Phase II: The urgent need for regional de-confliction

Ezzat Ibrahim
Saturday 15 Nov 2025

A strategy of regional de-confliction is the key to bringing about peace in the region – not by establishing it overnight, but by keeping the door open to it.

 

The war in Gaza has left behind ruins, grief, and a dangerous sense that nothing is truly over. Even if the guns were to fall silent tomorrow, the Middle East would still be sitting on a powder keg.

The region faces a hard choice: slip into another round of revenge and proxy wars, or begin what might be called a “second phase” – a stage where not only Gaza but the whole region starts a serious process of de-confliction, a simple idea that means keeping crises from turning into new wars.

This is not a peace plan or a lofty ideal. It is the quiet, practical work of avoiding mistakes that cost lives.

In diplomacy and the military, de-confliction means setting up rules, hotlines, and communication channels so that forces sharing the same territory do not collide. It is the difference between control and chaos. In a region where one drone flying over Southern Lebanon can trigger a week of rockets, or one misidentified ship in the Red Sea can shake global trade, such coordination is no longer optional. It is a matter of survival.

Recent reports from Washington and Beirut show how urgent such de-confliction has become. According to Reuters, the United States is pushing for a diplomatic solution to prevent a wider conflict between Israel and Hizbullah, warning that a full-scale war would be “catastrophic.” Hizbullah said this week that “Lebanon is bound by the ceasefire,” leaving the door open for quiet understandings even without official talks.

Yet, Israeli airstrikes continue in the south of the country, and border families keep fleeing their homes as proof that the truce is fragile. The international NGO the International Crisis Group summed it up simply by saying that the truce was “vital, but insufficient.” The guns may have paused, but the logic of war continues.

That is why the next stage in bringing about peace must be regional. Focusing only on Gaza is an illusion. The Middle East now behaves like one connected battlefield, and one in which when one front heats up, another reacts. What happens in Gaza echoes in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The UK newspaper the Financial Times has quoted Israeli officials warning of the dangers of Iran-aligned groups in Lebanon and Yemen, for example, showing how local sparks can ignite regional fires.

De-confliction is not a substitute for diplomacy; it is the ground on which diplomacy can stand. It turns fragile ceasefires into predictable systems and gives all sides room to step back from the edge. To make it work, three things are needed: genuine communication channels to manage incidents; incentives that make calm more rewarding than confrontation; and steady coordination among regional mediators.

The first step is to build reliable channels of communication. On the northern front, a 24-hour coordination cell linking Israeli, Lebanese, and UN officers and with Egyptian participation could manage hotlines, define “no-strike” zones around hospitals and schools, and monitor airspace. The goal would not be instant peace, but predictability.

In the Red Sea, where Houthi drones and missiles have threatened shipping, a maritime safety system could organise signals and convoy routes and the quick investigation of incidents. None of this would grant legitimacy to anyone, but it would replace confusion with order. Each day without a clash is a small victory for restraint.

The second step is to link these rules to real rewards. No one chooses calm for its own sake. If cross-border fire in Lebanon recedes, reconstruction projects and energy support can resume. If shipping in the Red Sea remains safe for three months, some trade restrictions on Yemen could ease. If Gaza’s ceasefire holds, rebuilding funds should be released transparently under Arab and international supervision. The message must be clear: calm brings gains, escalation brings losses.

The third step is cooperation among regional brokers. Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, Turkey, and the Gulf states, together with the UN, the US, and the EU, must stay in constant contact. The Sharm El-Sheikh Summit that helped secure the Gaza ceasefire proved that such coordination can work. The challenge now is to make it permanent through regular meetings, shared data on incidents, and what the UK think tank Chatham House has called “revolving-door diplomacy” – quiet, continuous engagement instead of one-off headline summits.

This regional approach also has a strategic logic. The region’s crises are intertwined. Escalation in Lebanon reshapes Gaza’s politics; Iranian drones affect Saudi and Emirati calculations; Red Sea instability threatens Egypt’s and Jordan’s recovery. A web of de-confliction can help manage the system as a whole and not just its explosions. Treating every war as separate guarantees that none of them will end.

For Egypt, this strategy fits naturally with its wider role in the region. Cairo borders both Gaza and the Red Sea and keeps channels open with nearly every player. It is uniquely placed to host a regional de-confliction group, coordinate maritime safety, and supervise aid and ceasefire monitoring. Egypt’s diplomacy – calm, pragmatic, and institutional – matches this task. What it requires is patience and skill, not ideology.

Some critics argue that de-confliction freezes injustice. But this ignores the fact that it should be seen as a bridge and not a barrier. Peace cannot grow amid explosions. Managing crises in a technical manner gives everyone the breathing space to talk about solutions. As one report has put it, “every avoided incident strengthens a wider web of predictability.” In a region exhausted by constant shocks, predictability itself is a moral good and one that keeps people alive long enough to debate justice.

Others say that many actors benefit from confusion and that militias and governments alike hide behind the fog of war. But that is exactly why de-confliction matters since it introduces clarity where trust is missing. A hotline between enemies is not friendship; it is responsibility. Once communication exists, accidents become rarer and deliberate escalation becomes riskier.

If this approach takes root, progress will come quietly. In Southern Lebanon, families could return home as the border calms. In Gaza, aid trucks could move freely, and reconstruction would begin. In the Red Sea, insurance costs would fall as threats fade. In Cairo, Doha, and Amman, regional contact groups could meet regularly, even without fanfare. Real stability is measured by silence and by the absence of breaking news.

The alternative is all too familiar: one mistaken missile or one misread radar signal could trigger a chain reaction pulling in Iran, Israel, Hizbullah, the United States, and the Gulf. As Reuters has warned, the region is on a “countdown to war” unless it steps back from the brink. De-confliction is that step back. It does not promise peace overnight, but it keeps the door open to it.

The lesson of the past year is simple. The Middle East will not find stability through ideology or sheer force. It needs habits and the daily routine of talking, coordinating, and holding fire. Every hotline, every shared air route, every agreed maritime signal helps build those habits. De-confliction is how the region can learn to live with itself without tearing itself apart.

People in this region deserve to live normal lives with quiet streets, predictable days, and nights without warning sirens. The most radical idea today may also be the simplest: that no one fires first, that every army knows where the other stands, and that every capital answers the telephone before the next explosion.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 November, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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