One last chance for Sudan

Asmaa Al-Husseini , Thursday 20 Nov 2025

As the war of attrition between Sudan’s adversaries escalates, humanitarian aid is becoming more scarce by the day.

One last chance for Sudan

 

The situation in Sudan grows more complicated as the fighting intensifies in the Kordofan region. Over the last few days, clashes have escalated and expanded, turning into a war of attrition between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their allies on one side, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies on the other.

Fears are growing that the prospects for peace in Sudan are diminishing. General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, commander-in-chief of the army and chairman of the Sovereignty Council, declared a state of general mobilisation and urged citizens to take up arms. The RSF, meanwhile, has not only maintained its grip over Al-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur and a strategic city, extending its control across the entire region, but also shifted its weight into neighbouring Kordofan.

Despite announcing its acceptance of a ceasefire, the RSF has continued to target multiple strategic areas with its forces and drones, to distract and overstretch army units while pushing for further territorial expansion.

The city of Al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, has been the focal point of fierce fighting. Through a rapid military operation, the SAF regained Um Dam Haj Ahmed and Kazgeil in North Kordofan, securing Al-Obeid against ground attacks. The SAF had withdrawn from these areas in late October after losing the strategic town of Bara.

The SAF also announced that it had repelled one of the fiercest RSF attacks on Babnousa in West Kordofan, targeting the headquarters of the 22nd Division. RSF forces have continued artillery strikes around the division. In a repeat of the Al-Fasher scenario, the RSF is amassing forces around Babnousa in preparation for launching a ground offensive to seize the city, which is the army’s last stronghold in West Kordofan.

Kordofan, divided into four regions or states — north, south, east, and west — links the capital, Khartoum, and central Sudan with the Darfur region, making it a hub for military supply routes.

Control over key cities such as Al-Obeid provides the controlling force with the ability to dominate supply lines towards the capital and Darfur, which has fuelled recent clashes between the SAF and RSF. The region holds strategic importance as it forms a central axis for defensive supply lines; whoever controls it gains greater leverage over routes to Khartoum and Darfur.

Kordofan, together with Darfur, accounts for 35 per cent of Sudan’s economic resources and roughly half of its land area. Babnousa is a major transport junction linking South Sudan and connecting the borders of Kordofan and Darfur to South Sudan. It appears that the RSF are seeking to regain control of Khartoum and Al-Obeid after losing them several months ago.

This comes at a time of mounting warnings from international humanitarian agencies about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Sudan and growing humanitarian needs amid escalating displacement in an increasingly dangerous environment.

The UNRWA drew attention to the despair of civilians attempting to flee the region, noting that many remain in Al-Fasher while others face obstacles in continuing their journey due to various dangers, the risk of being sent back to Al-Fasher, or the presence of vulnerable individuals, including people with disabilities.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has warned of worsening hunger and the outbreak of cholera that has claimed more than 3,500 lives. WHO Spokesperson Christian Lindmeier said that Sudan is experiencing one of the most severe food crises in the world, with “over 21 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity as of September this year.”

Lindmeier confirmed that famine has been verified in Al-Fasher and Kadugli and is now threatening 20 additional areas in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan.

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the danger stems not only from food shortages and disease but also from explosives and ongoing fighting. Sadik Rashid, a UNMAS official, said that in urban areas where the fighting is intense, there is a high presence of mines and unexploded ordnance, stressing that the situation is extremely perilous for civilians trapped in an environment where every step is deadly.

Meanwhile, the crisis over access to safe drinking water is worsening in camps for displaced persons from Al-Fasher, extending to the Northern State and other areas. Humanitarian conditions are deteriorating as the number of displaced persons rises and local authorities struggle to meet their needs.

The International Organisation for Migration reported that only 10 per cent of Al-Fasher’s displaced population in the camps have access to drinking water, while more than 90,000 people displaced from Al-Fasher over the past two weeks find themselves in arid areas. The organisation warned that the scale of the crisis coincides with an unprecedented decline in international humanitarian aid.

Meanwhile, questions are emerging over the Quad initiative launched on 12 September under the leadership of the US, with the participation of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The initiative called for a three-month humanitarian truce aimed at establishing a permanent ceasefire, addressing the humanitarian crisis, and paving the way for a political settlement that would facilitate the transfer of power to civilians while preserving Sudan’s unity.

Masoud Boulos, adviser to the US president, said the next few weeks would see further action by the Quad. He had previously hinted at measures against those obstructing a peaceful resolution of conflict in Sudan. Intense pressure appears to have begun on the conflict parties, including statements by the US secretary of state, who held the RSF accountable for violations and atrocities, hinting at the possibility of designating it a terrorist organisation.

The Quad initiative also pointed to the role of Iran and Islamist groups in supporting the army and fuelling the war, stressing the need to exclude them from Sudan’s future political landscape.

Sudan remains at a sharp and complex crossroads, facing two potential scenarios:

The first is the continuation of war, which would lead to further violations, atrocities, catastrophic humanitarian conditions, more bloodshed, displacement, and refugee flows. It would also intensify international and regional interventions, complicate Sudan’s relations with its neighbours and the wider international community, and put the country’s unity at serious risk.

If the current, catastrophic situation persists, Sudan may face fragmentation or total collapse, potentially becoming a magnet for extremist, terrorist, and armed groups. The Sahel region is not too far removed from this threat, with nearby Mali already vulnerable to domination by terrorist groups.

The ambitions of the RSF appear not to be limited to declaring a state in Darfur or in Darfur and Kordofan combined, but extend to controlling the entire Sudanese state. At the same time, the SAF and its allies seek to continue with the battles until the RSF is defeated, implying prolonged zero-sum fighting in a bloody, destructive war with no end in sight.

This leaves Sudan facing a scenario akin to that of Libya or Somalia, or becoming a proxy battleground for international and regional conflicts.

The second scenario is one of negotiation and peaceful settlement. This is the scenario that many regional and international actors now support. After two years and seven months of brutal, destructive war marked by widespread starvation, atrocities and devastation, they recognise that the conflict is senseless, leaving everyone a loser, not just Sudan.

They also understand that the flames of the war could spread to neighbouring countries and beyond. This is why the Quad initiative has received broad backing regionally and internationally, seen as perhaps the last opportunity to halt the war and restore a country divided between two administrations and ravaged by the conflict between them.

Under this scenario, pressures may continue to persuade the warring parties to engage in negotiations or reach a settlement, or a settlement could be imposed if persuasion fails.

Some actors, however, remain wary of this peaceful path, whether due to concerns over their position in a future arrangement, their personal security, the country’s future, or doubts about the fairness and alignment of the forthcoming solution with the interests of the Sudanese people.

The success of this path depends on the seriousness of the Quad initiative, the commitment of its leaders and the international community’s determination to end the war. It also depends on their ability to pressure the parties into genuine negotiations, establish mechanisms for implementation on the ground, enforce effective monitoring, separate combatants, open humanitarian corridors to aid millions of people, and ultimately launch a comprehensive political settlement.

There is no doubt that a peaceful settlement does not imply surrender, but rather an effort to safely exit the quagmire of war, which can only lead to more bloodshed, destruction and chaos. Yet the political process in Sudan is certain to be an even larger and more intense struggle, involving internal, regional, and international forces competing to shape the country’s present and future as well as its resources.

Sudan’s unique position as a diverse and resource-rich Arab-African country, with its complex structure, extensions, and influence, makes the political process far from easy.

This reality calls for the unity of all Sudanese national forces committed to preserving Sudan’s territorial integrity, its sovereignty, and the welfare of its people, alongside all of Sudan’s regional allies and friends, to help craft the forthcoming peaceful settlement. They must be partners in shaping a solution that is fair and comprehensive, safeguards the highest interests of the Sudanese people, and lays the foundation for a state grounded in citizenship, equal rights and justice, ensuring that the current war becomes Sudan’s last.

Such a settlement will require extraordinary efforts to bridge the deep trust gap between the Sudanese parties, end the media war, hate speech, and pointing fingers of treason. Efforts should also be directed towards halting the flow of weapons to all conflict actors, and establishing both a Sudanese and an international determination to make this scenario succeed. This represents a critical and possibly final opportunity to save Sudan.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 20 November, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

 

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