The drills reflected the grouping’s expanding presence beyond its traditional economic mandate, as warships from several participating states operated off the coast of Cape Town. The exercise drew criticism from Western governments—particularly the United States—against the backdrop of growing political and strategic divergences between Pretoria and Western capitals, as well as South Africa’s increasingly assertive posture in safeguarding the autonomy of its foreign policy.
The exercise unfolded in two principal phases. The first phase, spanning January 9 to 12, centered on port activities and shore-based engagements, including an opening ceremony, reciprocal ship visits, cultural and athletic programs, and professional exchanges among naval personnel. The second phase, conducted from January 13 to 15, focused on operational maritime drills encompassing communications exercises, formation maneuvers, live naval fire scenarios, counter-piracy simulations such as the rescue of hijacked vessels, aeromedical evacuation, and coordinated medical support.
Beyond its immediate military dimension, “Will of Peace 2026” rekindled debate over whether BRICS is undergoing a gradual functional shift—from an economic-developmental platform toward a framework with more explicit geopolitical and security attributes. This discussion is unfolding within an international system increasingly defined by the diffusion of power, the relative attenuation of Western dominance, and the global redistribution of strategic influence.
Reaffirming maritime security as a shared BRICS Plus priority
The naval drills, conducted in South African territorial waters with the participation of Russia, China, and Iran, took place within a highly sensitive global context characterized by the redefinition of alliances, spheres of influence, and instruments of power projection. In response to Western criticism portraying BRICS as an entity conceived primarily for economic coordination, South Africa framed the exercise within a technical and security-oriented narrative emphasizing maritime cooperation and the safeguarding of international shipping lanes.
This framing assumed particular significance amid persistent instability in the Middle East, which has compelled a growing number of commercial vessels to avoid the Suez Canal and reroute via the Cape of Good Hope. Consequently, this historic maritime corridor has regained strategic prominence within global trade networks. Within this context, “Will of Peace” was presented as a readiness initiative designed to enhance collective capabilities in confronting non-traditional maritime threats and contributing to regional stability.
Yet the operational narrative, while consistent with China’s broader discourse of a “community with a shared future for mankind” and a “maritime community with a shared future,” does not obscure the exercise’s underlying geopolitical implications. Intensifying competition over sea lanes and the proliferation of unconventional maritime risks continue to shape an increasingly contested maritime domain.
Escalating controversy surrounding Iran’s participation
On January 9, 2026, South Africa’s National Defence Force confirmed the arrival of Iranian naval assets at the Port of Cape Town, including the destroyer Jamaran, the warship Mahdavi, and the destroyer Shahid Naqdi, alongside the Russian destroyer Stoikiy. Vessels from China, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates also took part, underscoring the exercise’s multilateral character.
South African authorities described the deployments as part of a BRICS Plus initiative aimed at bolstering maritime security and protecting international trade routes. This characterization sought to project a defensive and economically grounded rationale. However, the official narrative did little to dispel American skepticism, with Washington interpreting the developments as a coordinated display of power by strategic competitors in one of the world’s most critical maritime regions.
Iran’s involvement generated heightened political sensitivity in light of stringent U.S. sanctions on Tehran and ongoing domestic tensions within Iran. While South African Vice Admiral Monde Lobese publicly welcomed the Iranian presence, Pretoria reportedly requested, prior to the drills, that Iran limit its participation to observer status. This adjustment was widely interpreted as a response to U.S. pressure, including warnings of potential trade repercussions for states maintaining commercial engagement with Iran. The episode exposed the delicate balancing act confronting South Africa as it navigates its BRICS commitments alongside a complex relationship with the United States.
Emerging Sino-Indian divergence in the maritime sphere
The exercise proceeded under the banner of “joint action to secure major shipping corridors and maritime economic activities.” China’s participation was particularly robust, featuring a task group drawn from the 48th Chinese naval escort flotilla, including the guided-missile destroyer Tangshan and the comprehensive supply ship Taihu, supported by a shipborne helicopter and special operations personnel. The scale and composition of the Chinese contingent highlighted Beijing’s leadership role in both planning and operational command.
India’s absence from the exercise was equally consequential, illuminating the limits of consensus within BRICS regarding engagement in military-security initiatives imbued with overt geopolitical significance. New Delhi’s decision aligns with its broader strategic calculus, shaped partly by participation in Western-aligned maritime frameworks that impose constraints on its diplomatic and security positioning.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs justified the non-participation by emphasizing that the exercise, though associated in some narratives with BRICS, constituted a South African initiative involving a limited subset of member states. The ministry clarified that the drills do not form part of BRICS’ institutionalized or recurring activities and noted that India has not participated in previous iterations. It reiterated that India’s regular trilateral maritime engagement remains IBSAMAR, the naval exercise involving India, Brazil, and South Africa, most recently convened in October 2024.
Intensifying domestic debate in South Africa over foreign policy orientation
Within South Africa, “Will of Peace 2026” forms part of a broader strategy of geopolitical repositioning aimed at consolidating foreign-policy autonomy and reinforcing the country’s role as an influential actor within the Global South. Historically, South African foreign policy since the 1990s has undergone successive recalibrations shaped by leadership transitions and evolving international dynamics.
Under Nelson Mandela, Pretoria prioritized reintegration into the international system and the cultivation of strong Western partnerships. Thabo Mbeki advanced a vision centered on African integration and continental leadership. During Jacob Zuma’s tenure, foreign policy tilted more decisively toward strengthening ties with China and Russia, culminating in South Africa’s formal accession to BRICS. Under President Cyril Ramaphosa, this orientation evolved into a pragmatic balancing strategy seeking to preserve traditional Western relationships while expanding engagement within BRICS.
This approach reflects South Africa’s effort to reconcile strategic autonomy with the image of a globally responsible actor maintaining relative neutrality in international conflicts. Nevertheless, the trajectory has fueled sharp domestic debate. The Democratic Alliance, a member of the governing coalition, criticized the hosting of joint military exercises with Russia and China, arguing that such engagements risk undermining South Africa’s declared neutrality and damaging its international standing. Concerns have also emerged that the political symbolism of these maneuvers could be leveraged externally to justify a reassessment of bilateral relations.
Although the South African government maintained that the exercise had been scheduled well in advance, the accumulation of frictions with the United States—including Pretoria’s diplomatic proximity to Moscow, its legal case against Israel at the International Court of Justice, and prior joint exercises—has made it increasingly difficult to isolate the drills from the broader context of strained relations with the West.
Ultimately, “Will of Peace 2026” transcends the parameters of a routine naval exercise. It represents a layered strategic and political signal, encapsulating South Africa’s ongoing effort to redefine its position within a rapidly transforming international order marked by intensifying competition, expanding multipolarity, and the intricate management of domestic and external balances.
*Senior Researcher, Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies (ECSS).
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