A Syrian president crossed the threshold of the White House in Washington this week with the visit of Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to the US capital for a meeting with US President Donald Trump.
Since the birth of the Syrian Republic in the 1940s, not a single leader from Damascus had set foot in those storied halls. For decades, the chasm between Washington and Damascus has run too deep to bridge, and paradoxically no one has appeared less destined for such a visit than Al-Sharaa, a man once branded as a wanted terrorist and now the first Syrian head of state to be hosted by an American president.
Al-Sharaa’s visit came without fanfare, however. In a gesture that underscored the conditional nature of American diplomacy, he was ushered through a side entrance, away from the cameras and the ritual handshake on the White House steps. There was no press conference, no joint statement, and only the faintest hints of what transpired behind closed doors.
When the meeting ended, Al-Sharaa emerged alone, stepping into the cool Washington air to greet a small crowd of Syrian nationals gathered beyond the gates. His subdued reception reflected the reality that recognition at the White House is never freely granted and that unspoken compromises still wait to be sealed.
Al-Sharaa’s chief aim in Washington was clear: to push for the lifting of the sanctions strangling Syria’s economy and to secure Western investment and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-backed loans to jump-start recovery.
Yet, when the talks concluded, his tangible gains were modest. The White House merely extended the suspension of existing sanctions, first paused in May, for another 180 days.
What Al-Sharaa had truly sought was far more ambitious: a full repeal of the Caesar Act sanctions against Syria. But that decision lies not in the hands of Trump, but with Congress, leaving the Syrian Transitional Government facing a long and uncertain road before such a step becomes conceivable.
American officials, meanwhile, focused on the different agenda of drawing Syria into the fight against the Islamic State (IS) group, encouraging its participation in the Abraham Accords, and laying the groundwork for a US-brokered security pact between Syria and Israel.
Few details emerged from the discussions. The only confirmed outcome was Syria’s commitment to join the international coalition against IS.
Even so, the Trump-Al-Sharaa meeting marks a defining moment for the Arab world and the broader Middle East and an inflection point that could reshape the region’s strategic landscape. Its potential impact may prove as consequential as the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, when the United States effectively pulled Baghdad out of the opposing camp.
Now, Syria appears to be undergoing a similar transformation, stepping away from the axis of resistance, aligning with the Western sphere, and integrating into an emerging American-Israeli security framework.
The immediate repercussions of this realignment remain uncertain. On the one hand, it could usher in unprecedented international backing, providing the guarantees necessary to ensure a stable transition within Syria. But on the other hand, the risks are equally evident. Al-Sharaa’s move could fracture old alliances and provoke fierce opposition, particularly from jihadist factions in Syria who view any accommodation with the US and Israel as a betrayal of their cause.
Should Al-Sharaa succeed, he could become the first Syrian leader of the post-war era to restore the country’s place in the international order, albeit on entirely new terms. But should he fail, Syria could once again descend into turmoil, this time into a conflict even more fragmented and unpredictable than before.
In a move widely seen as a signal of Damascus’ intention to align with the international coalition and ahead of Al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington, Syria’s transitional authorities launched what they described as a “large-scale” campaign against IS cells in Aleppo, Idlib, and the Damascus countryside.
According to the Interior Ministry, more than 61 raids were conducted, leading to 71 arrests and the seizure of weapons and ammunition.
The rapprochement with Washington and the anticipated security agreement with Israel will not only affect the relationship between the Transitional Government in Damascus and its former allies among the jihadist movements in Syria, but also its relationship with the Syrian Kurds.
While the Interim Government hopes that joining the international coalition against IS will mark the beginning of a strategic realignment and one that might gradually sideline the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and shift American military and political backing towards it, the Kurdish leaders see things differently.
They argue that the agreement strengthens, rather than diminishes, their position. The SDF leaked details indicating Damascus’ approval for the creation of three new SDF divisions in Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, and the Euphrates region covering Raqqa and Kobani, with each division including a specialised brigade dedicated to counterterrorism operations nationwide.
If these reports are true, they introduce a serious complication for Turkey. Ankara had hoped for a framework that would fold the SDF into the new Syrian army under a unified command and diluting Kurdish autonomy rather than preserving it. Instead, the emerging arrangement seems to maintain Kurdish military formations and their decentralised governance, albeit under the nominal umbrella of the Syrian state.
Reflecting Ankara’s unease, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan attended a trilateral meeting at the White House during Al-Sharaa’s visit, alongside Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
According to a statement from the Syrian Foreign Ministry, the meeting aimed “to follow up on what was agreed between presidents Ahmed Al-Sharaa and Donald Trump and to establish clear mechanisms for implementation.” The parties reportedly reaffirmed their commitment to “advance the March 10 agreement, including the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian army.”
However, the unspoken centrepiece of Al-Sharaa’s White House visit is the proposed US-brokered security agreement between Syria and Israel, alongside Damascus’ potential accession to the Abraham Accords. Both Washington and Damascus have confirmed that discussions are underway in talks that the Trump administration regards as central to its vision for a new regional security architecture.
In an interview with the US network Fox News following his meeting with Trump, Al-Sharaa said that Syria would not enter negotiations with Israel “at this time,” explaining that “the Syrian situation differs from that of the countries that have signed the Abraham Accords. We share a border with Israel, and it occupies the Golan Heights. We will not engage in direct negotiations now. Perhaps the American administration, under President Donald Trump, can help us reach that stage.”
Leaks from Israel regarding the proposed security agreement have only deepened the unease in Damascus. The draft arrangement reportedly grants Israel de facto security control over southern Syria, bans Syrian aircraft from operating in the area, and prohibits the deployment of heavy weaponry. Critics in Damascus argue that the Transitional Government lacks the mandate to commit Syria to such an accord, warning that it could endanger the nation’s unity and territorial integrity.
According to Israeli sources, the envisioned security arrangement would transform southern Syria, including Daraa, Quneitra, Suwaida, and parts of the southern Damascus countryside, into a demilitarised buffer zone designed to secure Israel’s northern frontier. This zone would be monitored by Israeli patrols and joint Israeli-US surveillance systems.
Though southern Syria accounts for about 13 per cent of the country’s territory, its strategic weight is immense. The area borders both Jordan and Israel, encompasses the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, vital vantage points for Israeli security, and contains key highways linking Damascus to the southern frontier. Economically and militarily, it is the artery of the south and home to roughly 1.5 million people. Under the proposed security deal, residents would remain under Syrian civil and legal authority.
The region would be reshaped into a tightly managed buffer zone under direct US-Israeli supervision. When a formal “security agreement” is eventually announced between Damascus and Tel Aviv, the current Israeli incursions will stand revealed as the groundwork for a new de facto border.
Damascus now finds itself manoeuvering within a post-conflict framework increasingly defined by US and Israeli security imperatives. The stakes are immense, with economic relief, international legitimacy, and reintegration into the global order being balanced precariously against the erosion of autonomy and internal fragmentation.
But whether this juncture will inaugurate a pragmatic new era of calculated engagement or simply entrench Syria in another cycle of divisions remains to be seen.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 13 November, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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