminate this Zaidi Shia organiaation, which many believe is backed by Iran. It is difficult to read the true intentions of Washington or Riyadh towards the Houthis. But it is possible to monitor how various countries react to Yemen generally, and to the Ansar Allah Movement, as the Houthis are officially called, in particular.

Recent US wars in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that conclusive victory cannot be achieved without a massive ground operation involving tens of thousands of highly trained troops, with losses that take years to make up for. Observers do not believe the US will launch a ground invasion in Yemen’s rugged northern highlands, especially considering that President Donald Trump campaigned on the premise of “bringing the boys home.” Nor is there any realistic expectation that intensified aerial bombardments alone, regardless of their scale or precision, will lead to the eradication of the Houthi movement.

“There is no viable path to containing, let alone eliminating, the Houthis without coordination between all regional states that have suffered from their operations,” said Naguib Seddik, editor-in-chief of 14 October newspaper, which is affiliated with Yemen’s interim government currently headquartered in the southern coastal city of Aden. A former head of the South Yemen Press Syndicate, Seddik also noted, “I am of the opinion that the recent US strikes against the Houthis are linked to negotiations between the US and Iran.”

Since his return to the Oval Office, Trump has resumed the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran he had adopted during his first tenure after withdrawing in 2018 from the 2015 nuclear agreement brokered by his predecessor, Barack Obama. Washington and Tehran engaged in an initial round of “indirect” negotiations in the Omani capital, Muscat, with a follow-up session scheduled for the coming week. It is still unclear whether the discussions are confined to Iran’s nuclear programme, as Tehran insists, or whether they also encompass its regional influence and ballistic missile capabilities, as Washington demands.

“The US doesn’t really want to eliminate the Houthis. Its primary goal is to weaken them or use them as leverage against Iran,” said Seddik. “The US seeks to create a persistent state of instability in the region, especially in the Gulf and for international shipping routes, to justify its continued presence there.”

But Mohamed Al-Mikhlafi, a former professor of international law in Sanaa, disagrees. “I believe the Houthis have suffered devastating blows from which they will not recover. The US strikes signal the beginning of a strategy to eradicate the Houthis altogether.”

Nevertheless, a war against the Houthis will be far from easy. Yemen’s northern regions, characterised by rugged mountains, pose significant challenges to any ground invasion. Even the US, which managed to control mountainous Afghanistan for two decades, ultimately withdrew in a chaotic fashion. Nor can the Gulf states participate in a military campaign against the Houthis, especially after seven years of war that failed to alter the battle dynamics. The Houthis are also cautious about launching attacks on Saudi Arabia, knowing the strength of the Saudi Air Force. A ground operation may be the only way to eliminate the Houthis, but whether Trump will make this move remains unclear.

“A ground operation would be difficult. But avoiding it means the Houthis will continue to exist as a major force in Yemen and the broader region. Whoever governs Yemen will be forced to negotiate with them and offer concessions,” said Al-Mikhlafi. “Yemen cannot rid itself of the Houthis on its own,” he continued. “Even regional powers cannot do so without strong American backing, as they see the group as a protracted drain.”

Seddik agreed: “We Yemenis are divided over the Houthis, especially the Zaidis. Some support them, while others, like the republicans, stand in opposition.”

The Zaidis constitute 60 per cent of Yemen’s population, while the rest are Sunni. If the majority of Zaidis align with the Houthis – as has occurred – it becomes impossible to defeat them. The governments under presidents Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and Rashad Al-Alimi failed to shift the battlefield, even with air support from the Saudi-led coalition. The Houthis’ alliance with president Saleh granted them access to a broad Zaidi base, including influential tribes and segments of the middle class, bolstering their internal strength. Despite resistance from some of Saleh’s loyalists, tribal and sectarian loyalties fortified the Houthis’ hold, making their defeat an unattainable goal for local or regional forces.

The only real hope for their opponents lies in a direct US military intervention supported by allies. With the exception of the UK, it is uncertain whether US allies will take part in this venture. But this raises a critical question: what will the US gain by eliminating the Houthis? And what could the opposition – comprising the Muslim Brotherhood, southern separatists, and remnants of the Saleh-aligned middle class – offer Washington in return?

The Brotherhood has never managed a military victory over the Houthis; the separatists have proven unable to impose authority in the north, as seen in both the 1994 Civil War and the current conflict.

As for the Saleh-aligned middle class, many have fled the country – Egypt alone hosts over a million – leaving them with little influence on the ground in Yemen.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 April, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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