Two American aircraft carriers are now operating within range of Iran. The USS Abraham Lincoln is in the Arabian Sea as part of US Central Command’s area of responsibility, while the USS Gerald R Ford has been directed towards the eastern Mediterranean.
US officials have also acknowledged increased airlift activity and the repositioning of additional aircraft and forces.
The choreography is unmistakable: Washington is reinforcing its military option. Yet, US President Donald Trump continues to insist that negotiations must proceed and that he prefers a deal. The optics appear contradictory, but the underlying reality is far more complex.
Trump’s conflicting messages this week have deepened the ambiguity surrounding American intentions. On the one hand, he has expressed his openness to a direct meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader. On the other, when asked about the prospect of regime change in Iran, he remarked that it “seems like that would be the best thing that could happen.”
On Tuesday, Trump stated that he would be “indirectly” involved in the new round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran taking place in Geneva, calling them “very important”. He added that Tehran wants a deal and warned that failing to reach one could bring serious consequences.
Despite the discordant rhetoric, calculated ambiguity, and the conspicuous military buildup, both Washington and Tehran opened the second round of talks in a notably pragmatic tone and one tempered by cautious, but unmistakable, optimism.
The US delegation includes senior adviser Jared Kushner and White House Envoy Steve Witkoff. The Iranian team is led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, with Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi continuing in his mediating role in the indirect talks.
Tehran has indicated that Washington’s stance appears to have shifted towards a more pragmatic footing. Araghchi has also signalled Iran’s openness to dialogue but not from the old playbook.
Iran’s bottom line is blunt: sanctions relief is not a side benefit but is the core objective. Any agreement must deliver tangible and durable economic gains. Burned by the 2015 deal, Tehran now refuses to trade nuclear concessions for vague or reversible promises.
On enrichment, the position is firm. Iran insists that its right to enrich uranium is non-negotiable. At the same time, it distinguishes between that sovereign right and the specific levels, scope, and technical limits of enrichment. That is the manoeuvering space – to preserve the principle but negotiate the parameters.
Araghchi has also emphasised that Iran will not negotiate under pressure. Ahead of the talks, Tehran reinforced that message with naval drills in the Strait of Hormuz, signalling both diplomatic engagement and strategic deterrence.
Witkoff and Kushner have acknowledged that securing a durable agreement with Tehran has historically been difficult, but they note that thus far Iranian negotiators have adopted a constructive tone.
Their recommendation to the administration is to continue the talks, maintain a firm position, and, if a satisfactory agreement emerges, present it to Trump for a final decision.
Trump, however, remains neither fully committed to war nor fully confident in peace. He is attempting to balance deterrence, domestic political pressures, alliance management, and strategic risk in a theatre where any miscalculation could prove costly.
The argument for escalation is straightforward. Israel has made it clear that any acceptable agreement must extend well beyond the nuclear file.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies argue that uranium enrichment is no longer the central danger. Instead, they contend that Iran’s missile programme and its precision, range, and scale pose the more immediate threat. Israeli officials also insist that Tehran’s regional network of partners stretching from Lebanon to Yemen and Iraq must be dismantled.
For Trump, there are incentives to align with this position. A maximalist agreement that restricts enrichment, curbs missile capabilities, and reduces Iran’s regional leverage could be framed as a strategic triumph. Republican hawks argue that anything less would replicate what they view as the deficiencies of the 2015 nuclear agreement.
Influential pro-Israel donors and lobbying networks would likely rally behind a president perceived as confronting Tehran decisively. A short, surgical strike, if such an option truly existed, might even generate a rally-round-the-flag effect ahead of the midterm elections.
There is also the logic of coercive diplomacy. By deploying two carrier strike groups and signalling readiness, the White House may hope to extract Iranian concessions without firing a shot.
Yet, that logic rests on increasingly fragile assumptions. The first concerns military feasibility. Trump has reportedly requested a “clean, quick” option – an operation that would degrade Iran’s capabilities and conclude before regional escalation takes hold.
Military planners, however, are said to have responded bluntly: no such option exists. Iran’s retaliatory toolkit is extensive. Ballistic missiles could target US bases across the region. Anti-ship systems along the Gulf coastline complicate carrier operations. Even a temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz would send oil prices sharply higher, with immediate global economic repercussions.
The second assumption is that American power can be exercised without significant cost. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that the country is preparing for war. Underground facilities are expanding, and missile forces are being integrated into more resilient and dispersed networks. Crucially, Tehran has signalled that any attack, whether by Israel or the United States, would trigger broad retaliation rather than a limited exchange.
The situation is further complicated by the opaque realm of external support. China has deepened technical cooperation with Iran, particularly in radar integration and data-link systems that could enhance missile targeting. Such enabling technology, even if indirect, would increase risks to US air superiority and raise the cost of military action.
Trump thus confronts an uncomfortable strategic equation. A strike might degrade certain facilities, but it would almost certainly provoke counter-strikes. US air and missile inventories would be tested. Resupply chains could come under strain. Markets would react swiftly. A president who campaigned against “endless wars” could find himself presiding over precisely that outcome.
Domestic politics compound the dilemma. The American public has grown wary of large-scale Middle Eastern interventions. Inflation remains politically sensitive; a surge in oil prices towards $150 per barrel would reverberate through petrol stations and ballot boxes alike.
Midterm elections loom, and campaigns are increasingly expensive and polarised. Alienating pro-Israel donors carries risks, while igniting a protracted conflict could carry even greater risks for Trump’s MAGA base and the American public more broadly.
Thus, Trump’s room for manoeuvre is narrower than his rhetoric suggests.
Moreover, during their White House meeting last week, Trump and Netanyahu reportedly agreed to intensify economic pressure on Iran, particularly by targeting its oil exports to China. With more than 80 per cent of Iranian oil shipments destined for Beijing, any US escalation, whether through stricter sanctions enforcement, tariffs, or trade restrictions, risks heightening tensions with China just ahead of a high-profile summit between Trump and President Xi Jinping in April.
This interdependence further complicates American decision-making, creating a high-stakes triangle linking nuclear diplomacy, regional security, and global trade.
Additionally, Netanyahu has reportedly warned that Israel will act alone if any agreement excludes meaningful missile constraints. That prospect is fraught with danger. An Israeli strike would likely trigger Iranian retaliation, placing Washington under intense pressure to intervene. In such a scenario, the United States could lose control of the escalation dynamic while still bearing much of the cost.
Trump’s hesitation between war and peace is therefore multidimensional: military, economic, political, strategic, and personal. He faces the absence of a low-risk strike option, the fragility of global energy markets, tension between hawkish constituencies and war-weary voters, and the possibility of indirectly drawing in China or Russia.
The coming weeks will test whether diplomacy can yield a workable compromise. The window is limited. Military deployments generate their own momentum; once assets are in theatre, the pressure to use them intensifies.
The central question is not whether war will erupt tomorrow, but whether one side, or perhaps both, will conclude that limited concessions today are preferable to a far riskier gamble tomorrow.
In this fragile equilibrium, every signal, military exercise, and negotiating tactic is calibrated to preserve strategic flexibility while compelling the other side to recognise shared vulnerabilities. In the Iran-US confrontation, war and peace appear to be negotiated in parallel.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 19 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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