In the northern region of Somalia, not far away from the southern entrance to the Red Sea, lies a breakaway Somali entity known as Somaliland. It seceded from Somalia back in 1991, a year that saw the beginning of a period of political instability in the country, with terrorism continuing there since then though with varying degrees of intensity.
From 1991 until two weeks ago no country had recognised Somaliland, judging such recognition a violation of the Charter of the United Nations as well as of international law and setting a dangerous precedent by tampering with the territorial integrity of nations around the world.
This non-recognition was broken two weeks ago when Israel officially recognised Somaliland. Last year, Ethiopia, a land-locked country in search of a port city, also signed an agreement with Somaliland in return for access to the sea. Due to negative reactions in Africa, that agreement has still to be implemented. But with the Israeli recognition of Somaliland, the road is now open for Ethiopia to have its access to the sea.
In fact, contacts between Israel and Somaliland have probably been facilitated by Ethiopia. Now that Israel has gained a foothold on the Red Sea, a very important one, the tacit alliance between Ethiopia and Israel has become public with the Israeli recognition of Somaliland.
In the meantime, and a few days after the announcement of the Israeli decision, two ships arrived in the Red Sea port of Mukalla in Yemen allegedly carrying weapons for Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC), which calls for the establishment of an independent state in South Yemen with Aden as its capital.
Sensing the danger on its southern border, Saudi Arabia bombed the two vessels. An independent South Yemen with pro-Israeli leanings controlling the eastern shore of the Red Sea, and with Israel at the same time with a foothold in Somaliland, could jeopardise the Strait of Bab Al-Mandab, if, as some sources inside the STC have done, it expresses a willingness to join the Abraham Accords of 2020 when four Arab countries recognised Israel.
Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has shown great interest in having quick and secure access to the Red Sea, on the one hand, and in preventing any other power that is not at peace with it from exercising dominance over it.
The closure of the Gulf of Aqaba in the summer of 1967, and the Yemeni Houthi group’s attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea in 2024, in solidarity with the Palestinian people, demonstrated to Israel how important it is to have a presence at the southern tip of the Red Sea to deter any adversary or enemy from controlling it.
Moreover, a presence in Somaliland would make it a lot easier for Israel to monitor Iran’s support for pro-Iranian and anti-Israel armed Arab groups and movements like Hamas in Occupied Palestine, Hizbullah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen.
Some experts believe that the attacks planned and carried out by the Houthis against merchant ships heading for Israel prompted the Israeli government to make the decision to recognise Somaliland. Another consideration that has come up when trying to understand the reasons behind the Israeli recognition of this breakaway province is that Israel made the decision in return for the acceptance on the part of the Somaliland government of a number of “displaced” Palestinians in the context of the forced or voluntary displacement of Palestinians to countries around the world.
These two considerations are plausible of course; however, they tend to underestimate one important strategic priority of Israel — which is to keep the sea lanes to and from it free of any threat to its security, on the one hand, and to provide it with the ability to monitor its adversaries and enemies in the south of the Red Sea on the other.
The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 8 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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