The sudden depreciation has triggered unprecedented price increases, compounding the deterioration of key economic sectors already strained by international sanctions. As with previous protest waves, demonstrations that began peacefully soon escalated into cycles of violence and counter-violence between protesters and security forces.
From the outset, the protests drew support from a broad social spectrum. Oil workers, university students, teachers, and truck drivers joined the demonstrations, alongside the traditionally influential bazaar class. Several Iranian cities witnessed protests of varying intensity, with western provinces particularly affected.
In Kermanshah, commercial activity came to a complete halt as shops closed in protest. By the time of writing, at least seven people—among protesters and security personnel—had been killed, dozens injured, and public buildings damaged across fifteen cities.
A significant turning point came on the sixth day of protests, when US President Donald Trump intervened directly, posting on his platform Truth Social that the United States would “come to the rescue” of peaceful protesters if the Iranian authorities resorted to lethal force. Iranian officials responded swiftly, folding the statement into the regime’s long-standing narrative of foreign interference, portraying the protests as part of a Western-Israeli plot to destabilize the country.
President Masoud Pezeshkian initially adopted a more conciliatory tone. He acknowledged that the protests could not be attributed solely to external actors and conceded that mismanagement of key economic files had played a role. He also instructed the Interior Ministry to engage with protesters’ representatives and listen to their legitimate demands. Yet this rhetoric soon clashed with developments on the ground. As protests turned violent, security agencies reverted to familiar methods of suppression, reinforcing the perception that Iran’s coercive institutions remain disconnected from the profound social transformations unfolding across the country.
Beyond economic grievances
The current protest wave cannot be understood through traditional lenses that reduce Iranian unrest to immediate economic grievances or reactions to specific repressive policies. While sanctions, inflation, and declining living standards form an important backdrop, they do not fully explain the persistence, geographic spread, leaderless nature, and recurrence of protests despite repeated crackdowns.
What distinguishes these protests is that they reflect a deeper rupture in the relationship between the state and society. Demonstrations have become a recurring feature of Iranian public life, expressing a long-term erosion of public compliance and trust that preceded the current economic crisis by years.
Economic crisis as a trigger, not a cause
Economic pressure has once again acted as the immediate catalyst. What makes this wave distinctive, however, is the prominent participation of merchants and business owners. According to Iranian media, traders initiated demonstrations in key commercial districts in Tehran, including Lalehzar Street, often dubbed Iran’s “Champs-Élysées.” Their anger was fueled by extreme exchange-rate volatility after the dollar surpassed 1.4 million rials, a development that led to the resignation of Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin.
These protests coincided with inflation reaching around 52 percent in December 2024, according to Iran’s Statistical Center, and with President Pezeshkian’s submission of the 1405 budget to parliament in late December 2025. Critics noted that the spending structure remained largely unchanged, continuing to allocate substantial resources to ideological institutions and entities linked to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, while failing to address the country’s acute economic distress.
Public anger increasingly focused on unequal resource distribution, the dominance of Revolutionary Guard-linked institutions over major economic sectors, and continued external spending at a time of domestic hardship. Protest slogans such as “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon—my life for Iran” captured this shift in priorities.
The rapid mobilization of the bazaar signalled that the economic crisis had reached a critical threshold. Rising prices of food, medicine, and energy, combined with unemployment and collapsing purchasing power, quickly pushed protests into university campuses. Students at leading institutions in Tehran and Isfahan protested not for abstract political freedoms, but against the cost-of-living crisis that now defines their daily reality.
Political deadlock and contradictory messaging
The protests also reflect deep political stagnation. The marginalization of reformist forces and the tightly managed electoral process have weakened public faith in change from within the system. As a result, leaderless, continuous protests have emerged as the only available channel for political expression.
While President Pezeshkian spoke of dialogue and reform, other officials sent sharply different signals. Iran’s prosecutor-general warned of decisive judicial action if protests were deemed destabilizing or externally orchestrated. This duality in discourse has eroded public trust further, portraying the president as constrained within a system unwilling or unable to translate conciliatory rhetoric into institutional practice.
Public opinion surveys underline this erosion of legitimacy. Polls conducted in 2024 by the GAMAAN research group showed that around 70 percent of respondents opposed the continuation of the Islamic Republic, while support for revolutionary principles had fallen sharply. A majority expressed preference for a democratic system, and more respondents viewed protests—not elections—as the most effective means of change.
A society in transformation
The protests also reflect deeper demographic and cultural shifts. Younger generations in Iran have no lived memory of the 1979 revolution or the Iran-Iraq War, the foundational moments on which the regime’s legitimacy narrative rests. They judge the state not by revolutionary ideals, but by its ability to provide economic stability, social security, and a decent quality of life.
As a result, traditional mobilizing narratives centered on “resistance” and “external threats” have lost much of their resonance. Lifestyle choices—such as dress, music, public behavior, and digital expression—have become implicitly political, turning everyday life into a site of friction between state authority and social practice.
At the same time, the regime’s traditional mechanisms of social control have weakened. Religious and intermediary institutions, once capable of mediating between state and society, have lost credibility. In their place, the state has increasingly relied on coercive tools—security forces, judicial measures, and restrictive legislation. While this approach may contain unrest in the short term, it deepens mistrust and entrenches a cycle of repression and protest.
Looking ahead
Iran now faces a dual challenge: mounting internal discontent and heightened external threats following recent confrontations with Israel and the United States. The regime increasingly frames domestic protests as part of a broader security threat environment, reinforcing a securitized approach to governance.
This strategy may preserve short-term stability, but it risks accelerating long-term fragility. Many Iranians do not view external pressure as justification for tighter domestic control; instead, they see it as a reason for better governance and economic management. The growing gap between these perspectives underscores a structural imbalance in state–society relations.
For now, the Iranian system remains capable of managing dissent through institutional power. Yet the deeper challenge lies not in immediate survival, but in the gradual erosion of legitimacy and social engagement. How the state responds to this shifting social landscape will shape not only the future of protest in Iran but the durability of the political order itself.
*Rania Makram is a Senior researcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS)
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