An examination of the developments that have unfolded on the Syrian political scene since the fall of former president Bashar Al-Assad in December, especially the emergence of violence targeting members of minority groups, whether doctrinal or ethnic, compels us to pause and seriously examine the implications of these events.
Whether this violence has occurred under the guise of “revenge” or “retaliation” for suffering under the former regime, as some have said by way of attempting justification for the attacks against the Alawites, or whether it has come in response to incitement based on extremist ideologies targeting sectarian minorities such as the Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis, or whether it has been fuelled by mobilisation under the slogan of preserving the unity of the state, as seen in incidents regarding the Kurds, these developments urge us to consider carefully what might lie ahead if the escalation continues, not only for Syria but also for the entire Arab world, particularly the Levant and Fertile Crescent.
To begin with, let us agree that plans for sectarian fragmentation have always been present in the minds of the various powers that have sought to colonise the Arab world both in the past and the present or those seeking to control its resources and to intervene in its internal affairs. This was seen during the mediaeval Crusades and the Mongol invasions and later with the successive waves of European colonialism.
The same strategy has been adopted by some non-Arab states in the Middle East and by some major international players that continue to seek control over the Arab world and its wealth in attempts to steer its course in ways that serve their interests. These powers aim to thwart any factors of integration or unity, whether within the Arab world at large or within its countries, as such unity does not align with their goals.
Therefore, it is necessary, whether from a national, pan-Arab, or Islamic civilisational perspective, to firmly oppose any call, regardless of its justification, that promotes incitement against any sect that forms an integral and inseparable part of the national social fabric of any Arab state. These groups have made valuable contributions to the development of Arab-Islamic civilisation throughout history. They are an inseparable part of their societies and have played vital roles in their advancement and have defended their homelands against foreign invasions and occupations. They have consistently rejected overtures from hostile regional or international powers offering them “protection” from their fellow citizens with whom they share a homeland, history, culture, customs, traditions, and a common destiny.
However, while many of these minority groups have historically refused to become instruments of foreign powers or to act as fifth columns to facilitate internal fragmentation within the Arab world or its individual countries, and while they have declined to undermine the unity and territorial integrity of their countries, one must remain realistic. If these communities feel that their very existence is being targeted by factions within their societies, particularly by those belonging to the majority, and that their continued survival is at risk, they may cling to any apparent lifeline offered by a foreign actor.
It should not be forgotten that some of these minority groups, when subjected earlier in history to attacks and incitement by Arab governments or political forces, particularly during the peak of some pan-Arab nationalist movements that occasionally lacked awareness, foresight, and inclusivity, have at times aligned, or even formed alliances, with regional or international forces hostile to Arab interests.
This scenario must not be allowed to repeat itself today. However, the danger now stems from those expressing hostility towards these groups from the standpoint of certain Salafi, fundamentalist, or jihadist Sunni Islamic perspectives, which lack broad vision and deviate from the true, comprehensive, and civilisational essence of Islam. The progress of this during its golden ages was contributed to by non-Muslim minorities and certainly by non-Sunni and non-Arab doctrinal and linguistic groups.
Thus, immense responsibility now lies on the shoulders of various actors during this crucial and highly sensitive phase, which bears warning signs for Syria and potentially also for other Arab countries, especially in the Asian part of the Arab Mashreq. The danger is that these could slide into the quagmire of sectarian conflict, which would bring no benefit to any Arab or non-Arab constituent of the national fabric of the Arab countries, including those who are not Arabs or not Muslims.
The only beneficiaries would be those regional and international actors who harbour ill will towards the future of the Arab countries and their peoples, both Arab and non-Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim, whether as individual states or collectively as the Arab world.
On the Arab side, the Syrian authorities and the governments of neighbouring Arab Levantine states, all of which include religious, ethnic, doctrinal, and linguistic diversity, some of which overlaps with communities in Syria, bear the responsibility to adopt policies, measures, and public messaging that clearly reassure all these communities that they are integral parts of their countries, peoples, histories, cultures, present realities, and future destinies.
It is crucial that these reassurances include serious security measures to protect these communities and ensure the safety of their members, families, and property, and see them as equal citizens with the same rights and duties as other citizens of Syria or the other Arab countries. This must go hand in hand with applying the law equally to all, and taking firm action, in accordance with the law, against any individual or group, under any pretext, that commits violence against members of these communities or threatens their lives.
Simultaneously, it is essential to get rid of foreign fighters who are not citizens of these countries. These have multiplied since the wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and elsewhere, during which people of many nationalities were recruited to fight under jihadist slogans. Their presence in the Levant increased after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent power vacuum and chaos and further increased during the Syrian conflict that erupted during the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011.
This must be accompanied by the launch of broad national dialogues that exclude no group, except those who use violence and weapons against their fellow citizens. Launching such dialogues is a core responsibility of governments, and they should enable each participating group to express its fears, demands, aspirations, and the basis of its positions. Such dialogue can strengthen national unity and peacefully resolve differences within a united, civilised, and democratic framework.
However, the responsibility for these national dialogues should not be limited to governments. Arab intellectuals, and not only Syrians, must play a central role, along with both the traditional and new media and relevant civil society organisations, in supporting and promoting these national dialogues to ensure their seriousness, effectiveness, and meaningful outcomes.
This support should align with the model of an inclusive national state that guarantees rights to all its citizens on the basis of citizenship and law regardless of their religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other affiliations.
The writer is a diplomat and commentator.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 15 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: