Those threats remain ambiguous as to whether the objective would be merely to weaken Iran’s military capabilities or to completely overthrow the current government in Tehran. All these developments have been taking place despite a new round of negotiations between the two sides, whose agenda and scope remain disputed.
Consequently, comparisons have resurfaced in analyses of current developments. These comparisons draw parallels between the present situation and the possibilities and prospects of US military intervention and the 1953 military coup in Iran against the democratically elected government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, a coup that was planned by the American CIA and the British MI6.
A careful and in-depth reading of the two cases reveals many similarities and, at the same time, many differences. In this article, I will address only two similarities and two differences, by way of example.
If we begin with the differences, the first relates to the nature of the world order in each case. In 1953, the world order was clearly bipolar, structured around a struggle between the Western bloc led by the United States of America and the Eastern bloc led by the former Soviet Union. This struggle was rooted in ideological contradiction: capitalism and liberalism on the one side, and Marxism and its communist system on the other. At that time, neither the Non-Aligned Movement nor the Group of 77 had yet emerged to represent the Global South; both were formed in the 1960s. The rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs manifested as a multi-front conflict, political, strategic, economic, cultural, social, and security-related.
It was therefore natural for the United States of America and Britain to carefully assess the likely Soviet reaction before moving to overthrow Mossadegh’s government, particularly given Iran’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union. The two countries succeeded in predicting Soviet non-intervention based on several factors. Mossadegh and the National Front he led had entered into conflict with Iran’s communist Tudeh Party, losing its support and that of its popular base.
At the time, the Tudeh Party was one of the largest communist parties in the Middle East in terms of popularity, strength, and influence. As a result, the Soviet Union withdrew its support for Mossadegh’s government, viewing it as representing the “petty bourgeoisie,” a class about which Soviet leader and prominent communist theorist Vladimir I. Lenin had expressed well-known reservations regarding its revolutionary role. We must recall that this was in 1953, when Stalinism was still the official and practiced Marxist doctrine in the Soviet Union. It rejected political alliances or support for governments led by the “petty bourgeoisie” in the Third World, before the ideological and political shifts that later occurred under Nikita Khrushchev.
Today, however, the global scene is far less clearly defined. Some speak of a new bipolarity emerging between the United States of America and China, though it has not yet fully crystallized. Others describe a multipolar system, pointing not only to Washington and Beijing but also to the European Union, Russia, Japan, India, South Korea, and some other countries. A third perspective highlights international groupings with overlapping memberships that have assumed growing influence over global decision-making, especially in economic, financial, and trade matters, though at times also in security, strategic, and political issues, such as the G7, the G20, and the BRICS group. In all cases, the international environment is characterized by fluidity or volatility, signalling instability and facilitating unilateral actions by major powers, often without regard for international legitimacy or international law.
The second difference between 1953 and today concerns the nature of American intervention in Iran’s internal affairs. In 1953, intervention took an indirect form, orchestrating a military coup from within the ranks of the Iranian army. The current scene, however, points to a direct US military strike or intervention. Its first “rehearsal” was the American air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites on the penultimate day of the Israeli war on Iran in June 2025.
Naturally, each situation had its own distinct surrounding circumstances. In 1953, most of the Iranian army was loyal to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who lavished it with gifts, privileges, and favours to secure its loyalty. After the coup succeeded, the Shah even married his daughter to the coup leader, General Zahedi. At the same time, Iranian army leaders had extremely close relations with Pentagon officials, as many Iranian officers had received military training in the United States. This close relationship later played a role in January 1979, when Iranian military leaders, after months of popular revolution, listened to advice from their American counterparts and withdrew their support for the Shah.
In the current historical moment, however, the situation of the Iranian army has changed significantly since the 1979 revolution and the establishment of the system of Wilayat al-Faqih under the Islamic Republic. There were deep suspicions toward the army due to its earlier support for the Pahlavi regime and later for President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in his conflict with senior clerics around Ayatollah Khomeini. The army helped Bani-Sadr flee Iran in June 1981 to begin opposition from abroad.
There were also accusations of underperformance by some army leaders during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). Consequently, the new religious and political leadership established parallel institutions based on ideological loyalty to perform military functions, most notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (The Pasdaran), which has become more powerful in armament, training, combat capabilities, and institutional influence than the regular army. Although a joint command structure exists, effective leadership has clearly been with the Pasdaran from the outset. The Pasdaran enjoys the trust and loyalty of the religious and political leadership. It also operates economic institutions that fund its needs, and grants its officers and soldiers greater privileges than those offered to the regular army.
Given all these factors, the possibility of indirect US intervention in Iran, without an internal political ally such as the Shah in 1953, amid the relative weakness of the army vis-à-vis the Pasdaran, and with the difficulty of penetrating the army on a large scale as occurred in 1953, appears surrounded by risk and high chances of failure. Thus, a direct military strike or intervention seems the more likely scenario should Washington decide to intervene.
Turning to the similarities between the 1953 coup and the prospects of direct US military intervention today, the first lies in the primary objective of intervention, whether to intensify pressure on the Iranian regime or to overthrow it entirely, which is Iran’s wealth, particularly its oil and mineral resources, given its vast global production and reserves.
In 1953, the principal motivation for accelerating the coup was Mossadegh’s decision to nationalize Iran’s oil industry so that it would belong to the Iranian people and serve their interests. This struck directly at the interests of major American and British oil companies, prompting intelligence services in Washington and London to organize and coordinate the coup. Afterward, the Shah expanded oil concessions to American and British companies while deliberately weakening and neglecting the national oil industry to prevent it from competing internationally. This must be understood within the Cold War rivalry over vital resources, including oil.
In 2026, despite decades of talk about alternative, clean, and renewable energy sources, reality shows that the struggle to secure traditional energy resources, especially oil, remains intense. Control over global oil wealth continues to be a strategic objective of the Western bloc, led by the United States of America.
In this context, the American military raid on Venezuela, the arrest of its President and his wife, and the temporary installation of a pro-Washington opposition leader at the head of the country carried significant implications. While Washington justified the move with criminal charges against President Maduro, many analysts, academics, journalists, and some politicians argued that the real objective was control over Venezuela’s oil resources and denying them to rivals such as Moscow and Beijing.
This precedent strengthens the view that the real objective of a military attack on Iran may primarily be control over its oil wealth, coming even before concerns about its nuclear or missile programmes, or even its hostility toward Israel or support for groups Washington designates as terrorist organizations.
The second similarity, though not complete equivalence, concerns the surrounding regional environment. In 1953, Ben-Gurion’s government in Israel strongly supported the American position, partly to demonstrate loyalty to Washington and partly due to strained Israeli-Iranian relations under Dr. Mossadegh. This stand was also dictated by the fact that Iranian Jews supported the Shah in his struggle against Mossadegh.
Conversely, there was widespread Arab anger at the coup against Mossadegh. Egypt, which had welcomed Mossadegh in 1951, and in light of the regime change in Cairo after the 23rd July revolution in 1952, viewed the coup as a blow to anti-colonial movements. The coup coincided with France’s exile of Morocco’s Sultan Mohammed V, reinforcing perceptions in the Arab world of a Western counterattack against national liberation movements in the Muslim world.
Nowadays, Arab countries, including Egypt and the Gulf states, have repeatedly warned against a US war on Iran, cautioning that it would threaten regional peace and stability, already fragile and troubled, and could escalate into a broader regional war.
A notable shift at the regional level concerns Turkey. In 1953, Kemalist Turkey was closely allied with the United States of America and welcomed the coup. Today, like many Arab states, Turkey warns against American military action against Iran.
Thus, we have presented two differences and two similarities between the 1953 coup and current US preparations for a possible direct military American strike or intervention in Iran. This does not exhaust the subject; many other points of similarity and of difference could be explored. US-Iranian relations remain uniquely complex, whether since the end of World War II in 1945 or since the Iranian Revolution in February 1979, up to the present day.
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