Organized under the Sudan and Horn of Africa Studies Programme and the African Studies Working Group at the Egyptian Enterprise for Policy and Strategic Studies, the discussion brought together Egyptian and Sudanese diplomats, academics, legal experts, and political figures to assess why the war has become structurally difficult to “classify” or resolve through traditional ceasefire-first approaches.
Egypt’s principles and the logic of parallel tracks
In opening remarks, Mohamed Abdel Halim, Director of the Egyptian Enterprise for Policy and Strategic Studies, stressed Cairo’s fixed principles: Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, and the preservation of national state institutions. He framed Sudan as a vital strategic depth for Egypt and a pillar of regional stability, arguing that the point of the workshop was to move from diagnosis to practical approaches that could help rebuild state capacity. The opening segment was moderated by Samar Ibrahim, head of the Sudan and Horn of Africa Studies Programme, with African affairs expert Ramadan Qurni facilitating the joint Egyptian–Sudanese exchange.
Red lines: No parallel governments, no “second army”
Former Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister Ambassador Salah Halima argued that any stabilization effort must run on parallel tracks — security, humanitarian relief, political settlement, and state reconstruction — rather than treating the war as a technical ceasefire file. He said the conflict’s roots predate April 2023, pointing to political process outcomes that deepened tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and accelerated the emergence of competing power centres inside the state. Halima underlined Egypt’s rejection of any parallel government linked to the RSF, warning that such an outcome would speed fragmentation, reshape demographic realities, and create direct security risks on Egypt’s southern border. He also linked war dynamics to resource extraction and smuggling networks, arguing that curbing “war economies,” particularly gold-related revenues, is essential to restoring Sudan’s economic viability.
State failure, not just a military clash
Amani El-Tawil, Director of the African Programme at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, argued that Sudan’s war cannot be reduced to a fight between two armed formations. Instead, she described it as the eruption of a long-standing crisis of state failure, identity, and citizenship, going back decades. She urged a shift in the discourse from generic calls for unity to a more concrete debate about the form of unity Sudan needs — including a stable civil state capable of managing diversity without reproducing old exclusions. El-Tawil also questioned the credibility of political umbrellas associated with armed actors, insisting that any meaningful civilian track requires a full separation between politics and weapons, and renewed bridge-building among Sudanese elites to craft solutions not dictated by external leverage.
Drones, logistics, and the hard math of endurance
Strategic expert Major General Ahmed El-Nahhas argued that the conflict’s timing and evolution intersect with wider regional pressures, including security in Gaza and the Red Sea, turning Sudan into a variable with consequences beyond its borders. He warned that prolonged instability risks producing a chronically “disturbed” state that external actors can exploit to reshape the Horn of Africa’s strategic map. On the battlefield, El-Nahhas highlighted the growing role of drones and irregular tactics, arguing that success cannot be measured by repelling strikes, but by neutralizing launch capabilities and regaining operational initiative. He also indicated the importance of disrupting cross-border financial and logistical pipelines that sustain armed capacity. At the same time, he proposed using economic tools — including business networks and trade corridors — to strengthen humanitarian delivery and reinforce state resilience, noting that bilateral trade has exceeded $1 billion.
Scenarios: a prolonged conflict and a “Libya-style” risk
Ramadan Qurni argued that Sudan’s rapidly shifting battlefield makes prediction harder than in more conventional wars, citing developments across Darfur and the spread of clashes toward key urban zones. He presented competing scenarios, warning that the most likely path is a prolonged conflict producing rival authorities and rival external support networks, thus exhausting institutions, and risking a fragmentation pattern reminiscent of Libya. He also drew attention to a broader regional linkage — including supply routes and maritime nodes — arguing that the war is increasingly fought across intersecting regional theatres rather than remaining contained within Sudan’s borders. Participants also discussed how drone warfare, reportedly enabled through external supply channels, has altered urban conflict dynamics and increased pressure on infrastructure.
Sudanese voices: The limits of force and the need for a new political contract
Sudanese participants offered contrasting diagnoses but converged on one conclusion: a purely military solution is unlikely to end the crisis without deepening fragmentation. Former Foreign Minister Ambassador Ali Youssef framed the war as entangled in wider regional competition over resources and strategic positioning, calling for stronger security coordination with Egypt and questioning the neutrality of some regional actors involved in mediation. Legal scholar Nabil Adeeb rejected the “civil war” label, describing the conflict as institutional, rooted in earlier decisions that created parallel armed structures, and argued for “supra-constitutional” principles that safeguard the state’s identity and democratic trajectory regardless of shifting majorities. Sadiq Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Secretary-General of the Somoud Alliance, emphasized that rebuilding the state requires strict separation between political competition and the military sphere. It also entails an inclusive development-focused national project. Writer Mahboub Abdel Salam warned that polarization on social media can be as destructive as battlefield violence, and urged translating Egypt’s deep security stake in Sudan into a more effective stabilization framework.
What participants recommended
The workshop’s closing recommendations focused on agreeing on fixed national principles — including unity, state identity, and a national army — and conditioning political participation on full separation from armed structures. Participants stressed that rebuilding should prioritize institutions over quota-based power sharing, including moving toward a functioning legislative framework. They also called for stronger regional and international coordination to curb the external channels that fuel the war, alongside serious disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) tracks tied to state reconstruction. The meeting concluded with a note of cautious optimism that Sudan’s recovery remains possible if political forces acknowledge past failures and commit to a new social contract that places the state above factional power.
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