This week, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi received Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). According to a government source, their talks focused on helping the TSC and SAF consolidate stability and security across Sudan.
Al-Burhan’s visit to Egypt came as the SAF is advancing on the ground in the two-year war with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a previously tolerated militia that served regime interests before the ouster of Omar Al-Bashir, and which subsequently worked with the SAF until they fell out in April 2023.
According to informed sources, the SAF/TSC have regained over two thirds of the territories the RSF had taken over. In the words of one, “Today, it has become possible for Al-Burhan to return to Khartoum from Port Sudan where he has been since August 2023”, though the source added such a move would depend a lot on the nature of the next phase of war “because Al-Burhan is still trying to push the RSF into a much narrower area” in and around Darfur.
According to the same sources, Egypt’s help has been crucial in reversing the military tide and securing SAF advances over the last 12 months. Cairo continues to stand firm behind Al-Burhan, offering support on the Arab and international fronts.
Cairo and Washington have cooperated on Sudan since the war began. According to Egyptian diplomatic sources, Egypt has successfully lobbied support for Al-Burhan in many Western capitals, including Washington. The Egyptian-American position, they say, is clear: both capitals share a similar apprehension at the prospect of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) taking over Sudan.
A source informed on Egypt-US contacts on the matter argued that this shared position is in part due to the general perception that Dagalo is a warlord closely associated with International Criminal Court-investigated allegations of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, and partly a result of unwillingness to take a gamble on a whimsical warlord controlling a country that is crucial to the stability of the Red Sea.
Current and former government sources stress that Red Sea security is subject to close Egypt-US cooperation, from Bab Al-Mandeb, at the south, to the Suez Canal, at the north. “It has always been a day-in-day-out consultation process,” said a former government source. He added that close Egypt-US coordination takes place within the framework of Task Force 153 which is concerned with enhancing stability in the Red Sea, Bab Al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.
According to a current government source, despite this cooperation, Cairo declined a US request to directly participate in the Rough Rider operation targeting Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen who have been attacking vessels heading to and from Israel to protest against Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.
“We were asked repeatedly but declined. A decision against getting directly involved in the Yemeni situation was taken long ago,” he said.
On 22 April 2015, the Saudi Arabian-led Operation Restoring Hope was launched in an attempt to eliminate Houthi influence in Yemen which was undermining the Saudi-backed government installed after the ouster of Ali Abdullah Salah who ruled Yemen from the late 1970s until he was removed in February 2012. At the time, Egypt confined its role to strengthening Bab Al-Mandeb security.
“It is not that we don’t want to see an end to the Houthi attacks on vessels. Obviously we do, given the attacks have caused a huge drop in Suez Canal revenues,” said the source. He added, however, that Cairo’s calculations, particularly when it comes to warfare and regional stability, involve more factors than a decline in hard currency revenues, even when Egypt is facing a serious economic crunch.
According to the same source, the administration of US President Donald Trump accepted Cairo’s decision to steer clear of any direct involvement in Rough Rider, though he added the Americans had made it clear from the beginning that they would expect something in return for eliminating Houthi capacity to attack shipping.
It nonetheless came as “quite a surprise” when President Donald Trump said last week that he expects Egypt to exempt US commercial and military vessels passing through the Suez Canal from transit fees.
It was less the demand, said the source, given “something similar had been suggested in some channels of talks,” but the fact the US president made a public statement on the matter, adding that he had instructed Secretary of State Marco Rubio to discuss the issue with Cairo, that left people flabbergasted.
In Egypt, commentators, parliamentarians, and TV anchors launched an attack against the demand, calling it irrational.
“We cannot do this for so many reasons, including the fact that if we granted the US preferential treatment, we would have to consider similar requests from other countries,” the government source said. He added that the matter is being “quietly managed” through diplomatic and political channels.
Egyptian diplomatic sources note that Trump’s free passage request comes at a moment of unease in relations between Cairo and Washington, as Egypt continues to resist the US president’s suggestion it accept half the population of Gaza to be resettled in Sinai.
Diplomatic sources say that given the overall picture of Egyptian-American relations, which includes cooperation on many fronts, including political, military and economic, Cairo is unwilling to pick a public fight with Washington. Things, they say, will be done in a balanced way. The Suez Canal, they point out, is a national security interest for Egypt, but so too are relations with the US, including cooperation on Red Sea security, as well as the situation in the Horn of Africa and in Sudan.
Questions related to Yemen and Red Sea security are expected to be on the agenda of the talks Trump will have in Riyadh mid-May as part of a tour that will take in Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. Diplomatic sources say that Cairo and Riyadh are already coordinating views on the matter.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 1 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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