Saudi Arabia is continuing with its efforts to recharge the political path to a peaceful settlement in Yemen. The focus is restoring order in the south after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), now dissolved, led a military adventure in the eastern governorates of Hadramawt and Al- Mahra.
As the internationally recognised, legitimate government of Yemen regained control of the south, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) made sweeping changes purging STC members from the government. The PLC also accepted the resignation of its cabinet led by Salem bin Breik and appointed Foreign Minister Shaya Mohsin Al-Zindani as the country’s new prime minister to replace Bin Breik. STC leader Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, who fled South Yemen to Abu Dhabi, and his deputy Faraj Salmeen Al-Bahsani, also in UAE, were sacked from the PLC and replaced by the governor of Hadramawt Salem Al-Khanbashi and former defence minister Lieutenant General Mahmoud Al-Subaihi.
The eight-member PLC received financial support from Saudi Arabia, announced after a meeting between its chairman and PM with Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman. More than half a billion dollars (SR1.9bn) were allocated as economic support and a package of development projects under the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Programme for Yemen. Most of the projects are in the south – Aden, Marib and other governorates. Earlier this month, Riyadh said it would host a conference with representatives from Southern Yemen to address issues of the south in the framework of a unified country.
Latest developments in Yemen erupted last month when southern separatist militias tried to secede from the north and split from the legitimate government. North of Yemen is mostly controlled by the Iran-backed Houthi militia which took control in 2014. In the following year, a Saudi-led coalition launched a war against the Houthis to restore legitimacy. The main partner was the UAE, before it withdrew most of its military in 2019. The war left hundreds of thousands of Yemenis dead and millions displaced.
The UAE has always supported the cause of South Yemen separation, while Saudi Arabia was keen on a unified state. Emiratis warned of including militant Islamists like the Islah Party in the Yemeni government. There was a lull for years until early December when the Saudis had to move forcefully against separatists and asked the UAE to withdraw completely from Yemen.
Many commentators saw the rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE as reflecting rather more than differing visions for Yemen; it was about red lines regarding Saudi security and national interests not limited to its southern neighbour but extending to the Gulf of Aden, the Bab Al- Mandeb Strait and the Horn of Africa. This strategic sphere is vital to the Red Sea, not only as a maritime route but as a military arena. Egypt too shares Saudi Arabia’s concerns and has its own red lines concerning the Red Sea, which is vital to its Suez Canal.
According to some analyses, Riyadh was not aiming for a comprehensive military victory in Yemen. Rather, its objectives were to protect borders, contain threats, and exit a prolonged war of attrition. De-escalation with the Houthis and their use as a bargaining chip rather than a target for decisive defeat reflects this shift. Even in differences with the UAE, there was no intention of escalation but rather a firm stance to preserve national interests.
The same applies to the Emirati position, according to this analysis, as it avoids open confrontation. It has focused on extending its influence through ports and coastal areas and supporting local actors without direct confrontation. That pattern is repeated in Sudan through support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as an instrument of influence rather than a military or ideological choice. This is also the case in Libya, Somalia, and Ethiopia.
Drawing parallels between Yemen and Sudan, last week the Sudanese academic and political analyst Al-Wathiq Kameer published an article detailing that analogy. He wrote that in Yemen “regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Iran have entered labyrinths of influence and competing interests, rendering the conflict more complex and longer-lasting than expected. [In Sudan] the war between the army and RSF, now surpassing two years, is not merely an internal conflict; it has become an extension of regional and international intersections with clear political and military implications.”
While Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey support the legitimate government, the UAE is said to support RSF. As Kameer notes in his article, “the Egyptian presidency’s statements about ‘red lines’ in Sudan does not imply war or expansionist influence but rather support for maintaining a unified Sudanese state and preserving the army as a central national institution.” That is exactly what the Saudis are doing in Yemen.
Last week, Bloomberg published a report suggesting that “Saudi Arabia is in the process of establishing a new military alliance with Somalia and Egypt.” The report added that Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will soon be travelling to Saudi Arabia to finalise a deal that looks to strengthen Red Sea security as well as military cooperation. Recent news reports revealed that Turkey is seeking to join a military pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan first formed in September.
That comes after Somalia cancelled security and ports agreements with the UAE, citing a violation of its sovereignty in the extraction of the STC leader through its territory. Somalia is also seeking Saudi and Egyptian support for its territorial integrity after Israel recognised Somaliland. Worth mentioning is the fact that Somaliland is dependent on support from the UAE and Ethiopia.
The loosely-formed alliance between Saudi Arabia and regional powers is thought to go beyond Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Last week some news reports mentioned that members of the perceived alliance, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Oman, and Qatar persuaded the Trump administration to refrain from the military escalation against Iran.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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