The renowned international relations scholar James Rosenau summed up the state of the world after the end of the Cold War as being shaped by two variables, both rooted in the phenomenon of “globalisation.” The first concerned the formation of political entities within states and beyond them.
Due to the ongoing communications revolution, it has become easier for the predominant political culture to make the state attractive and assemble diverse groups into a single political entity. At the level beyond the state, the historical model is presented by the European Union, which brought 27 European countries together in a single, functional unit. The second variable is the inverse role of the same technologies regarding sub-groups. Rather than working to unify diverse groups, they reinforce the sub-group bonds and identities, making them stronger than the bond between the group and the sovereign state.
Several phenomena highlight a problem related to national identity and cohesion in most Arab and Islamic states, which can be classified according to the extent to which “national identity” prevails within them. This collective identity may be resisted through “sub-national” or “supra-national” identities. The former comprises forms of belonging that are narrower in scope than the nation state affiliation. Whether organised around tribal, religious, regional or ideological identity, their definition of political selfhood does not remotely align with the boundaries of the sovereign nation state. “Supra-national” identities, by contrast, encompass all forms of belonging that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. They often aspire to forming political entities larger than the state, expressing a conception of Arab or Islamic identity. Even within societies that have achieved, whether voluntarily or by force, progress towards entrenching Western modernity and “globalisation,” controversy – sometimes escalating to the point of conflict – persists between the different levels of identity. In the Arab region, Arab and Islamic identities constitute national identity’s principal competitors.
This problem became especially acute following the so-called Arab Spring, which unleashed a major earthquake in our Arab region and the greater Middle East. The consequent, comprehensive disruption in the balance of power whetted regional and international ambitions, which variously manifested themselves in direct occupation, the establishment of settlements, repeated violations of national sovereignty, and militias casting themselves as alternatives to state structures. In the decade and a half since the Arab Spring, the Arab world has experienced three main trends. The first is best described as absolute chaos. The second was characterised by the rise of certain extremist religious currents that managed to attain power in some countries. This trend is epitomised by IS, which established its so-called Caliphate over an extensive area straddling the Syrian-Iraqi border. The third trend was the reformist drive pursued by the Arab monarchies that survived the convulsions of the “spring” and was soon adopted by pivotal Arab states such as Egypt.
This reformist trend is grounded in the concept of the nation-state coupled with comprehensive modernisation. It is pursued through the construction of robust state infrastructures, as well as through the development of new productive bases and the revivication of religious thought to bring it in line with the spirit of the age and the quest for progress.
The Middle East has thus come to be characterised by two realities. First, it is divided between reformists who seek peace and stability – both prerequisites for development – and others those who oppose peace and stability out of considerations related to history, religion, habit, or vested interests in obstructing development. Second, an open or undeclared war is underway between the two sides, each of which engages with the world on fundamentally different premises.
Of the 22 members of the Arab League, 12 have established a national identity shaped by common interests, a shared history of the struggle for independence, and a national project for progress based on modern constitutional principles. In addition, all are able to exercise control over their sovereign territories. Those states include the six Arab Gulf states, Jordan and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and – relatively speaking – Iraq. By contrast, ten other states suffer a crisis of identity, an inability to preserve independence, and internal fragmentation, all of which obstructs the formulation of a national project for development, modernity, and progress. These states include Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, as well as some states that are less seriously afflicted by the crisis.
While the question of identity remains the critical factor in the pursuit of stability, resolving it is not sufficient in itself. Other crucial factors are the condition of the strategic elite that is poised to assume power and manage the state, and the extent of progress a state has achieved in terms of technological expertise and modernisation. In other words, attaining independence in itself is not enough. The effective nation state is one that can forge a vibrant national identity from history, geography and shared interests, and one that is capable of penetrating the whole of its territory and mobilising its natural and human resources.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 29 January, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
Short link: