The Dream of Justice

Hossam Badrawi
Sunday 4 May 2025

One characteristic of Egyptian society is its tendency to circumvent the law rather than comply with it.

 

"Do not go to your grave carrying the best you have within you. Die empty—so that you may fill others’ lives.” I found this to be a powerful and unconventional expression. In that spirit, I look to Egypt’s future and commit to offering ideas that contribute to its construction. At the heart of that future lies an efficient justice system, without which no state can stand.

Achieving justice is the goal, and it must rest on qualitative and intellectual reform of justice institutions and law enforcement (the police), which are its instruments. The pillar of justice is one of the most critical foundations of the modern civil state, alongside access to knowledge through education and culture.

Delayed, selective, or ineffective justice—and a citizen’s sense of injustice—is incompatible with a modern civil state. Reforming its institutions, which are the tools society uses to attain justice, requires sincere self-reflection.

A state of law and rights is built on the separation of powers and the protection of human and minority rights. Justice cannot be realized unless the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers is firmly established—and takes on its true meaning when all authorities are subject to the law. Legislation only reflects the will of the nation when it respects the rights of all citizens, and the executive branch cannot function, though it holds coercive power, without respecting laws and guarantees of citizens’ rights.

The principles of legality and constitutionality presuppose the existence of an independent and impartial judiciary. The rule of law and the judicial system play a central role in upholding and protecting both the state and its citizens.

When it comes to citizens' rights, it's not only about procedural rights—such as the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial court established by law and operating under clear legal procedures—but also about inviolable rights that must not be compromised, even in emergencies. These include the right to be free from torture and degrading treatment, protection from enforced disappearance, and protection from arbitrary detention.

A dangerous confusion has arisen between the concepts of a “strong state” and a “tyrannical state.” This confusion has led some institutions to equate state strength with oppression and to believe that democracy weakens the state. They fail to realize that democracy demands a state strong enough to protect democracy itself and to establish justice through security.

A strong state also means a strong police force, as it is the arm of the state in enforcing the law. It also means strong administrative institutions, measured by their modernization and ability to keep pace with the times. That requires purging these institutions of the remnants of authoritarian ideologies deeply embedded in them, often without acknowledgement. This can only be achieved by cleansing the laws and provisions that enable and protect tyranny and raising these institutions' scientific and professional standards.

Some may say that the independence of the judiciary is already enshrined in past and present constitutions, but I emphasize here the need for actual, not just nominal, independence. The real issue is that the constitutional philosophy—and our understanding of it—is not clearly recognized within some sectors of the executive branch.

While judges, lawyers, and prosecutors are entitled to the same human rights as all citizens, they deserve special protection because they guarantee others’ rights. If judges cannot freely assess facts and apply the law, both nationally and internationally, the judicial system itself becomes arbitrary. If lawyers cannot freely communicate with their clients, the principle of equality of arms—and the right to a fair trial—will be compromised.

Yet, the special protection granted to judges, prosecutors, and lawyers also imposes special responsibilities. The principle of judicial independence does not grant them the right to exceed their authority for personal gain or to violate individuals’ rights. Judges must not rule based on ideological or religious whims, but according to facts and their legal characterization.

Judge Hassan Al-Badrawi once noted that from the establishment of Egypt’s national courts in 1883 to 1994, all changes to the judiciary were quantitative—enhancing performance, yes, but lacking in the qualitative transformations now urgently required.

Quantitative changes have not alleviated the burdens on the judiciary. These burdens have grown more rapidly than the performance improvements, and the gap is widening even on a purely numerical basis.

Let me shift from generalities to the application of justice in a specific domain: the economy.

Throughout modern history, Egypt has undergone profound economic and social transformations — typically through legislation.

The country moved from an agricultural system based on large land ownership and integrated with the British economy, to a nascent agrarian-industrial model, to a purely capitalist system, then to a centralized, state-controlled economy that marginalized private ownership.

Later, it transitioned again to a new capitalist system embracing both public sector retention and global market integration through privatization.

Opting for a free and open economy aligns with Egypt’s recent experience and global circumstances, particularly given Egypt’s geostrategic position. It also resonates deeply with the Egyptian personality, which values individual labor and its rewards. Yet the same personality, shaped by 7,000 years of centralized government, still expects a role for the state in the economic sphere.

I envision a meaningful role for the state within the framework of social liberalism, as affirmed by the constitution, not a role in direct economic activity, but in guiding, enabling, regulating, and protecting it.

We must simultaneously empower individual economic activity to reduce the state’s direct economic role. This means simplifying procedures, relying more on post-activity inspection and audits rather than pre-approvals, leveraging tax and customs exemptions to encourage investment, playing an active role in developing economic information systems, and re-evaluating judicial operations to prepare them for the future in structure, assessment, and technology. It also means revisiting legislation based on outdated philosophies and connecting all these reforms to the idea that justice has economic value in society.

Because economic freedom and individual entrepreneurship are the ideals to pursue, all legal barriers undermining that freedom must be removed. Therefore, we must ensure speed and efficiency in resolving economic cases, prevent the state from pressuring or intimidating business owners for political gain, and enhance arbitration institutions to overcome Egypt’s current shortcomings and align with global standards.

If legislation aims to promote this economic orientation, it must eliminate all administrative obstacles that precede economic activity—obstacles that encourage petty corruption and sap business owners' confidence and investment plans.

Thus, clearer and more concise legal code would allow more citizens to internalize and accept it in good faith. We saw this clearly with Egypt’s tax law before 2011, a successful experience abandoned later for political reasons, despite the mutual trust it fostered between taxpayers and the state.

For centuries, suspicion and caution have marked the relationship between citizens and the state. This attitude was reflected in laws that addressed citizens with a tone of distrust. Today, we must strip our legislation of that tone and rebuild it on a foundation of respect for citizens and trust in them.

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