While nuclear risks remain structurally embedded in the international system, strategic attention has increasingly shifted toward high-intensity conventional conflicts, hybrid threats, and rapidly advancing military technologies. This recalibration has contributed to the marginalization of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, despite their continued relevance to long-term strategic stability.
At the global level, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has reshaped security priorities through the large-scale use of conventional firepower and advanced military capabilities, normalizing sustained high-intensity warfare. Events affecting civilian nuclear infrastructure in the context of active hostilities in 2022 laid bare the unprecedented risks posed to nuclear safety and security when such facilities become entangled in armed conflict.
In response, European states and other countries have significantly increased defence spending, prioritizing deterrence, force readiness, and technological modernisation, particularly within the European Union (EU).
These dynamics are mirrored in the Middle East.
In Gaza, credible documentation by United Nations (UN) mechanisms and international human rights organizations has established evidence of the use of weapons prohibited under international humanitarian law by Israel. Concurrently, hybrid and cyber-enabled operations, including the pager detonation incident in Lebanon, have further blurred the boundaries between conventional and strategic conflict.
At the same time, ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran over Iran’s nuclear programme continue to generate uncertainty regarding escalation dynamics, reinforcing concerns about renewed nuclear risk in an already volatile regional security environment.
Collectively, these trends erode the culture of restraint underpinning arms control regimes, making a critical reassessment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process both timely and necessary.
The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the primary foundation for any productive dialogue regarding the global elimination of nuclear arms. However, recent years have seen a significant decline in trust regarding the NPT Review Conference process, largely due to a perceived power imbalance between states that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not.
This erosion of confidence is fueled by several factors, including the humanitarian concerns raised by non-nuclear states, the frustratingly slow progress in meeting Article VI disarmament obligations, and the rising interest in a ban treaty that excludes the participation of nuclear-armed powers.
A core tension exists between non-nuclear-weapon states, which argue that possessing nuclear weapons undermines global safety, and nuclear-armed states, which view deterrence as a vital component of national security.
At the 2015 Review Conference, 160 nations endorsed a humanitarian initiative that focused on the catastrophic impact of nuclear detonations on human life and the global environment. These states pushed for a legal framework for elimination using “humanitarian consequences” terminology, but nuclear-armed states countered that there was no immediate requirement for disarmament.
Consequently, 107 states signed the Humanitarian Pledge, which seeks to address the “legal gap” in the NPT regarding the prohibition of these weapons.
By the 2022 Review Conference, the humanitarian movement had transitioned into a formal legal regime via the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which had entered into force the previous year. This propelled the 10th Review Conference to grapple with the TPNW as a permanent part of the international legal landscape for the first time.
Debates within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reflect deep divisions among States Parties regarding both the meaning and the modalities of effective nuclear disarmament. These divergences are rooted in differing threat perceptions, security doctrines, and interpretations of legal obligation. As a result, four distinct approaches to nuclear weapons elimination have crystallized in NPT discourse: the Step-by-Step, Comprehensive, Framework, and Ban Treaty approaches.
These differences became increasingly pronounced during the 2022 NPT Review Conference. Nuclear-armed states and their allies remained resistant to the growing normative influence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Meanwhile, many non-nuclear-weapon states expressed frustration with the perceived stagnation of disarmament efforts. This ideological fragmentation contributed directly to the failure of States Parties to reach a consensus on an outcome document.
Nuclear-weapon states have traditionally favoured an incremental approach to disarmament, viewing it as the only realistic path consistent with international stability and strategic balance. This model has facilitated substantial bilateral reductions in the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War. It relies on sequential and independent measures, including nuclear test bans, negative security assurances, a halt to fissile material production, and negotiated, verifiable arms reduction treaties.
During the 2022 review cycle, proponents of this approach promoted the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative, launched by the United States in 2019, as a means of addressing the underlying security conditions inhibiting disarmament. Critics, however, argued that CEND functioned as a delaying mechanism, shifting attention away from existing treaty obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
By contrast, many non-nuclear-weapon states advocate a comprehensive, time-bound agreement—often conceptualized as a Nuclear Weapons Convention—that would prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons within a single legal instrument. Proponents argue that only a unified framework can ensure that disarmament is irreversible, verifiable, and universal.
Momentum for this approach was renewed in 2022, as several states cited the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals as evidence of the failure of incremental measures. These states called for the inclusion of concrete timelines and benchmarks in the draft final document, proposals that were ultimately rejected by nuclear-weapon states.
First articulated by the UN Secretary-General in 2008, the framework approach envisages a legally binding architecture composed of separate but mutually reinforcing instruments. Under this model, an initial treaty would establish core prohibitions and obligations, followed by subsequent agreements addressing verification, timelines, and institutional arrangements. This approach seeks to link prohibition and elimination while allowing for phased agreement on technical details.
During the 2022 Review Conference, some states advanced the framework approach with a potential bridge between the NPT and the TPNW, arguing that it could mitigate treaty fragmentation and provide a common technical pathway, particularly on verification, acceptable to states across differing legal positions.
The Ban Treaty approach has gained significant momentum through sustained advocacy by civil society, notably the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Its central objective is to stigmatize nuclear weapons by establishing their categorical prohibition, even in the absence of participation by nuclear-armed states. In 2017, a majority of UN member states supported the negotiation of such an instrument, leading to the adoption of the TPNW, which entered into force in 2021.
The 2022 Review Conference was marked by intense debate over references to the TPNW. While the draft outcome document acknowledged its entry into force, several nuclear-weapon states and their allies formally objected, arguing that the treaty risks undermining the NPT’s centrality within the global non-proliferation regime.
Although the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review cycle is structured around five-year intervals, the process has long been characterized by concerns regarding its pace and effectiveness. Observers and participants alike have noted that review conferences frequently generate extensive statements and working papers, while producing limited tangible progress on disarmament commitments.
Nuclear-weapon states have consistently maintained that Article VI does not prescribe specific timelines for disarmament, whereas many non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society actors regard the absence of time-bound benchmarks as a significant legal and political gap within the Treaty’s implementation framework.
Historically, consensus outcome documents were achieved at the 1975, 1985, 1995, 2000, and 2010 Review Conferences, reflecting periods of relative alignment among States Parties. By contrast, the conferences held in 1980, 1990, 2005, and 2015 concluded without consensus, underscoring the vulnerability of the review process to shifting geopolitical conditions and divergent strategic priorities. This uneven record has reinforced perceptions that progress under the NPT remains contingent on external political circumstances rather than driven by institutional momentum.
The 2022 Review Conference further accentuated these concerns. Originally scheduled for 2020, the conference was postponed for more than two years due to the global COVID-19 pandemic, significantly disrupting the review cycle. When it eventually convened, it concluded without the adoption of a consensus outcome document for the second consecutive time. This outcome intensified assessments that the NPT review process is experiencing a period of stagnation, if not paralysis.
The failure to reach consensus in 2022 was ultimately shaped by a broader geopolitical crisis, namely the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Objections raised by Russia to specific language in the draft outcome document, particularly provisions relating to the safety and legal control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, prevented its adoption.
This episode highlighted a structural vulnerability within the NPT framework: the capacity of a single nuclear-armed state to impede collective outcomes based on narrowly defined national interests. In doing so, it reiterated the persistent tension between the Treaty’s consensus-based procedures and its aspiration to serve as a resilient instrument for global nuclear governance.
The sources highlight several legal deficiencies in the NPT, such as the lack of a comprehensive prohibition and the fact that Articles I and II only restrict non-nuclear states. There is also ambiguity regarding whether nuclear states can assist each other in manufacturing or if modernization is prohibited under Article VI. Many argue that a clear normative framework is missing, as nuclear weapons are the only weapons of mass destruction not yet explicitly labelled as illegal by a global treaty.
The conflict in Ukraine during the 2022 conference highlighted a new legal gap regarding the security assurances provided to non-nuclear states. This led to urgent calls for legally binding “Negative Security Assurances” to protect non-nuclear states from the threat of nuclear use by a weapon state.
Verification remains a central pillar for building international confidence and ensuring accountability in nuclear disarmament. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) holds a statutory mandate to apply safeguards and contribute to disarmament verification. Existing analyses suggest that the Agency could further strengthen this role by developing generic dismantlement models, standardizing declarations for facilities and personnel, and advancing measurement techniques applicable to verification processes.
Transparency could be enhanced through voluntary annual declarations by nuclear-armed states to the United Nations on warhead numbers, delivery systems, and fissile material holdings. Complementary multilateral initiatives, such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), also provide valuable platforms for technical cooperation among states.
Following the 2022 Review Conference, there is increased attention on nuclear safety and security, expanding expectations of the IAEA’s role to include monitoring civilian nuclear facilities in conflict settings. The Agency’s monitoring activities in conflict-affected environments have elevated nuclear stewardship as a core concern, linking disarmament verification more explicitly with risk reduction and crisis prevention.
At the same time, despite broad recognition of the IAEA’s technical expertise, States Parties did not agree on expanding its mandate toward active verification of nuclear weapons dismantlement or on establishing a concrete verification roadmap for elimination. Continued modernization of nuclear arsenals by all five nuclear-weapon states further brings to the fore the gap between verification discourse and substantive progress under Article VI of the NPT.
The international system stands at a critical juncture marked by the intensification, diversification, and technological evolution of armed conflict, with particularly acute implications for the Middle East.
Ongoing hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, including risks to nuclear infrastructure and heightened nuclear signalling, alongside escalating tensions between the United States and Iran, illustrate how conventional and geopolitical crises can increasingly intersect with nuclear danger across regions.
As immediate security imperatives dominate strategic agendas, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament risk further marginalization. In this context, persistent divisions and procedural paralysis within the NPT review process reflect a broader erosion of confidence in multilateral security governance.
The 2026 Review Conference is expected to unfold amid these geopolitical tensions, with States Parties likely to prioritize risk reduction and nuclear safety over the resolution of longstanding disagreements on disarmament pathways and implementation. Whether the Treaty can retain credibility under these conditions, and how States Parties engage with the TPNW process, will play a key role in shaping the future resilience of the global non-proliferation regime.
Throughout these developments, Egypt has consistently emphasized the need to revitalize the NPT process, with particular emphasis on restoring momentum to the nuclear disarmament pillar as an essential component of the Treaty’s credibility and balance.
Egypt has repeatedly cautioned that emerging risks to the stability of the NPT regime require timely and collective responses, as continued stagnation risks eroding confidence in the Treaty as a whole.
Anchored in its broader pursuit of regional peace and stability, Egypt continues to regard the NPT as a central pillar of the international security architecture and a foundational framework for addressing both current and future nuclear risks.
*Ambassador Sameh Aboul Enein is Professor of International Relations, Geneva School of Diplomacy, and a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
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