At dawn on 7 October 2023, the dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict underwent a transformation that defied expectations. That day was not merely the start of another confrontation between Hamas and Israel, but a seismic political and military shift that reshaped the region’s landscape.
As Hamas launched the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, long-standing equations of power began to unravel, opening the door to a phase of regional and international recalibration.
For Hamas, 7 October represented more than a military operation; it was a strategic declaration to break the blockade and reassert its central role in the Palestinian political arena after years of isolation, division, and declining influence. Yet Israel’s massive response and the ensuing war in Gaza turned that moment into a defining juncture in the movement’s path, marking a transition from strength and ascendancy to vulnerability and redefinition.
In this context, it is essential to examine Hamas’ trajectory before 7 October and to analyse its objectives and calculations during and after the operation, especially in the light of the two-year aftermath of the war.
Equally significant is assessing the war’s implications for Hamas’ internal organisation and political-military positioning, while projecting its future amid evolving realities, particularly following the peace plan announced by US President Donald Trump in September, which could reshape Hamas’ role within the broader Palestinian scene.
Following Israel’s occupation of Gaza in 1967 and its withdrawal in 2005, the territory underwent a series of political and military transformations that shaped the trajectory of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Hamas, founded in 1987 during the First Intifada under the banner of “liberating Palestine from the river to the sea,” gradually rose to prominence, combining armed resistance with social and religious activism.
In 2006, the results of the Palestinian legislative elections triggered a sharp confrontation with the mainstream Palestinian group Fatah, culminating in Hamas’ full takeover of Gaza in 2007. Since then, the movement has functioned as the de facto governing authority, simultaneously managing civilian affairs and maintaining an armed resistance posture and arrangement that positioned it at the centre of Gaza’s political and security landscape.
Hamas consolidated its rule through a network of administrative and security institutions, supported by strong grassroots influence. Regionally, it aligned itself with the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran and Hizbullah, while sustaining close relations with Qatar and Turkey in partnerships that provided crucial financial and political backing.
Militarily, Hamas developed its armed wing, the Izzeddin Al-Qassam Brigades, into a structured and increasingly capable force with advanced rocket, drone, and tunnel systems. Between 2008 and 2023, these capabilities enabled repeated confrontations with Israel, reflecting a notable degree of operational sophistication.
However, the relative stability achieved in Gaza gradually eroded. Since 2017, deepening tensions with the Palestinian Authority (PA), deteriorating ties with several Arab states, and the wave of normalisation agreements with Israel left Hamas politically isolated. Although it maintained links with Iran, Qatar, and Turkey, these relationships remained confined and did not translate into broader regional legitimacy.
By 2023, Hamas operated within a narrow geographic and political sphere governing Gaza but excluded from formal Palestinian and Arab political frameworks. Its pre-7 October strategy focused on quiet consolidation and gradual military buildup, balancing governance with armed resistance.
Yet, this equilibrium was fragile, undermined by economic hardship, blockade, and political stagnation. Against this backdrop of isolation and frustration, the conditions were ripe for escalation, culminating in the events of 7 October which marked a strategic turning point in the movement’s trajectory.
On the morning of 7 October 2023, Hamas launched a large-scale and surprise attack on Israel, which it named “Al-Aqsa Flood.”
The operation began with the firing of thousands of rockets at various areas in southern and central Israel, alongside the infiltration of hundreds of fighters through the fortified security barrier into Israeli settlements and military sites. It resulted in the killing of around 1,200 people and the capture of more than 200 hostages, and it was marked by a high level of strategic surprise, as Hamas succeeded in concealing its preparations from Israeli intelligence for years, taking advantage of Israel’s political divisions and internal crisis at the time.
The attack is considered to be one of the most coordinated and complex in the movement’s history, given its multi-dimensional nature that combined massive rocket barrages, ground assaults, and cyber intrusions. While interpretations of the motives vary, a deeper reading suggests that Hamas was operating under a dual strategy: a military dimension, centred on surprise and deep penetration to break Israeli deterrence and deliver a symbolic blow to the prestige of the Israeli army; and a political dimension, aimed at repositioning the movement as an indispensable actor in any future regional or Palestinian arrangements, thereby breaking out of the political isolation it had faced for years.
From a military perspective, Hamas’ strategy during the war has relied on guerrilla warfare tactics rather than direct conventional confrontation. The movement has depended on a complex network of tunnels, enhanced rocket fire capabilities, and manoeuvre operations within densely populated urban areas, taking advantage of Gaza’s geography, which provides a relative defensive edge.
Hamas has also adopted field flexibility tactics, including redeployment, rotation of fighters, and the efficient use of limited resources, in an effort to prolong the confrontation and exhaust Israeli forces politically and psychologically, thereby preventing a decisive victory.
On the political level, Hamas has pursued an approach aimed at turning the conflict into a broader regional and international crisis, aimed at bringing the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the global agenda after years of marginalisation. The movement has also wagered that the continuation of the war would lead to rifts within the Israeli government and place its allies in an increasingly difficult position before international public opinion, especially amid growing criticism of Israel’s military campaign in global forums.
However, the Israeli response has been severe and comprehensive, involving intensive aerial and artillery bombardment and expanded ground operations, which destroyed most of Hamas’ military capabilities and infrastructure, as well as the erosion of its civilian support base in Gaza. It can be said that Hamas’ strategy combined shocking military action with calculated political manoeuvering, aiming to assert a renewed presence within the overall balance of the conflict.
Nearly two years after the war’s outbreak, Hamas finds itself in a complex phase of strategic reassessment and organisational restructuring.
The movement has endured significant setbacks on both the military and political fronts. A substantial number of its senior leaders inside and outside Gaza have been killed, including Yahya Al-Sinwar, Mohamed Deif, Marwan Issa, and Ismail Haniyeh, resulting in a leadership vacuum and the disruption of command continuity.
Much of Hamas’ military infrastructure and tunnel network, once the backbone of its defensive strategy, has been dismantled. As Israeli operations intensified, the movement lost operational control over most areas of the Gaza Strip.
On the societal level, the toll has been devastating: tens of thousands have been killed or injured, vast portions of infrastructure and residential areas have been destroyed, and unprecedented displacement waves have severely weakened Hamas’ social base, which had long served as a cornerstone of its resilience.
Despite these losses, Hamas has emerged from the war with limited yet symbolically significant political gains. The 7 October operation reignited global and regional attention to the Palestinian cause after years of marginalisation and demonstrated Hamas’ continued capacity to initiate and influence events despite the asymmetry in power. The movement also garnered increased political support from certain regional actors who advocated for an end to the war and the reconstruction of Gaza.
Moreover, Hamas’ symbolic stature grew among segments of Palestinian and Arab public opinion, where it was once again perceived as the standard-bearer of resistance particularly amid the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, which generated widespread sympathy.
In the light of these developments, Hamas can be said to have achieved a “limited symbolic and strategic success” in reaffirming its identity as a resistance movement, even as it has lost much of the structural and political foundations that previously underpinned its strength.
It now faces a dual challenge: rebuilding its internal organisational framework and regaining the trust of a war-weary Gazan population, while also contending with newly emerging armed factions hostile to its leadership, some of which have reportedly received backing from Israel.
Nevertheless, the ideological foundation of Hamas centred on armed resistance and the rejection of occupation continues to provide it with a measure of resilience and influence, even as its military capabilities have been severely diminished.
Looking ahead, the aftermath of 7 October marks a decisive turning point in Hamas’ trajectory. The movement appears to be undergoing a profound strategic transformation, shifting from a governing authority within Gaza to a more decentralised resistance network.
By relying on its social and civil structures, Hamas may continue to exert indirect influence on Palestinian public life even without formal power. Yet, this transition reflects a deeper recalibration of its identity: from a hybrid political-military actor to a movement redefining itself through resilience, adaptation, and covert resistance.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 9 October, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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