Ten days ago the world was following reports that the United States would go to war against Iran with great concern, given the possible consequences of an American attack on Iran both regionally and internationally and in both strategic as well as economic terms.
The American threats against Iran came against the backdrop of nationwide demonstrations across the country that met with bloody repression from the Iranian government and claimed, according to human-rights organisations, thousands of lives and thousands of people injured. Some of the protesters were tried and executed, and the Norway-based Iran Human Rights organisation reported that more than 3,400 people had been killed and thousands more injured.
This repression prompted US President Donald Trump to say that if the “killing” of the protesters did not stop he would attack Iran. At the same time, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei denounced those Iranians who had taken to the streets in the protests as the “stooges” of the West and warned of “bloodshed and chaos” if the demonstrations continued.
His picture was burned by some of the protesters in response. The uprising in Iran is not only motivated by the worsening economic situation in the country but also by a desire to overthrow the 47-year-old Iranian Revolution and end the 37-year rule of Khamenei.
American military assets were moved to the Middle East in a show of force, and in the meantime some Arab allies and partners of the United States in the Gulf region called for restraint in contacts with the Trump administration.
On 15 January, the UN Security Council met in an emergency session called by the United States, which invited two activists from the Iranian opposition to address it, namely Masih Alinejad and Ahmed Batebi, and they detailed the suffering of the Iranian people since 1979.
US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz told the council members that the US president “stands by the brave people of Iran,” adding that the level of violence and repression that the government in Iran has unleashed against its own citizens has “repercussions for international peace and stability.” He said that Trump had made it clear that all options were on the table to stop the slaughter.
As expected, both the Russian and the Chinese delegations to the UN opposed the use of force against Iran. The Chinese representative said that an American intervention in the country would plunge the region into an abyss, while his Russian counterpart said that “Trump’s rhetoric” with regard to Iran amounted to “nothing but incitement to violently overthrow” the government in Iran.
At the same time, backchannel talks were held in order to defuse the situation and to enable the US administration and the Iranian government to work out certain understandings that would not be directly related to the domestic situation inside Iran but would have to do with a re- positioning of Iran on the regional chessboard.
A case in point was the statement by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in which he indicated a willingness to defuse tensions with the United States by returning to the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme.
One plausible explanation of the American position towards Iran during this crisis is that the administration has been using the threat of the use of force against Iran in order to push certain policy changes that align with traditional American demands that have been made by Republican and Democrat administrations alike.
These changes include ending the Iranian nuclear programme, ending the development of the ballistic-missile programme, ending all forms of support to Iranian-backed militias in the Arab world, for example Hamas in Occupied Palestine, Hizbullah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, and ending threats against Israel and withdrawing all opposition to the so-called Abraham Accords in which some Arab countries have established or are being encouraged to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.
We should not expect that the Iranian government will accept all the demands on this list at present, especially in the waning days of Khamenei, but they might constitute an acceptable road map for the future in a changing political scene in Tehran that coincides with radical changes in the geopolitical scene in the Middle East region.
The changing of the guard in Tehran could be the catalyst for an entente cordiale between Washington and Tehran that would benefit both capitals and especially the next Supreme Leader in Iran, whoever he turns out to be.
I believe the United States is planning for the day after in Iran and how Iran will fit in with the ongoing strategic reconfiguration in the Middle East.
The writer is former assistant foreign minister.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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