In this context, there is an urgent need for collective diplomacy led by influential regional powers capable of combining political influence, regional legitimacy, and historical experience in crisis management. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, by virtue of their geographical location, political weight, and intertwined relationships with regional and international actors, are natural candidates to lead this effort, not through unilateral initiatives, but through coordinated collective diplomacy aimed at restoring stability in the hotspots of Arab collapse, primarily Yemen, Sudan, and Libya, and contributing to moving the Gaza agreement from a fragile ceasefire to a more sustainable political path.
In the Yemeni case, the past years have proven that military approaches, whether led by regional powers or involving international forces, have only resulted in a redistribution of violence without a decisive outcome, contributing to the deepening of social and political divisions and transforming Yemen into a proxy battleground for regional conflict. Here, Egyptian Saudi collective diplomacy has an opportunity to redefine the path to a settlement, by shifting from a logic of conflict management to a logic of state reconstruction.
Saudi Arabia, which has borne the brunt of the war's consequences, has become more aware of the limitations of the military option and more open to political settlements that reduce security threats on its borders. Egypt, for its part, possesses accumulated experience in supporting national state institutions and a more comprehensive vision for the security of the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Combining these two dimensions could lead to a genuine Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue that is not limited to power-sharing among armed elites, but rather restores the concept of an inclusive state and, at the same time, prevents Yemen from sliding into a permanent sphere of influence for non-Arab powers.
In Sudan, the need for collective diplomacy appears even more urgent, given the devastating internal war that has reproduced the logic of militias and opened the door wide to external interventions and the internationalization of the conflict. The failure of previous international efforts stemmed not only from the complexity of the Sudanese landscape, but also from the absence of a regional power capable of imposing a coherent negotiating framework that balances a ceasefire with addressing the root causes of the crisis related to the nature of the state and the civil-military power structure.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, given their direct relations with the parties to the conflict and their economic and political influence, can push for a new negotiating framework that links a ceasefire, the reunification of the military institution, and the launch of a gradual civilian political process, without illusions of a rapid transition or the complete exclusion of any party. This type of diplomacy does not seek to impose a ready-made model, but rather to prevent complete collapse and preserve a minimum level of state functionality, as a prerequisite for any subsequent stability.
As for Libya, it is the clearest example of the failure of conflict management through temporary arrangements and power-sharing among de facto forces. Years of international conferences have only served to entrench the division and transform Libya into an open arena for competing external interventions. Here, collective diplomacy led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia can help break the deadlock by recentering the Arab track, linking any political settlement to the withdrawal of foreign fighters, dismantling the war economy, and building a minimum consensus around unified sovereign institutions. Egypt has a direct interest in the stability of both western and eastern Libya, while Saudi Arabia can use its political and diplomatic weight to reduce contradictions in international positions and push Libyan actors toward a less fragile settlement, even if it comes at the expense of the short-term ambitions of some local forces.
Regarding Gaza, the transition from the first phase of any agreement, which often focuses on a ceasefire and prisoner exchange, to a more complex second phase involving reconstruction, governance arrangements, and security guarantees, remains the greatest challenge. Historical experience indicates that the absence of a supportive regional framework makes this phase vulnerable to rapid collapse. Here, Egypt plays a pivotal role due to its geographical location, its relations with various Palestinian factions, and its long experience in managing de-escalation efforts.
However, the success of this role requires broader Arab support and Saudi political and financial backing, which would reconnect the Gaza issue to a wider regional context that does not separate the humanitarian from the political. Collective diplomacy of this kind can help prevent the second phase from becoming merely crisis management and instead push for arrangements that reduce the likelihood of a return to war, even in the absence of a comprehensive final settlement.
What distinguishes the collective diplomacy that Egypt and Saudi Arabia can lead is not only the multiplicity of issues but also the approach. This is a pragmatic diplomacy that does not assume the possibility of quick or ideal solutions, but at the same time recognizes that leaving crises unresolved carries a heavy strategic cost for Arab security. It is a diplomacy that understands the limitations of military force and instead relies on a combination of political influence, economic pressure, building regional consensus, and cautious engagement with international powers, without becoming completely beholden to their agendas.
In a world moving towards greater competition among major powers and a decline in international commitment to managing long-standing conflicts, a regional role becomes not an option, but a necessity. If Egypt and Saudi Arabia succeed in developing a coherent collective diplomacy, based not on reactive responses but on a shared strategic vision, this may not resolve the crises in Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and Gaza all at once, but it can at least put these crises back on manageable tracks and prevent their descent into further fragmentation and chaos. This achievement may seem limited on the surface, but in the current Arab context, it represents a significant step forward. This is a crucial step towards restoring the very idea of a regional order.
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