On 14 January, the skies over Iran became a prohibited zone. By operational order of the Iranian authorities, a NOTAM was issued closing the country’s airspace to civilian flights starting at 1am Tehran time.
A NOTAM, or Notice to Airmen, is an immediate alert from the civil aviation authorities announcing any change that affects flight safety, such as runway closures, military activity, navigation failures, severe weather, or restricted zones.
As a result, all civilian planes approaching Iranian airspace were rerouted to alternative paths on 14 January. The sudden move left many holding their breath: had US President Donald Trump grown weary of political avenues and decided to resolve the matter militarily?
The possibility clearly mobilised Iran’s military and Revolutionary Guard, which were bracing for a strike they could not predict whether it would come from Israel, the United States, or both simultaneously.
Later that same night, Trump ended Iran’s uncertainty with new statements.
Speaking to reporters in the White House, he said that “we’ve been told that the killing in Iran is stopping – it’s stopped. And there’s no plan for executions, or an execution – so I’ve been told that on good authority.”
According to the New York Times, after Trump’s remarks, the Pentagon prepared to stand down forces and allow troops to return to base, with a senior US military official describing the president’s comments as “an off-ramp.”
Long-range bombers in the US had been placed on alert for potential secondary strikes, the paper reported, but that posture was later quietly paused.
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz said that “Israeli officials conveyed to Iran, via Russia, that Israel would not strike first if Iran did not, with Iran reportedly reciprocating this understanding.”
On the same day, son of the former shah of Iran Reza Pahlavi issued a direct appeal to the armed forces in Iran.
“I have a special message for the personnel of the armed forces,” he said. “You are the national army of Iran, not the army of the Islamic Republic. You do not have much time left. Join the people as soon as possible” in protesting against the Iranian regime.
Pahlavi then sought to deepen his religious and cultural ties with Israel, stating that “I went to Israel to show that we are the descendants of Cyrus the Great, who 25 centuries ago helped free the Jewish people and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem.”
But despite these overtures, Pahlavi does not appear to be Washington’s preferred option for taking over Iran, and Trump voiced scepticism over his ability to rally a strong popular base against Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.
“He seems very nice, but I don’t know how he’d play within his own country. And we really aren’t up to that point yet. I don’t know whether or not his country would accept his leadership, and certainly if they would, that would be fine with me.”
To understand what happened on 14 January, one cannot find a better reference than the famous maxim of the classical Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, who said “let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.”
The logic is simple: the closure of Iranian airspace was a major opportunity and a perfectly timed US-Israeli preparation to test Iran’s Air Defences and gauge its response plans in the event of a sudden American strike.
It was also a direct and explicit threat to the Iranian regime, and to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei personally. Yet, it was clear that Washington did not intend to launch a full‑scale assault that night, but rather a limited strike.
Such a move would not be sufficient to topple a regime that had already endured painful Israeli and American blows over 12 days the previous year without collapsing. Removing it would require comprehensive attacks against the three pillars on which the Iranian system rests: political, military, and nuclear.
By comparison, the US military buildup against Venezuela late last year and resulting in the removal of the country’s president in January showed that executing a similar plan against Iran, a country with significant missile capabilities able to strike any American or Israeli target in the Middle East, would demand a massive concentration of force.
That buildup began on 13 January.
American and European reinforcements started flowing from Europe into the Middle East: British and German Typhoon fighters, French Rafales, and US F‑15s deployed outside Israel’s borders to form defensive lines, with the possibility of joining offensive operations led by the US carrier strike group USS Abraham Lincoln, which had arrived in the Indian Ocean.
This force, in coordination with the Israeli Air Force, possesses the capacity to wage a full military campaign aimed at weakening the Iranian regime comprehensively in a campaign that could be further facilitated by internal unrest.
This build‑up inevitably raises a pressing question: will American air and missile power be drawn into a prolonged campaign lasting several days against Iran, or will it take the form of phased strikes and calibrated stages of military action designed to compel the Iranian regime to yield and relinquish its authority?
Alternatively, might such operations serve merely as a catalyst and a means of testing Tehran’s responses in order to identify the most effective outcome at the lowest possible cost?
In parallel with this US build-up, the Iranian Navy joined exercises carried out by the BRICS group of countries in South Africa. The deployment was led by the expeditionary sea base Shahid Mahdavi, a vessel capable of launching Zolfaghar anti‑ship ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 700 km, Nawab surface‑to‑air missiles, and long‑range kamikaze drones.
After completing the drills, the detachment returned to Iran.
Iran is unlikely to place much reliance on either Russia or China as allies at present, and the reasons are fairly clear. Moscow remains deeply absorbed in the war in Ukraine, with its manufacturing base focused almost entirely on that front, leaving little scope for additional arms supplies.
Diplomatically, it is improbable that Russia would exercise a veto at the UN Security Council to halt military action against Iran, nor is it expected to risk direct intervention in such a conflict, despite the signing last December of a three‑year cooperation roadmap between the two countries aimed at sustaining military‑technical collaboration and activating their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.
As for China, a 2025 report from the US Congress underscores Beijing’s reluctance to become deeply entangled in Middle Eastern disputes. China continues to avoid confrontation with Washington, a stance that inevitably curtails the level of military assistance it would be prepared to extend to Tehran.
The situation, therefore, rests squarely on Iran’s own shoulders, and its capacity to safeguard itself must be assessed through two lenses: the offensive and the defensive.
On the offensive front, doubts remain over whether Iran’s army and Revolutionary Guard have been able to reinforce their capabilities sufficiently to restore their deterrence strategy. That strategy has traditionally relied on a wide array of offensive ballistic missiles, backed by a theoretically strong and diverse air-defence network.
Yet, it proved ineffective during last year’s 12‑day war in deterring both Israel and the United States. Its only partial success was in exhausting Israeli Air Defences and accelerating a ceasefire, a tactic that appears to be Iran’s current short‑term focus.
For the past six months, Tehran has concentrated on amassing as many medium‑range missiles as possible, particularly those with advanced manoeuverability and hypersonic speeds. The aim is to inflict maximum damage on Israeli and American targets if they dare to act, while simultaneously draining both sides’ air-defence systems.
Defensively, reports suggest that Iran has begun replacing its domestically produced systems with Russian and Chinese alternatives such as the HQ‑9B, while also accelerating efforts to acquire advanced Su‑35 fighter jets.
These choices could form the basis of an effective shield, but they require an integrated network of radar, electronic support systems, and experienced crews capable of operating them. That is not achievable in the short term, making this a long‑range plan whose results remain uncertain.
For now, Iran’s offensive capability remains its only viable card, provided it can manoeuvre effectively and avoid strikes against its stockpiles. Even so, the indications suggest that Tehran has acquired new electronic warfare systems, notably Russia’s Topol, reportedly capable of jamming signals from advanced US satellites such as Starlink, which are renowned for their resilience against interference.
At present, Trump’s trajectory is firmly directed towards Iran, which is bracing for a powerful strike. Time is running out for Tehran, and its political leadership may be forced to make major concessions to halt the momentum of military operations.
Reliance on military capability alone is unlikely to succeed, given the exhaustion and severe weakness exposed during last year’s campaigns. This reality suggests that the crisis can only be resolved through political means; otherwise, military suicide may become the Iranian regime’s alternative path.
The writer is a researcher in the Security and Defence Programme’s Amament Unit at the Egyptian Centre for Strategic Studies (ECSS).
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: