Egypt finds itself today in the midst of shifting global connectivity strategies, as major and emerging powers adopt competing infrastructure initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
These projects express more than international trade plans; they also signal deeper efforts to reshape global economic influence and strategic alignments. For Egypt, whose location has long placed it at the heart of international transport routes, this moment presents both opportunities and policy challenges.
Over the last decade, Chinese investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone) have become a cornerstone of Egypt’s development masterplan. With over 150 Chinese firms now operating in the logistics, manufacturing, and energy sectors, the partnership has produced tangible benefits and consolidated Egypt’s role in the Chinese Maritime Silk Road.
China’s proposal earlier this year to expand its TEDA (Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area)-Suez operations and upgrade the Ain Sokhna port facilities further reflects the depth of the bilateral relationship between Cairo and Beijing. Egypt’s participation in the BRI and its recent membership in the BRICS+ group of countries offer a geopolitical hedge, economic diversification, and easier infrastructure financing at a time of economic fragility and when US policies have caused uncertainty and shifting priorities across the world.
Moreover, they have helped to position Egypt within a wider South-South connectivity framework, thus enhancing access to development funding beyond the usual Western channels.
At the same time, the IMEC, promoted by India, the UAE, Israel, the US, and the EU, has regained momentum in recent months. Originally announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, it had stalled due to regional conflict but has since re-emerged as a strategic platform for alternative trade corridors.
India’s recent diplomatic push, along with renewed interest from Brussels and Washington, has led to a second-phase agreement focused on port integration across the Haifa, Jebel Ali, and Khalifa ports. These developments aim to reduce the world’s dependency on both China and the Suez Canal, raising legitimate concerns in Cairo.
Egypt’s absence from the IMEC’s core framework has been the subject of commentary at home and abroad. While some have interpreted this as a sign of strategic marginalisation, most observers suggest it reflects a cautious, and understandable, Egyptian posture, shaped by national priorities.
The Egyptian authorities have expressed their openness to engagement on terms that are consistent with Cairo’s development plans and regional balance, but they naturally remain wary of joining initiatives that would help to shift logistics hubs away from the Suez Canal or create new forms of political dependency for Egypt.
The broader regional context reinforces Egypt’s desire for strategic adaptability. US and Israeli proposals put forward earlier this year to relocate the Palestinians from Gaza into Egypt were met with clear and firm Egyptian opposition. Cairo’s response was shaped not only by national security imperatives and a broader rejection of any arrangement that could redraw its borders or compromise Egypt’s sovereignty, but also by fears that agreeing to any such proposal would kill off the Palestinian cause once and for all.
This episode also reignited in Egypt the debate over conditionality, the limits of aid-linked diplomacy, and the urgency of strategic and economic diversification.
Port geopolitics now adds another layer of complexity. The UAE and China, both major Egyptian partners, have increasingly overlapping ambitions across East Africa, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Emirati investments through the DP World and AD Ports companies are reshaping regional maritime corridors, while China continues to deepen its economic presence in the SCZone and Red Sea ports.
Egypt, as the beneficiary of both Gulf financing and Chinese infrastructure capital, must navigate this evolving competition with care.
This Egyptian “multi-alignment” strategy seeks to preserve national decision-making space while attracting investment from a wide range of partners. It is not without challenges, however, as in a global environment that is increasingly polarised ambiguity can carry costs. Yet, for countries having the regional weight of Egypt, strategic independence remains a necessary principle, especially when geography alone is no longer sufficient to guarantee leverage.
The path forward requires more than diplomatic balancing. Improving port governance, digital infrastructure, and customs efficiency will be key to ensuring that Egypt remains integral to future trade corridors, regardless of the geopolitical configuration. Equally, engaging constructively with regional and global partners, whether in the BRICS+, IMEC, or African frameworks, should aim not only to attract capital but also to shape the rules of regional cooperation.
Recent European debates over IMEC’s entry points, complicated by China’s ownership of Greece’s Piraeus port, have also shown how contested and fluid these connectivity projects remain. Egypt may yet find opportunities to integrate into them on revised terms. But in order to do so, Cairo must demonstrate regulatory readiness and logistical competitiveness, while preserving its strategic autonomy.
In short, Egypt remains a country of consequence in the emerging connectivity landscape. But continued relevance will depend less on inherited geography and more on forward-looking policy, relevant institutional reform, and a clear strategic compass.
The writer is a professor of political science at New Giza University.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 1 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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