Over recent years, however, the Yemeni file has suffered from profound structural dysfunction in both the political and military spheres—dysfunction that has obstructed the effective implementation of UN resolutions and weakened the recognised government’s capacity to restore control.
Recent developments in southern and eastern Yemen represent a major turning point and an opportunity to reengineer the political and military balance within the pro-legitimacy camp on firmer, more coherent foundations, opening a window for a more active Egyptian role rooted in history and strategic interests.
Structural Dysfunction within the Pro-Legitimacy Camp
Politically, the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022—comprising eight members under the leadership of Rashad Al-Alimi—reflected the post-war balance of power after years of conflict, with the stated aim of containing internal rivalry and unifying the pro-legitimacy camp against the Houthis.
The Council brought together a mix of partisan affiliations, regional loyalties, and military power centres, including representatives from the General People’s Congress, the Islah Party, and the Southern Transitional Council, alongside commanders of regionally backed armed formations. Yet from its inception, the Council carried deep structural contradictions and lacked a unified political vision or clear decision-making mechanisms. Its members often acted as representatives of separate power bases, each supported by distinct regional patrons, networks of influence, and competing priorities.
Within this heterogeneous structure, the influence of Aidarous Al-Zubaidi—President of the Southern Transitional Council and Vice President of the Presidential Leadership Council—became particularly pronounced. Al-Zubaidi has advocated southern secession or, at minimum, the imposition of expanded autonomy.
Through de facto territorial control over Aden and large parts of the south, and through the possession of military and security formations operating outside the official chain of command, he established himself as a fait accompli actor combining formal authority within legitimacy institutions with an independent political-military posture. This dynamic went as far as the Southern Transitional Council openly criticising government performance, refusing to implement government decisions, and at times expelling the government from its seat of power at Al-Maashiq Palace in Aden.
At the same time, Yemen’s military establishment no longer resembles a unified national army. Instead, it has evolved into a web of armed formations with multiple loyalties, most notably the Security Belt Forces, the Hadrami Elite Forces, the Shabwani Elite Forces, the Giants Brigades, the National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh, and the Homeland Shield Forces, alongside tribal formations in Marib, Al-Jawf, Shabwa, and Al-Mahra whose alliances shift with the prevailing security and political context.
This fragmentation has been further entrenched by the political economy of war, as different factions compete over state resources such as ports, oil fields, customs revenues, and financial transfers. The outcome has been the erosion of central command, the absence of a national military doctrine, and the transformation of military decision-making into a product of local influence calculations rather than a component of a national strategy to confront the Houthis. In an attempt to address these problems, a joint security and military committee was formed to restructure and unify armed and security forces under a single command. Yet several factions—most notably the Southern Transitional Council—resisted unification measures and preferred to operate independently.
By contrast, the Houthis have benefited from this fragmentation by maintaining disciplined central leadership, unity of political-military decision-making, and a superior capacity to mobilise and direct resources. They have also exploited gaps in the international sanctions regime and inspection mechanisms, enabling them to receive financial and military support from Iran, the Popular Mobilisation Forces, other members of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” and additional external actors. This turbulent political and military landscape has therefore constrained the pro-legitimacy camp’s capacity to achieve meaningful political or military progress over recent years.
Internal Escalation
It was unrealistic to expect this decaying landscape to persist indefinitely; confrontation was only a matter of time. In recent weeks, the Southern Transitional Council has escalated its political and military activity in parts of Hadramout in an effort to expand its influence eastward beyond its traditional strongholds in Aden, Lahj, and Al-Dhale. This move relied on both military repositioning and political messaging that sought to incorporate these governorates into a wider “southern” project. Yet these attempts collided with distinct social and tribal realities, as well as with local forces unwilling to accept externally imposed arrangements or to see their regions transformed into arenas of influence competition.
Faced with the risk of the eastern governorates sliding into open confrontation, Saudi Arabia intervened to contain the escalation, driven by the imperative of securing its southern border and preserving cohesion within the anti-Houthi camp. As political containment efforts faltered, Riyadh resorted to limited military intervention targeting positions and support shipments linked to the Southern Transitional Council, delivering a clear message regarding the permissible limits of movement.
As pressure intensified, Aidarous Al-Zubaidi disappeared from the scene, amid competing narratives—some suggesting he had left the country, others insisting he remained inside Yemen. In parallel, Homeland Shield forces were deployed to several areas where the Southern Transitional Council had held security influence, in a bid to recalibrate the battlefield and impose new security arrangements.
Politically, Riyadh hosted prominent Southern Transitional Council figures, while the Council dissolved its institutions and announced its intention to engage in political dialogue on the “southern file.” Meanwhile, President Al-Alimi introduced changes to the membership of the Presidential Leadership Council and reshuffled the Yemeni government. These moves signal a shift away from managing fragile balances towards reengineering the southern landscape in ways that constrain uncontrolled secessionist tendencies and prevent the eastern governorates from descending into a multi-actor open conflict.
Reengineering the Yemeni Landscape and the Egyptian Role
Reengineering the Yemeni file is a complex, multidimensional undertaking that requires a comprehensive approach addressing the roots of political and military dysfunction, alongside the social and humanitarian dimensions of the crisis. At the forefront of such steps is the task of reunifying political forces within an inclusive national framework and empowering Yemeni political parties to reclaim their natural role in the political process.
In parallel, reforming the military structure becomes essential, particularly in confronting the core structural defect of multiple competing power centres, by reorganising armed forces and unifying diverse military formations under a single central command. Development and reconstruction are no less important than political and military efforts. Improving humanitarian conditions, restoring basic services, and supporting livelihoods are decisive elements in rebuilding public trust and strengthening popular support for legitimacy.
In this context, the development of an Egyptian role becomes particularly significant—one that supports political, military, and developmental tracks in Yemen through institutional foundations capable of advancing internal stability, strengthening peace, and contributing to the emergence of a renewed Yemeni state. Any Egyptian engagement must avoid rebuilding the political and military system in ways that reproduce past mistakes, trigger regression in the political process, or deepen fragmentation within the legitimacy camp.
Although Egypt has not played an active role on the Yemeni arena in recent years for several reasons, it possesses a substantial reservoir of shared history and mutual interests with Yemen, positioning it as a welcomed and potentially effective actor in reorganising Yemen’s political landscape.
The Yemeni situation intersects directly with strategic files that touch upon Egyptian national security, including the security of the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait, freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, and stability in the Horn of Africa. From this perspective, Egyptian policy could be advanced through several parallel tracks, including the development of a formal Egyptian strategic vision for Yemen’s future that addresses state-building across its different dimensions and proposes practical options aimed at strengthening the pro-legitimacy camp on multiple fronts.
This should be accompanied by structured engagement with key regional and international actors to explore Egyptian perspectives and develop a regional, consensus-based vision on Yemen’s future. In this regard, the recent visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan to Cairo following the latest developments offers an opening for this type of coordination.
A further priority lies in advancing the Egyptian-Yemeni strategic dialogue, which resumed in 2024 after years of interruption, and in exploring opportunities to activate cooperation across sectors—particularly security cooperation in light of the activity of terrorist movements in Yemen such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. It is equally important to revive the work of the Joint Higher Committee chaired by the prime ministers of both countries to deepen coordination across areas of cooperation and strengthen economic ties.
Alongside official channels, Egypt could contribute by establishing an informal Egyptian-Yemeni Track Two process that brings together academics, intellectuals, and think-tank experts from both sides to develop implementable ideas and policy options that can be elevated to the official level, thereby reinforcing bilateral relations and enhancing the prospects for a more stable Yemeni future.
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