“I am working hard to end the war [in Sudan]. We are very close to this. It would be the ninth war if we don’t first deal with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but we are working hard to end this war. We are very close to it, we almost did it,” President Donald Trump said last week. He emphasised the need for a solution that guarantees stability and security for the war-torn country and the region.
On the ground, the war of attrition between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is intensifying and military and civilian leaders on both sides are doubling down on their hardline rhetoric. If anything, this points to the complexities and hazards awaiting anyone who attempts to resolve the nearly three-year-old war that, according to UN agencies, has produced the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world.
Trump’s remarks were made two days after the US Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos announced that the Trump administration has finalised a peace plan for Sudan that would soon be unveiled. Not that long ago, he and other US officials had released statements promising a truce in Sudan before the beginning of the current year, yet no sign of a pause in hostilities has materialised.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that rather than hope or relief, statements coming out of Washington tend to trigger a stream of questions, reflecting widespread scepticism about US credibility. Have the warring parties in Sudan been consulted at all? If so, did they agree on any aspects of the US plan, or will it somehow be imposed by force? This, in turn, raises questions like whether it will be the UN Security Council’s responsibility to enforce the plan under Chapter VII, whether the US will undertake that task unilaterally, or whether the solution will fall somewhere in the middle, such as within the framework of the “Quad” (US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) or the bilateral US-Saudi framework. In other words, to what extent will the US seek to monopolise the management of this process or, alternatively, engage international powers?
Speculation is also rife over the direction of US thinking on Sudan beyond a ceasefire. How will it deal with the RSF, which initiated the conflict? Will it push for a restructuring of the Sudanese army? Will it try to sideline the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, designating it a terrorist organisation as it did with the Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon? There are also endless questions regarding the post-war Sudanese political dialogue and which civilian forces will be tasked with leading the country during a transitional phase.
None of the foregoing is to deny that some positive US-sponsored developments have taken place. Foremost among those is the humanitarian conference on Sudan held in Washington last week. Attended by representatives of the members of the Quad, Kuwait, the UK, and other countries, the event managed to secure pledges exceeding $1.5 billion in humanitarian aid for Sudan. This development was welcomed by many civil and political forces in Sudan, who underscored the urgency of humanitarian intervention and the need for it to focus on securing humanitarian corridors, ensuring unimpeded access to food and medical relief, reopening hospitals and health centres, and reviving primary healthcare services, ensuring access to safe drinking water, and improving sanitation and wastewater systems.
Trump’s vaunted peace-making record is the subject of another set of questions related to his assertion that Sudan will be number nine. Did genuine peace actually materialise in the first eight cases, or is it truer to say Trump does not possess a magic wand capable of delivering instant and lasting peace? Often, the Trump administration’s formulas appear at best hastily concocted, insufficiently studied, and overly dependent on dealmaking. The results tend to be performative, having skirted around the root causes that stem from complex historical and social issues and processes. More often than not, the solutions blatantly prioritise US interests and those of its allies, while sidelining rivals and their concerns and interests.
Regardless of its substance and the partners it brings on board, the most the US plan is likely to achieve is a very fragile truce, which Washington will then try to cajole into something more permanent. If mishandled, the truce will merely serve as a pause allowing the belligerents to regroup and rearm or, worse, to consolidate their hold over the areas they control and eventually partition the country. Achieving sustainable peace and stability and preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan require more than lip service. Above all, these aims must engage Sudanese actors themselves, supported by the country’s friends and international organisations that truly have the interests of the Sudanese people at heart.
The Sudanese crisis has entered one of its most critical phases. Humanitarian conditions are deteriorating rapidly, with UN agencies predicting imminent famine. According to the UN World Food Programme, food assistance for Sudan is shrinking due to severe funding shortages. Warning that millions of people could be deprived of food within weeks, the WFP issued an urgent appeal for $700 million to sustain its operations in Sudan until June. UNICEF has also sounded the alarm, warning that 33 million people in Sudan – the equivalent of two-thirds of the population – will require urgent humanitarian relief this year. It stressed that over half of these people are children.
Meanwhile, Sudanese army leaders continue to insist on the military option. SAF Commander Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, in a recorded message to the displaced residents of Al-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, vowed that “the army is coming to liberate the city” which would enable them to return to their homes. To the west, escalating warfare in Kordofan continues to force civilians from their homes, exposing them to grave risks, while the RSF relentlessly targets civilians and aid convoys with drones, drawing widespread international condemnation.
Against this tragic backdrop, Omar Al-Duqair, the leader of the Sudanese Conference Party and head of the Political Mechanism of the Somoud Alliance, appealed to both the SAF and RSF to respond positively to regional and international calls for a humanitarian truce by the start of Ramadan. Urging an end to the bloodshed, he stressed the need to protect civilians and open safe corridors for humanitarian relief and intervention. This appeal, he said, “emanates from a sense of moral and humanitarian responsibility and an awareness of how the Sudanese people have suffered from the agonies of displacement and hunger.
He hoped that any truce would be accompanied by strict monitoring mechanisms to enforce compliance, in order to generate a climate conducive to a peaceful political path that ends the suffering. The remaining question is whether the US-sponsored plan and whatever mechanisms it initiates will heed this appeal.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 12 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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