During his visit to the Saudi capital Riyadh on 13 May, US President Donald Trump unexpectedly announced the suspension of US sanctions on Syria.
Washington had been widely anticipated to maintain the sanctions until it had verified the full implementation of a set of conditions it conveyed to Damascus several weeks earlier. However, Saudi Arabia appears to have played a role in assuring the US of Syria’s commitment to the conditions, expediting the lifting of the sanctions and allowing the beginning of reconstruction.
The decision to lift the sanctions was announced a day after a meeting between Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Syrian Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa in Riyadh, in addition to a call between Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
It reflects Turkish and Saudi efforts to secure US acceptance of recent changes in Syria, especially the acceptance of Al-Sharaa as interim president.
Though Al-Sharaa had been listed on US terrorist lists for years under his former name of Abu Mohamed Al-Golani, with a $10 million bounty for information leading to his capture, his recent ideological transformation appears to have persuaded Ankara and Riyadh of his suitability for Syria’s leadership, and the two capitals were also able to convince Washington to accept him.
The suspension of US sanctions is a significant gain for Syria and shows what Syria’s allies can offer to protect it. Earlier speculation had suggested that sanctions relief, introduced in January, would be revisited no earlier than the end of summer, following the expiration of the current measures and a reassessment of the new Syrian leadership.
Earlier US demands delivered to the Syrian Foreign Minister at the Brussels Donor Conference in March had also suggested that the evaluation process would be both long and complex.
Trump’s decision to lift the sanctions implies that Washington has accepted Saudi Arabia’s guarantees regarding the new Syrian administration and has agreed to a phased implementation of the US conditions.
There were also concerns that the sanctions would continue to serve as leverage to pressure Damascus into entering an unjust peace process that favours Israel, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had reportedly counted on this to preserve Israel’s influence in southern Syria and prolong its pressure on Damascus through the threat of prolonging the sanctions.
However, the lifting of the sanctions now liberates Syria from the constraints of remaining under Israeli hegemony or accepting an unjust peace merely to attain US endorsement. Trump appears to be more aligned with Turkey’s vision for Syria’s future, one that bolsters the Damascus government’s capacity to reinforce security, stability, and unity.
The step may thus be interpreted as a diplomatic setback for Israel, which failed to prolong the US sanctions on Syria or marginalise its new administration.
Israel may have quickly announced the acquisition of Syria’s official archive on the Israeli spy Eli Cohen to promote an intelligence triumph against the backdrop of a diplomatic loss concerning the lifting of sanctions on Syria. Cohen, who infiltrated the Syrian political elite during the 1960s and relayed critical intelligence on Syrian military positions in the Golan Heights, was ultimately discovered and executed in Damascus in 1965. Despite longstanding Israeli demands for the return of his remains, successive Syrian governments have consistently refused.
Some observers say that the lifting of the US sanctions did not come without a cost, though the full extent of it has yet to be revealed. White House Press Attaché Caroline Levitt tweeted on X that Washington’s conditions included the expulsion of foreign fighters, particularly Palestinians, from Syrian territory, collaboration with the US to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State (IS) group, and the assumption of responsibility for IS detention centres in the country’s northeast.
Syria’s joining of the so-called “Abraham Accords” was also a point of discussion. Trump urged Al-Sharaa during their meeting to pursue a peace agreement with Israel, and dialogue around a potential Syrian-Israeli peace initiative may gain traction, especially in the light of statements by Al-Sharaa that Damascus has no intention of threatening its neighbours, including Israel.
The recent Syrian Presidential decrees establishing a National Commission for Transitional Justice and a National Commission for Missing Persons signal a move towards institutionalising transitional justice and preventing sectarian retaliation in Syria, such as the attacks on Alawite communities in the country in March.
These measures aim to address crimes by both former regime figures and extremist factions beyond government control. Syria’s protection of minorities and its judicial processes will now be monitored, and this may influence the removal of Al-Sharaa and others from terrorism watchlists.
However, the success of these efforts largely hinges on Al-Sharaa’s commitment to holding accountable hardline factions among his supporters and groups that espouse a more rigid stance than Al-Sharaa himself. Achieving this will require a delicate balancing act, since it was precisely these fighters who helped him ascend to power.
Meanwhile, the lifting of the US sanctions is likely to take some time and is contingent on US Congressional approval, especially because some of the sanctions, such as those imposed under the US Caesar Act, have already undergone legislative ratification and therefore must be subjected to a similar process for their repeal.
While improvements in Syria’s economy are unlikely to be immediate as a result of the lifting of the sanctions, potentially requiring six to 12 months to manifest tangible benefits in living conditions, Damascus appears to be on the right track.
The most urgent priority remains the reconstruction of Syria’s devastated towns and villages, a critical prerequisite for enabling the return of Syrian refugees who have sought refuge for years in neighbouring countries and Europe.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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