Last Friday, as the anticipated Budapest Summit between Russia and the United States promised a comprehensive end to the war, a single phone call between top diplomats from the two nations was enough to derail the plans. The hopes of Ukrainians longing to end their suffering now entering its third year were dealt a heavy blow.
According to Reuters, after Trump and Putin agreed to meet in the Hungarian capital to discuss ending Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a memo to Washington reiterating the same demands to address what Putin calls the “root causes” of his invasion — including territorial concessions, a significant reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces, and guarantees that it will never join NATO.
Russia’s objectives are clear: to establish and control a buffer zone. The concept of buffer zones has become increasingly common, particularly in the Middle East, where the geostrategic purpose is to secure a state’s vital depth. However, it is important to note that eastern Ukraine — now often referred to as the “Russian crescent” — is not merely a buffer zone. It is a region rich in natural resources, including coal, iron, manganese, and rare earth minerals, as well as exceptionally fertile soil ideal for wheat cultivation.
One of Russia’s stated justifications has been the protection and unification of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, who are predominantly concentrated in the east. Taken together, these factors make it highly unlikely that Russia will agree to relinquish eastern Ukraine in any potential settlement.
The Financial Times reported the US then cancelled the summit following a call between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, after which Rubio told Trump that Moscow was showing no willingness to negotiate.
On the same day, CNN reported the Pentagon had given the White House the green light to provide Ukraine with long-range Tomahawk missiles, after assessing that it would not negatively impact US stockpiles, leaving the final political decision in Trump’s hands.
The Tomahawk missile is a highly effective weapon, combining long-range capabilities with lethal precision to strike targets over a distance exceeding 1,000 miles. Traditionally launched from US Navy destroyers and battleships, the missile has recently gained a new deployment platform: a mobile ground-based system known as Typhon. This unique missile system is capable of launching offensive weapons like the Tomahawk and other cruise missiles, while simultaneously firing naval air-defence missiles such as the SM-6 and SM-3. Notably, those same missiles were used repeatedly this year by the US Navy to intercept Iranian missile attacks targeting Israel.
Ukraine has persistently sought to acquire the Typhon system following the disappointing performance of its long-range cruise missile, the Flamingo, which had been heavily promoted as a potential game-changer. In fact, obtaining Tomahawk missiles aligns perfectly with the Ukrainian military’s overarching strategy: avoiding direct confrontation with Russian ground forces and instead focusing on identifying and striking command centres and logistical lines that support frontline units.
This approach also targets Russian reserves positioned in the rear, aiming to isolate and encircle forward-deployed troops. Since the outset of the conflict, this strategy has proven effective — particularly through the extensive use of HIMARS missile systems, which played a key role in thwarting the attempted capture of Kyiv, in coordination with Ukraine’s elite ALPHA special forces and TB-2 drones. In response, Russia has adapted by relocating its command hubs and primary logistical routes further from the front lines to minimise losses. This shift has compelled Ukraine to seek munitions that combine long-range reach with high destructive impact.
The current situation raises a critical question: How many Tomahawk missiles will Ukraine to effectively carry out its strategic objectives? Given the limited number of launch platforms within the US military and the unlikely prospect of Washington supplying Ukraine with a large stockpile of these missiles, the answer is far from straightforward.
It is important to note that the Typhon system — designed primarily for countering Chinese threats in the Pacific — was never intended for mass deployment in Eastern Europe. The decision to transfer Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine may therefore be better understood as a political signal in response to Russia’s hardline demands, rather than a tactical shift aimed at altering battlefield dynamics.
In reality, the sheer volume of high-value targets across Russian-controlled territory would require hundreds of Tomahawk missiles to neutralise effectively. Such a scale of deployment is improbable through incremental transfers alone. Moreover, Ukraine may seek to repurpose the Typhon platforms not just for offensive strikes, but also to bolster its air defences — particularly against Russia’s newer, harder-to-intercept missile systems. This dual-use potential underscores Ukraine’s urgent need for long-range, high-impact munitions, but also highlights the limitations of relying solely on symbolic transfers to achieve strategic breakthroughs.
Ukraine’s core dilemma remains its inability to exert sufficient pressure on Russia to shift its negotiating stance or ease its demands — despite the immense efforts and sacrifices made by Ukrainian forces. Bold operations such as temporary incursions into Kursk and Belgorod, as well as the dual counteroffensives in eastern Ukraine, have generated media impact and showcased tactical ingenuity in modern warfare. Yet they have not translated into strategic leverage capable of becoming Russia’s Achilles’ heel. Moscow has consistently adapted to Ukrainian tactics, gradually regaining control by capitalising on several advantages, including North Korean support, rapid industrial output, and efficient replenishment of equipment and munitions.
On the other hand, last week marked a significant breakthrough by Russian forces in the Pokrovsk area, involving 27,000 troops, 100 tanks, and 260 armoured vehicles. This city holds strategic importance for Ukraine, having served as one of the key fortified positions obstructing Russia’s advance in the Donetsk region. The assault and subsequent encirclement attempt reflect a major shift in Russian battlefield tactics. Rather than relying on large-scale frontal assaults, Russian units now infiltrate in small groups, regroup behind enemy lines, and launch multi-directional attacks on Ukrainian positions from the rear. This method causes defensive collapse and opens breaches that allow rapid reinforcement and expansion by Russian forces—turning tactical innovation into territorial gain.
The Russia-Ukraine war stands out as a uniquely instructive conflict, offering valuable lessons to nations around the world. Both sides demonstrate a deep understanding of each other, shaping their future strategies accordingly. This dynamic was evident in President Zelensky’s remarks last week urging European nations to secure sustained financial support for Ukraine, which is likely to remain engaged in the war for another two to three years.
On the other hand, Russia has already ramped up its munitions production, particularly its daily deployment of loitering munitions, or “suicide drones,” which have become a persistent and disruptive threat to Ukrainian defences. By launching these drones in swarms across Ukrainian territory and cities, Moscow has adopted a cost-effective attrition strategy aimed at exhausting Ukraine’s air defence systems and forcing resource depletion.
The conclusion can only be that the war is unlikely to end soon. The conflict will continue in its familiar rhythm, with both sides adapting and recalibrating. Washington, meanwhile, will closely monitor Russia’s reaction to deep strikes carried out by Ukraine using long-range missiles — watching for any potential shift in Moscow’s stance.
Ukraine, for its part, will seek to maximise the impact of its limited arsenal, using each missile with strategic precision in hopes of pushing Russia back to the negotiating table.
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