Despite its conciliatory framing, the initiative remains, at its core, a security-driven process. It reflects less a profound democratic transformation than a calculated effort to close the chapter of armed struggle waged by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), under the pressure of rapidly shifting regional geopolitical dynamics.
This study analyzes the Turkish–Kurdish reconciliation process across six main dimensions. The first reviews the steps taken and achievements recorded since the launch of the initiative. The second examines patterns of engagement by official institutions, public opinion, and the media. The third explores the domestic and regional drivers behind the process. The fourth assesses the opportunities and challenges it has encountered. The fifth analyzes its implications for the reconfiguration of Turkey’s internal political landscape. The sixth and final section offers a reading of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach to the notion of Turkish–Kurdish–Arab brotherhood.
I. Practical Steps Toward Turkish–Kurdish Reconciliation (October 2024 – December 2025)
The Kurdish issue returned to the forefront of Turkey’s domestic political agenda in October 2024 with the launch of a new reconciliation track characterized by caution and gradualism. The process unfolded through a carefully calibrated package of political, legal, and security measures designed to maintain control and prevent deviation into unpredictable pathways.
The initiative began with politically symbolic yet highly significant gestures, most notably Bahçeli’s unprecedented handshake with deputies from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) during the opening of the parliamentary session in October 2024. This act signaled a willingness within the ruling alliance to pursue a tightly managed settlement, coinciding with a presidential discourse emphasizing the priority of strengthening the “internal front” amid regional geopolitical turbulence.
Within this context, Bahçeli announced, on October 22, 2024, a new political initiative proposing an end to the conflict through granting Abdullah Öcalan a direct role. This included allowing limited political communication, calling for the dissolution of the PKK and the laying down of arms, and floating the possible activation of the “right to hope” as a legal framework based on European Court of Human Rights rulings—without an explicit commitment to Öcalan’s release.
Concurrently, Turkish authorities permitted a visit to Öcalan for the first time in over three years, followed by limited contact with his family and legal counsel. This marked a calculated shift from complete isolation to a controlled communication regime. The DEM Party was entrusted with the primary coordination role, forming a parliamentary delegation that acted as an intermediary between Öcalan and the government. The delegation conducted repeated visits to İmralı Prison and held extensive consultations with the presidency, Turkish political parties, and Kurdish actors in Iraq and Syria, aiming to contain the cross-border ramifications of the process.
The process reached its peak on February 27, 2025, when Öcalan issued an explicit call to end armed struggle and dissolve the PKK. This was translated into concrete steps, including the PKK’s formal declaration of an end to armed operations, symbolic weapon-burning ceremonies, and organized withdrawals from Turkish territory and parts of northern Iraq during the second half of 2025—an unprecedented practical development compared to previous reconciliation attempts.
Institutionally, a multi-party parliamentary committee was formed in August 2025 to manage the political and legal dimensions of the reconciliation process. Its mandate focused on preparing a legislative framework for disarmament and reintegration, while deliberately excluding constitutional debates or sensitive identity-related issues. The committee consulted a wide spectrum of official and societal actors and produced legal recommendations aimed at regulating the “post-organization” phase and enhancing the political legitimacy of the process.
In parallel, groundwork was laid for a new legal framework centered on the reintegration of PKK members according to specific criminal classifications, without granting a general amnesty or releasing senior leaders, accompanied by limited confidence-building administrative measures. This underscores that the current trajectory prioritizes ending armed conflict and managing it through legal and security mechanisms, rather than advancing a comprehensive political settlement redefining the long-term relationship between the Turkish state and its Kurdish population.
II. Major Trends in Engagement with the Reconciliation Process
The launch of the “Turkey Free of Terrorism” initiative generated clear political and societal polarization within Turkey, reflecting divergent interpretations of its objectives, limits, and potential outcomes. These reactions can be broadly categorized into four main trends.
The first is represented by the ruling coalition, which frames the initiative as a purely security-oriented process aimed at eliminating the PKK’s armed threat rather than pursuing political reconciliation or societal healing. The state’s superiority and capacity to impose its terms are emphasized, while Öcalan is portrayed as a tactically constrained actor and the DEM Party as a political structure that can be “normalized” if severed from armed militancy. This narrative carefully avoids discussions of democracy, rights, or redefining state–Kurdish relations.
The second trend is embodied by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which adopts a cautiously supportive position, balancing principled endorsement of ending armed conflict with continued political opposition to the government. This reflects the party’s recognition of the importance of engaging with major security issues and its attempt to preserve Kurdish voter support. However, internal divisions persist between a nationalist-leaning faction opposed to coordination with Kurdish movements and a more pragmatic leadership, resulting in hesitant and inconsistent media messaging.
The third trend encompasses the DEM Party and the broader Kurdish political current, which views reconciliation as an entry point to broader democratic transformation and rejects reducing it to disarmament alone. This camp stresses the necessity of constitutional reform, recognition of Kurdish identity, and expanded political participation. Overall, Kurdish support remains conditional and cautious, both domestically and within diaspora communities in Europe, with internal divisions between wary supporters and ideological or interest-based opponents.
The fourth trend is represented by hardline nationalist currents that categorically reject the process, portraying it as a threat to state unity, the Lausanne Treaty, and national identity, while deploying populist anti-Kurdish rhetoric. This camp also frames reconciliation as an opportunity to weaken the MHP and siphon off parts of its electoral base, capitalizing on nationalist anxieties within Turkey and among nationalist diaspora communities, whose responses have largely been characterized by silence, reservation, and suspicion.
III. Domestic and External Drivers of Turkish–Kurdish Reconciliation
The reconciliation process did not emerge spontaneously but rather as the product of converging internal and external pressures that rendered it a political necessity. Externally, geostrategic shifts in the Middle East—including the fragmentation of the so-called resistance axis, the decline of Iranian and Russian influence, and the rise of U.S., Israeli, and Gulf roles—pushed Turkey to manage the Kurdish file independently. Iran’s weakening position, its withdrawal from Syria, and its diminished influence in Iraq heightened the need for a new modus vivendi to mitigate strategic risks.
Concerns over potential Israeli instrumentalization of the Kurdish issue in regional projects further encouraged reconciliation, as did post-Assad dynamics in Syria and Ankara’s fear of escalating Kurdish demands for decentralization or federalism, particularly given U.S. support for Syrian Kurdish forces.
Domestically, reconciliation has also functioned as a political tool serving Erdoğan’s objectives, including paving the way for a fourth presidential term through a potential trade-off between constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity and support for broader constitutional amendments. The government likewise perceives progress on the Kurdish issue as a means of easing domestic pressure stemming from economic hardship and social tensions, while improving management of the economic and social crisis in southeastern Turkey.
IV. Opportunities and Challenges Facing the Reconciliation Process
The reconciliation process unfolded within a complex political and security environment, opening opportunities to end a long-running conflict while generating significant challenges. Among the key opportunities were favorable regional and international dynamics that produced a convergence of interests between the Turkish government and Kurdish actors around ending armed struggle, as well as tacit societal acceptance and cross-party backing, with no strong opposition within either the AKP or MHP. This provided a relatively stable political foundation. The DEM Party played a bridging role, facilitating communication with state institutions and supporting the implementation of legislative and legal measures.
Öcalan’s decision not to condition the process on government steps shortened the timeline toward peace objectives, while Bahçeli’s bureaucratic backing helped limit nationalist institutional resistance. The PKK’s centralized discipline and Öcalan’s influence enabled the swift implementation of decisions, distinguishing it from more fragmented armed groups and enhancing prospects for success.
Nevertheless, the process has faced serious constraints that have capped its potential. Chief among these is the neglect of transitional justice. The focus on dismantling the PKK and voluntary disarmament has proceeded without addressing past violations or compensating victims. The parliamentary “National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy” committee confined itself to legislative and legal procedures, lacking authority to pursue accountability or truth-seeking mechanisms, rendering the process closer to an institutional political settlement than a comprehensive transitional justice framework.
Security-related confidence-building measures have also been insufficient, particularly regarding the village guard system, some members of which were implicated in abuses yet continue to operate under state protection, undermining local peace. Erdoğan’s fluctuating engagement—ceding public leadership to Bahçeli—has affected media discourse and fueled nationalist voter anxieties, while divergent priorities between the AKP and MHP have surfaced: Erdoğan emphasizes electoral gains, whereas Bahçeli seeks tangible legal and political progress.
The absence of a broad societal consensus and persistent mistrust between Turks and Kurds, coupled with entrenched nationalist rhetoric, has impeded positive peace. Turkish segments continue to view Kurdish rights as a threat to identity, while Kurdish communities remain skeptical of the government’s commitment to promises such as Öcalan’s release or expanded political and cultural rights.
These challenges have been compounded by divergent views within the parliamentary committee over the scope of legal and constitutional reforms and the right of return, as well as disagreements over visiting Öcalan. The CHP declined participation, deeming it premature, while the AKP exhibited strong reservations before acquiescing under Bahçeli’s pressure. Isolated statements and actions by PKK elements further eroded public trust. Finally, continued repression of opposition forces—including the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu and pressure on the CHP—has intensified polarization, delayed consensus-building, and threatens the sustainability of the process in the long term.
V. Reconciliation and the Reengineering of Turkish Domestic Politics
Given its deep domestic roots, the Turkish–Kurdish reconciliation process is poised to generate structural shifts in Turkey’s political dynamics, extending beyond the cessation of armed conflict to reshape political discourse, electoral alliances, and patterns of party competition.
Historically, the existence of an armed PKK has served as a central pillar of the AKP’s electoral rhetoric, enabling security- and identity-based polarization to mobilize voters and deflect attention from economic and democratic deficits. Disarmament deprives this discourse of a core justification, compelling the party to redefine sources of threat and transition from ethno-security polarization toward political-moral confrontation with the CHP under banners such as religion or anti-corruption, preserving mobilization logic.
The post-disarmament phase also forces the CHP to reinterpret its Kemalist principles to maintain Kurdish voter support without alienating its nationalist base. The Kurdish issue further exposes the party’s weakness in foreign and security policy, necessitating a more coherent regional vision to bolster its image as a credible governing alternative.
Simultaneously, reconciliation grants the DEM Party long-sought political legitimacy, transforming it into a domesticated opposition operating within defined boundaries. Erdoğan’s conciliatory rhetoric and signals of integration into governance balances suggest a tacit exchange of reconciliation for indirect political support. The party is likely to pursue organizational and discursive restructuring to broaden its social base beyond ethnic confines, potentially redrawing alliance maps ahead of future elections and risking CHP losses among Kurdish voters if excluded from constitutional processes.
Success may also elevate Öcalan into an indirect political actor through expanded communication channels and symbolic leadership, turning İmralı into a regulated platform of Kurdish political influence. Economically, ending armed conflict unlocks the development potential of eastern and southeastern Anatolia, attracting investment, revitalizing border crossings, and linking reconciliation to a long-term development agenda that strengthens social and political stability.
VI. Reading Erdoğan’s Vision of Turkish–Kurdish–Arab Brotherhood
Erdoğan has framed his approach to the Kurdish issue within a principle he terms “Turkish–Kurdish–Arab brotherhood,” aimed at achieving both a “terror-free Turkey” and a “terror-free region.” Yet the contours and mechanisms of this principle remain undefined. It appears to form part of a broader Turkish regional vision seeking to reposition Turkey as a more assertive and hegemonic power in the Middle East, expanding its military, political, and cultural influence.
From Ankara’s perspective, regional developments—namely Iran’s declining influence, the emergence of an allied Syrian regime, and Israeli-led efforts to reshape the Middle East with U.S. backing—have created a conducive environment for advancing this vision. Within this framework, Kurds are portrayed as potential partners and gateways for entrenching Turkey’s role in the new regional order, to the extent that some pro-government conservative Islamist figures have even floated the idea of redeploying former PKK elements and weaponry in the service of Turkish regional ambitions.
However, this vision faces formidable obstacles, including historical grievances among Turks, Kurds, and Arabs; religious and sectarian differences; the absence of a clearly articulated supra-identity or governance model; and the likelihood of friction with competing regional projects, particularly Iranian and Israeli ones. These constraints significantly limit the practical applicability of Erdoğan’s proposed brotherhood framework.
*Mary Maher is a Senior Researcher at the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS)
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