Driven largely by sectarian fears and uncertainty, Iraqi voters went to the polls in throngs last month to elect a new parliament and government for the country.
But frustration, pessimism, and anger emerged soon after the outcome showed that there was no one party that had won a majority of votes in the parliamentary race and could form a government.
The result mirrors that of all previous elections in the post-Saddam era in Iraq, when the leaders of the country’s confessional groups have mobilised their supporters to vote and resorted to hard bargaining later to form a coalition to govern and share power and wealth.
This time, however, there seem to be especially stormy waters ahead, given a politically charged atmosphere, deepening inter-communal divisions, increasing government dysfunction, a failing economy, and foreign interference.
A prolonged deadlock in forming a new government this time around could be explosive and drag the fragile country into paralysis and probably further instability.
The Shia parties won 187 seats, the Sunni factions 77, and the Kurdish groups 56 seats in the elections. The rest of the 329 seats in Iraq’s House of Representatives went to members of small minorities.
It is there that the enormous challenge that vitiates any celebratory feelings lies. No single party won the majority of the seats in the elections, and no single party is eligible to form a government alone.
Under an unwritten political convention following the fall of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003, a Shia holds the office of prime minister, a Sunni Arab serves as the parliamentary speaker, and a Kurd holds the ceremonial post of president.
Agreement on each post comes after tough negotiations within the factions of each community in the country and deal-making between them. The bargaining usually only comes to fruition after a prolonged stalemate.
According to results announced by the Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition emerged as the largest single Shia bloc with 46 seats in parliament.
But the incumbent Al-Sudani did not secure a majority even within the Shia camp, leaving clouds lingering over the process if he insists on having the post.
Three years after taking office as an unexpected choice by the Shia Coordination Framework (CF), Al-Sudani remains one of Iraq’s most intriguing political figures.
He was not a member of the anti-Saddam exile groups who were empowered by the US Occupation Authority after the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein, and he entered politics as a member of the Islamic Da’wa Party.
He soon rose to power as a governor of a southern province and later as a cabinet minister with several portfolios. His credentials lie in his ability to learn to operate effectively within the Shia oligarchy.
As he aimed for a second term in office, he moved to form the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, a bloc made up largely by lawmakers, tribesmen, and activists disgruntled by the Shia elites.
He also oversaw a period of relative political stability during his premiership, and a few development projects his government has undertaken have helped him build an image of strength and popularity.
In his colourful election campaign, Al-Sudani’s smiling face with his thumbs up could be seen everywhere in Baghdad and other southern provinces, which were awash with his posters plastered on billboards.
He was seen every night on TV at events such as new project openings and making promises for the coming years.
Yet, though Al-Sudani’s political bloc won the most seats in the elections, a new government could still be months away, first due to a required endorsement by the Shia CF and then a deal with the Sunnis and Kurds to settle on it.
As was widely expected, the CF leaders did not automatically greenlight Al-Sudani’s nomination and went on to lay down “criteria” for candidates for the post that have been widely seen as unconstitutional and humiliating.
The CF leadership has unceremoniously decided to set up a committee to interview frontrunners and asked them to prepare a CV. In a further downgrading of the prime minister’s post, they have said that the successful candidate will be “executive director” of the new cabinet.
Under these conditions, the next prime minister “should not be preoccupied with building a party model that qualifies him to join the Coalition as a leader,” it said.
Al-Sudani, who has made it clear that he will seek a second term, has continued to display a forceful public posture and show confidence and strength throughout.
He still appears in televised events as being upbeat and basking in the considerable support he received in the elections and probably hoping that favourable winds will blow.
A spokesmen blasted the CF’s decisions as unconstitutional and accused it of trying to “dwarf” the post of prime minister. He said Al-Sudani would “resort to the people” if denied a second term.
On Tuesday, his bloc declared that he will stand for nomination despite a CF statement that there are other candidates to be vetoed.
At the same time, Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish political parties that won 125 seats in the new House of Representatives could face critical choices in confronting a Shia majority.
Given their internal divisions, they fear a united Shia front will eventually emerge, like in previous elections, and dictate to them the terms for power-sharing.
The leaders of Iraq’s Sunni Arab political blocs have formed a National Political Council aimed at unifying the community as they prepare to negotiate forming the new government and their share in the cabinet and other top posts.
The Kurdish political parties that emerged further divided from last year’s elections in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region are deeply split, and there are no signs that they will forge an alliance that could bargain with Baghdad on favourable terms.
The two main parties in the Region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), are expected to compete for the post of the country’s president in Baghdad.
Under Iraq’s post-2003 Constitution, the newly elected MPS should hold their first session within 15 days of the ratification of the vote and elect a speaker by simple majority. They have 15 more days to elect a president by a two-thirds majority.
The third important and usually thorny step is to agree on a prime minister who should be invited by the president and presented to the parliament for endorsement by a simple majority.
To proceed with this process, the political factions should reach a power-sharing agreement that complies with the Constitution and names a new prime minister a month after the parliament elects the president.
Once a new government is in place, it will face key policy questions. The prevalent challenges are the dismal economy, government dysfunction, high unemployment, and rampant corruption.
Iraq’s rentier economy is in disarray and depends on oil revenues that make up more than 90 per cent of public revenues, the largest portion of national income. These are effectively the core of a potential national crisis.
With oil prices projected to decline drastically, Iraq will be impacted by lower revenues leading to budget cuts including salaries for nearly 10 million government employees, pensioners, and social security beneficiaries.
High unemployment, including a lack of suitable jobs for young people, a main factor behind the underperformance of previous administrations, is another major challenge for the next government.
Two other daunting challenges are how to solve Iraq’s water crisis, which has exacerbated desertification and impacted food security, and how to fight the endemic corruption that remains a major threat to reforms.
Foreign interference is another issue. The next government will need to navigate the delicate balance between the influences of regional and world powers in Iraq, primarily those of the United States and Iran.
While Turkey and Iraq’s Gulf neighbours have been watching the elections and government formation closely, Tehran and Washington have sought to directly influence the outcome of the vote.
While Iranian officials have refrained from making public statements about Iraq’s elections, the number of seats won by Iran-backed militias such as Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, the Badr Organisation, Harakat Hoquq, and Kataib Hezbollah, which amount to 56, speaks loudly of Tehran’s influence in the new parliament.
The Trump Administration in the US is showing a strong interest in the outcome of the elections, apparently disgruntled by the rise of pro-Iran groups despite its earlier threats and sanctions.
US businessman Mark Savaya, the US Special Envoy to Iraq, has apparently been designated to make warning gestures regarding what the US Administration wants from the new government in Iraq.
“There are big changes coming in Iraq... everyone will see actions instead of words,” Savaya, who is of Iraqi origin, told a Kurdish news outlet on Saturday. Iraq “stands at a critical crossroads,” he said in the clearest message yet from Washington.
Later he wrote on the X platform that “today, the world views Iraq as a country capable of playing a larger and more influential role in the region, provided that the issue of weapons outside state control is fully resolved and the prestige of official institutions is protected.”
While the US warnings about the Iran-backed militias could be linked to a possible renewal of the Iran-Israeli confrontation, they are also cited by many Iraqis, primarily Sunnis and Kurds, who want the armed actors to be dismantled.
However optimists may spin things, these challenges are not just minor details that can be sorted out like after previous elections. While Iraq’s post-election crisis might look familiar, this moment is especially critical for Iraq, where recent developments could determine the nation’s long-term future.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 4 December, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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