This world — III 

Mahmoud Mohieldin
Thursday 12 Feb 2026

Acknowledging the impending end of the present international order is a prerequisite for moving forward.

 

The collapse of the present world order, which is unfolding before our eyes, does not mean the end of the world as it will mark the beginning of new international arrangements.

The outgoing arrangements are the product of agreements reached towards the end of World War II and put into effect in its aftermath in a manner that reflected the weight of the victors in the post-war era.

Those arrangements have now become obsolete. Acknowledging the impending end of the so-called “rules-based international order” is a prerequisite for moving forward.

Some might be inclined to describe the current state of international cooperation as “G-Zero,” a term coined by the US international relations scholar Ian Bremmer. “G” here refers to international groupings such as the G7 or the G20 of the seven or 20 top industrialised nations.

As Ian Bremmer explains in his 2012 book Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World, the countries that make up these groupings are losing their ability, individually or collectively, to shape the international agenda and provide “global public goods” such as security, the protection of trade and navigation routes, and an effective response to crises.

Under the current conditions of fragile governance and economic fragmentation, geopolitical crises are multiplying while the disparate capacities of discordant powers are increasingly unable to address global challenges.

There is also the Singaporean economist Danny Quah’s description of international relations in a “G-minus” world, characterised by an international grouping minus the US or any other country that chooses not to cooperate, regardless of its size or power.

Why, Quah asks, should countries not directly involved in great-power conflicts have to choose between submission, alignment, or mitigation? He proposes instead that groups of countries sharing common visions and goals should come together and explore avenues for joint cooperation and collective negotiation.

He criticises the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states for choosing to negotiate with the US bilaterally rather than as a single bloc. He also urges non-ASEAN Asian countries like Korea and Japan not to waste time on fruitless bilateral bargaining to improve trade terms with the US and to redirect their trade away from it instead.

Faced with growing isolation, the US would then be compelled to cooperate with those who remain committed to the international order, or, as I would put it, what remains of it.

The fall of the current international “order” presents major opportunities for rising powers, and not only for middle powers like Canada and India, both of which are G20 members. The priorities of the middle powers were laid out in the recent World Economic Forum meetings in Davos.

For the rising powers, the opportunities rest on their first fortifying the pillars of the state. This entails strengthening institutions, upholding the rule of law, and rigorously coordinating public policies around priorities that serve the public interest and the localisation of development.

No state can engage in productive external cooperation if its internal social compact is at risk of unravelling. Attempts to forge cooperative mechanisms under such conditions would not only be a waste of effort but would also turn open channels into entry points for foreign exploitation.

In his 1951 book New Hopes for a Changing World, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell observes that the most violent international conflicts arise from one or more of three types of differences: economic, ethnic, or ideological.

Diverging economic interests were the primary cause of the disputes that led to World War I, Russell says, while economic interests and conflicting ideologies intertwined to cause World War II. A third World War, should it erupt, would be precipitated by economic interests, ethnic differences, and extremist ideologies all at once, he argues.

Just six years after the end of World War II, Russell foresaw the possibility of a third, raising the question of why that war did not occur despite the presence of an array of causes. What unfolded instead was a “global” Cold War between the US and the former Soviet Union, which eventually collapsed without a shot being fired, accompanied by various third-party skirmishes, proxy wars, and regional conflicts.

The reason why none of these escalated into another world war is due to two factors. First, the immense suffering and massive devastation inflicted by two world wars remained fixed in the collective memory, serving as a powerful deterrent against war and a compelling reminder of the need to pursue all available peaceful means to resolve disputes before they spiral out of control.

Second, there were the nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction bristling in the great powers’ arsenals. Owing to the existence of these weapons, any outbreak of direct hostilities between the major powers would be a war to end the world as we know it, with no possibility of starting afresh and no dreams of reconstruction.

Russell, describing the post-war era in the 1950s, remarked that the greatest obstacle to a decent world was fear: fear of natural disasters, fear of others and their actions, and fear of humanity’s own destructive impulses.

One wonders how he might describe the world today. Human life under primitive conditions has been famously described as “nasty, brutish, and short”, which seems perfectly apt for the ages before science, civilisation, and progress. Yet, large parts of the world today continue to suffer from that same wretched condition without any rational justification.

The world abounds in resources far exceeding its needs, yet it cannot find a way to shared prosperity because of mismanagement, greed, corruption, and the unequal distribution of wealth. These ills are manifested in what has been called the “politics of fools and the economics of profligates”, with consequences more devastating than the fiercest wars and natural disasters.

Those who are expecting salvation or gifts from a fallen world order are waiting in vain. They would be wise to reflect on how they stood before the collapse of this so-called order – a condition marked by contentment with scraps, hardships, and hopes for a less dire tomorrow.

Clinging to such hopes has led to ruin, diverting those who cling to them from what I believe is the only true path forward.

 This article also appears in Arabic in Wednesday’s edition of Asharq Al-Awsat.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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