File photo of US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2020. AFP
In his well-known book The Holocaust Industry (2000), American scholar Norman Finkelstein shows how the memory of the great Jewish tragedy has been turned into a political tool used to justify unwavering US support for Israel.
This has been the case particularly since 1967, when Israel demonstrated its ability to protect Western interests in the Middle East, in contrast to the weak and defeated Arab regimes.
However, this equation has begun to erode in recent years, reaching its peak during the first presidency of Donald Trump, who did not hesitate to redefine alliances based on a simple principle of “who pays more?”
He made his first foreign visit in his first presidential term not to Tel Aviv, but to Riyadh on 17 May 2017, where deals worth hundreds of billions were struck.
Trump openly expressed the shifting American mood when he said that his country spent billions on Israel but got nothing in return, while the Gulf states were pumping in money and creating jobs.
But now the question arises: has the “Israeli exception” ended? And does Trump’s current visit to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar mark a decisive turning point in this equation?
In this highly anticipated visit, the dimensions go beyond improving trade or economic relations between the United States and the Gulf states; they extend to outlining new strategic alliances in the region.
The Gulf states, historically seen as countries that need American protection, have today become the providers of economic protection to the US through massive investments and job creation and the pivotal role they play in global energy security. These shifts make it difficult for Israel to continue to be considered the exclusive protector of American interests in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement, “if we have to stand alone, we will stand alone,” raises questions. Can they do so? It reflects a deep Israeli concern about the erosion of its status as an “exceptional ally.” Clearly, Israel is beginning to feel that the full and free support of the West is no longer guaranteed in the global alliance equation. The Gulf states, once considered potential adversaries, have today become key partners in energy security, the arms trade, and global market stability.
The new Middle East we see unfolding today is being reshaped according to a clear economic logic: who offers tangible returns? Countries that were once under the umbrella of guaranteed American protection are now establishing their own ties, which may diminish Israel’s traditional role as the cornerstone of American security in the region.
The question now is: can Israel still market itself as the sole protector of American interests in the region? Or has that protection now become measured not by historical positions but by economic contributions and investment innovations?
We may not be at the end of the “Israeli exception” just yet, but it is clear that this exception is now more vulnerable to challenge, as the balance of power in the region adapts to new realities.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 15 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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