From geoeconomics to geopolitics: The return of geography

Ali El Din Helal
Monday 26 Jan 2026

President Donald Trump’s calls for the United States to assume control over Greenland, a territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, have sparked intense political controversy and firm European rejection, with repercussions that continue to reverberate across transatlantic relations.

 

Some observers have interpreted this debate as evidence of a renewed centrality of geopolitics and political geography in international affairs after decades in which globalization, technological transformation, and economic interdependence appeared to dominate strategic thinking. Yet this “return” is less a sudden revival than the continuation of an intellectual and policy reassessment that has been underway for more than a decade.

An early and influential contribution to this reassessment was Dr Colin Dueck's 2013 study, The Return of Geography. Dueck argues that following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, a widespread conviction took hold in Western strategic thought that globalization, international institutions, technological progress, and the diffusion of democracy would fundamentally transform world politics and diminish the relevance of geography. Experience has since exposed the limits of this assumption. Great-power rivalry has not disappeared, and geographical realities continue to exert a decisive influence on national interests, threat perceptions, and security strategies.

In this conception, geography is not confined to physical terrain. It encompasses political borders, the location of maritime chokepoints that regulate global trade, the spatial distribution of natural resources, and the positioning of military forces and bases. These material features shape the options available to states and impose enduring constraints on their behaviour. To disregard geography, Dueck contends, is not a sign of sophistication but a form of strategic self-deception.

Dueck situates his analysis within the classical canon of geopolitical thought, drawing on Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory of sea power, Halford Mackinder’s concept of the “heartland,” and Nicholas Spykman’s emphasis on the “rimland.” He then connects these traditions to contemporary realities, most notably the rise of China. China’s geography—its long coastline, crowded maritime approaches, vulnerable energy supply routes, and proximity to contested regions—deeply shapes both its economic ambitions and its military posture. Beijing’s quest to secure access to resources, markets, and sea lanes is thus inseparable from the spatial constraints and opportunities created by its location.

The broader conclusion is that while globalization and economic interdependence are powerful forces, they have not dissolved geopolitical competition or eliminated wars fought in defence of national interests. The international system continues to generate instability precisely because states still struggle over territory, resources, and strategic positions. International relations, therefore, cannot be meaningfully understood apart from the geographical contexts in which states exist.

Subsequent scholarship has reinforced these insights. Tim Marshall’s The Power of Geography (2021) and Francesco Bongiovanni’s The Return of Geopolitics and Imperial Conflict (2024) offer detailed examinations of how geography continues to structure the foreign policies of major powers and the conflicts among them. Together, these works demonstrate that motivations, objectives, and patterns of interaction in world politics remain deeply embedded in spatial realities.

This renewed salience of geopolitics is particularly evident in Europe, where Russia has repeatedly warned against NATO’s eastward expansion and its proximity to Russian borders. The wars in Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 revived classical notions of strategic depth, buffer zones, and military geography. Similar dynamics are visible in the Indo-Pacific, where both China and the United States have expanded their military presence in the South China Sea, and in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which places heavy emphasis on ports, railways, and overland corridors. Meanwhile, growing global attention to energy pipelines, maritime straits, and commercial chokepoints reflects an understanding that control over these arteries translates into geopolitical leverage.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the accelerating effects of climate change have added another layer to this reassessment. They have underscored that food security, public health, and supply-chain resilience are inseparable from geography. Many states have therefore sought higher levels of relative self-sufficiency in essential commodities and greater diversification of trade routes. The deeper implication is a renewed recognition that politics shapes economics, rather than the reverse, and that place continues to shape politics.

Technology, far from rendering geography obsolete, has given it new strategic dimensions. Submarine internet cables, satellite constellations, large-scale data centres, and the global distribution of rare-earth minerals are all geographically anchored and increasingly contested. The digital age has not dissolved spatial constraints; it has layered new forms of competition on top of them.

Within this broader context, the strategic value of Egypt’s location warrants renewed attention. Egypt sits at the intersection of Africa, Asia, and Europe. It possesses an approximately 1,941-kilometre coastline along the Red Sea, including the Gulf of Suez to the northwest and the Gulf of Aqaba to the northeast, and is directly linked to both the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It also has a 995-kilometre Mediterranean coastline stretching from Rafah in the east to Sallum on the Libyan border in the west, connecting Egypt directly to Europe and the wider Mediterranean basin.

For these reasons, Egypt has emerged as one of the world’s most important hubs for submarine cables, with numerous fibre-optic lines passing through its territory or landing on its shores, linking Europe with Asia and Africa. Egypt thus occupies a pivotal position in global connectivity and cybersecurity, to the extent that it is sometimes described as a global “digital bottleneck.” This role is reinforced by networks of oil and gas pipelines, electricity interconnections, and major regional infrastructure projects.

Egypt’s geography, therefore, derives increasing significance from its integration into large-scale international and regional initiatives. Combined with improvements in domestic infrastructure and sustained political stability, this location grants Egypt substantial strategic weight and a meaningful role in energy security, food security, maritime safety, and international trade. Taken together, these realities reaffirm an enduring truth: geography remains a foundational element of power in world politics.

*The writer is Professor of Political Science at Cairo University.

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