After the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were expelled from the Sheikh Maqsoud and Al-Ashrafiyah neighbourhoods of Aleppo in northern Syria, the skirmishes between them and Syrian government forces shifted to Deir Hafir and Maskanah in the eastern Aleppo governorate.
There too the battle was decided in favour of the Syrian army. Then, within the next 48 hours from 16 to 18 January the army advanced towards the Raqqa province and then the city of Raqqa itself.
In parallel, Arab tribal forces moved swiftly to seize Deir ez-Zor, expelling SDF forces from both the eastern and western banks of the city, which straddles the Euphrates. They then prepared to take Markada and Al-Shaddadi in the south of the Al-Hasakah governorate.
Several Arab tribal leaders including the sheikhs of the Shammar and Al-Mashahda tribes had defected to the government from the SDF. These forces then seized control of vital facilities previous held by the SDF, the most important being the oil and gas fields in Deir ez-Zor.
The tribal forces also took over guarding some prisons holding Islamic State (IS) group fighters for fear the prisoners might take advantage of the instability in the area to stage a prison break.
At the same time, government forces secured the Euphrates and Tishreen dams, amid fears that the SDF might booby-trap them. The SDF blew up two bridges in Raqqa to prevent government forces from advancing to the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
Against the backdrop of ongoing US mediation between the Syrian government and the SDF, Interim Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa issued Presidential Decree No 13 of 16 January granting Syrian Kurds the full citizenship rights that had been stripped from them since the beginning of Baath Party rule in Syria 1963.
Not only does the decree recognise Syrian Kurdish citizens as an integral part of the Syrian people, but it also recognises their language and cultural identity as part of the Syrian national identity.
It guarantees them the right to learn the Kurdish language in public and private schools and to revive the Kurdish heritage, designating the Kurdish Newroz festival as a national and official public holiday.
The combination of military and political developments compelled the SDF to comply with US mediation. On 17 January, SDF leader Mazloum Abdi met with US Envoy Tom Barrack, who brought with him Abdi’s long-time political and ideological rival, former President of Iraqi Kurdistan Masoud Barzani.
Reports circulated that Abdi would accompany Barrack to meet Al-Sharaa in Damascus the following day, but Abdi did not attend the meeting. After meeting with Barrack, Al-Sharaa announced a new comprehensive ceasefire agreement, effective across the country.
Unlike the broadly worded 10 March agreement, the new 14-point agreement is much more detailed. In addition to the ceasefire, it calls for the handover of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor to the Syrian state.
It stipulates that SDF forces will be integrated into the new Syrian army and police as individuals, rather than in their existing units. The names of the SDF members will be vetted in order to exclude any former regime officers who may have joined SDF ranks.
The institutions of the autonomous Kurdish administration in Al-Hasakah are to be integrated into state institutions, “with due regard for Kurdish specificity”. The SDF is to submit nominations for military and civilian posts in state institutions, while the governor of Al-Hasakah will be appointed by presidential decree based on a Kurdish nomination.
The agreement also provides for the return of civilians from Afrin and Sheikh Maqsoud to their homes, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the city of Kobani (Ayn Al-Arab), and the formation of local security forces drawn from the city’s residents.
It obliges the SDF to expel all non-Syrian leaders and members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) from Syria. The Syrian government is to assume control over border crossings, oil and gas fields, and prison administration. In addition, it has pledged to continue the fight against IS in the framework of the international coalition.
The agreement is the product of intense negotiations led by Barrack over several days, but the military developments may have accelerated its conclusion. Following the rapid advances of government forces in both Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, the SDF may have decided to agree to what was on the table before government forces reached the centre of Al-Hasakah when it would have been in a weaker position.
Barrack praised the courage of the two sides for reaching the agreement, which, he said in a post on X, “represents a pivotal inflection point, where former adversaries embrace partnership over division”.
He added that the agreement would lead to “renewed dialogue and cooperation towards a unified Syria” as the two sides worked out the details of implementing it. He said his government would continue to offer its support to both sides as they translated the provisions into concrete measures.
The agreement is unquestionably a major gain for the Al-Sharaa government and its vision for reasserting control over Syria’s military and security institutions and the management of critical resources and infrastructure, such as oil and gas fields and dams.
It also reinforces the government’s approach to rebuilding the Syrian army and police. The SDF had long insisted that its forces should be integrated as units within their existing hierarchical structure. The combination of military and diplomatic pressure forced the SDF to buckle to the Syrian government’s approach, which calls for dismantling non-state military structures and integrating its members into the new army and police as individuals after security vetting.
Crowds gathered to cheer government forces as they entered Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, majority Arab areas where many affiliated to the Arab tribes that had formerly allied with the SDF complained of suffering persecution for declaring loyalty to the new authority in Damascus.
While many Kurds welcomed the recognition of long-demanded political and cultural rights, many are sceptical about implementation because there are no guarantees for effective Kurdish participation in building the new state’s institutions and in decision-making processes.
The agreement “is a victory for all Syrians of all backgrounds. Hopefully, Syria will end its state of division and move to a state of unity and progress,” Al-Sharaa said.
He stressed the principle of implementing the agreement in a spirit of “no victor, no vanquished”. Nevertheless, the SDF and large segments of the Syrian Kurds feel a sense of loss after having felt their aspirations for autonomy within a confederal or federal system almost within reach.
But international and regional support for the new Syrian government consistently favoured the unitary state project over any form of decentralisation.
Some had accused the SDF of leading an alliance of minorities aimed at creating autonomous regions outside Damascus’ authority. These regions would have been a Kurdish self-rule entity in the northeast, an Alawite entity in the coastal region, and a Druze entity in Suwayda.
The SDF was also said to have obstructed the lifting of US sanctions on Syria in order to push for a federal system. However, the US Syrian diaspora coalition, which consists of Syrians of diverse affiliations, worked in the opposite direction: the lifting of sanctions and clearing the way for the central state to assert its control over all Syrian territory.
Previously, Washington had needed an ally on the ground to fight IS, which had seized upon the civil war to expand its presence in Syria. Now that the Al-Assad regime has been removed, US interests favour strengthening the central state to impose stability, while allowing it to take over the fight against IS remnants.
The SDF was sufficient to defeat IS and wrest territory from its control. Today, a decade later, when IS and its ideology still have followers in the prison camps of Al-Hasakah, a new form of “soft” counterterrorism is needed, one that counters the misconceptions and confusion that enabled IS to recruit supporters of its extremist Islamist agenda.
The SDF cannot undertake this form of counterterrorism, which will now fall to the Syrian government.
While Abdi did not attend the meeting in which the agreement was announced, he released a video confirming that the SDF had accepted it “to stop the bloodshed.”
While the Syrian forces were reported to have adhered to the ceasefire immediately, SDF forces continued fighting. This suggests either rebellion among hardcore elements or a failure to convey the ceasefire order to all the forces.
Unconfirmed reports have circulated of retaliatory killings against Arab residents in Al-Hasakah by SDF forces in response to the agreement. Some fear that rumours of SDF-linked targeting of Arab residents could spur Arab tribal forces to take revenge in ways reminiscent of the massacres unleashed against the Alawite communities on the coast and Druze in Suwayda last year.
The Syrian government is determined to avert such a scenario, which could undermine its ability to control the security situation and guarantee protection and safety for all components of Syrian society.
The SDF must still convince its supporters of the agreement’s value, lower expectations regarding autonomy within a federal system, and persuade PKK members to leave Syria. The government will have to abandon appointment practices based on loyalty and patronage networks and manage economic resources efficiently and effectively.
In short, the path towards partnership-building appears no less perilous than the recent eruptions of violence between the SDF and government forces.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 22 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: