From a theoretical point of view, I looked at the strategy through the lens of the balance of power theory of international relations. In the same way that the UK played the role of balancer on the European continent for almost 300 years, preventing the emergence of powers or a coalition of powers that could have threatened or actually threatened its predominance, I believe that the United States in the second term of President Donald Trump has opted for the role of balancer especially in the Indo-Pacific region.
The power that it is seeking to check and contain is China, not only in military terms but also economically and technologically. This containment is meant as a deterrent that can prevent escalation and military conflict. It calls for the strengthening of traditional alliances and partnerships with countries that have joint interests with Washington in checking Chinese power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
The 2025 US Strategy says that “in the long term, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent large-scale military conflict.” It believes that a “favourable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition [with China]” in the Indo-Pacific. This touches directly on the question of Taiwan and how the US is now approaching it.
Contrary to the forceful positions of the Biden administration in this regard, the new document is more diplomatic and realistic in formulating the position of the American administration on the question of Taiwan. It starts from recognising that given that one third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this situation has major implications for the American economy.
Accordingly, deterring a conflict over Taiwan, “ideally by preserving military overmatch,” is considered a priority.
In the meantime, the United States will maintain its traditional “declaratory policy” on Taiwan, the strategy says, meaning that Washington will not support any unilateral change to the status quo. It will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain that comprises Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
The document stresses that America’s allies in the region “must step up and spend and more importantly do much more for collective defence” in the region. Their contributions, at present and in the future, will “interlink maritime security issues along the First Island Chain” while bolstering the capacities of both the American military and those of its allies to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or lead to a situation where the balance of forces becomes so “unfavourable to us” as to make defending Taiwan impossible.
The strategy also speaks of a related security challenge in the Indo-Pacific, which is the potential for a competing power to control the South China Sea, thus threatening freedom of navigation.
It believes that in order to “thrive at home” the United States must compete in the region. It states that Trump signed major agreements during his tour of Asia last October that deepen America’s strong ties with its allies and partners and agreements that cover trade, technology, and defence. Trump reaffirmed American commitments to a free and open Indo-Pacific, the strategy says, building alliances and strengthening partnerships in the region that according to the document will prove to be the “bedrock” of security and prosperity “long into the future.”
This will take place in parallel to rebalancing the American economic relationship with China based on fairness and reciprocity in order to “restore American economic independence.”
The document concludes by stressing that preventing conflict requires a “vigilant posture in the Indo-Pacific,” a renewed defence industrial base, greater military investments, and winning the economic and technological competition “over the long term.”
The 2025 US National Security Strategy clearly states that the United States cannot allow any nation to become so dominant that it could threaten its interests. It emphasises that Washington will work with its allies and partners to maintain global and regional balances of power in order to prevent the emergence of “dominant adversaries.”
This principle holds true in the Indo-Pacific. It is worth noting that one major difference with previous National Security Strategies under different administrations is the absence of any reference in the new document to the denuclearisation of North Korea.
* The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 18 December, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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