Nearly seven months after Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas formed a constitutional drafting committee, he moved a few days ago to release a draft Interim Constitution of the State of Palestine to the public and relevant institutions for review and comment over a 60-day period, paving the way for a final version of the draft before it is put to a popular referendum.
One question, however, remains unresolved: does this step amount to a genuine initiative to establish a constitution for the State of Palestine, or is it largely a response to a particularly complex political moment, much as in previous phases? More pointedly, does the new draft offer credible solutions to a political and constitutional crisis that has defied resolution for years and that would justify its emergence at this juncture?
Several months ago, Abbas unveiled, through a presidential decree, a plan for institutional transformation, from authority to statehood, and called for the drafting of an interim constitution by October of this year followed by elections to the Palestinian National Council the following month.
He also reiterated his commitment to holding comprehensive presidential and parliamentary elections within a single year once the war on Gaza comes to an end. He explicitly linked the mandate given to the constitutional drafting committee to what he described as “part of the reform effort” amid sustained calls to undertake political reforms in Palestine.
These developments coincide with a significant wave of recognitions of the State of Palestine by Western countries, following the crimes committed by the occupation authorities in Gaza during the latest war, as well as the unprecedented pressure exerted by those authorities in the West Bank. The Palestinian experience with adopting the Palestinian Basic Law, amending it in 2003 and 2005 and reviving the constitutional committee in 2011, points to a recurring pattern: such decisions have consistently been shaped, if not driven, by prevailing political considerations.
The Palestinian Legislative Council adopted the Basic Law in 1997, designating it as an interim constitution for the Palestinian Authority (PA). Under the Oslo Accords, the transitional period was set at five years, after which final-status issues were to be resolved, an arrangement that was supposed to conclude in 1999.
Then Palestinian president Yasser Arafat did not ratify the Basic Law until 2002, three years after the occupation government had refused to bring the transitional phase to an end. This decision coincided with major political developments on the ground in the Palestinian territories, following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the sweeping Israeli policies that accompanied it and a systematic effort to undermine the standing of the PA.
In April 2003, a road map was released that explicitly tied political progress in the Palestinian territories to the reform of PA institutions and the construction of effective governance structures. That same year, far-reaching amendments were introduced to the Palestinian Basic Law, altering the very nature of the political system by creating the post of prime minister for the first time. These amendments, which assign executive and administrative powers to the Council of Ministers (Article 63), introduced an entire chapter on the executive authority, while clearly spelling out the authorities and responsibilities of the prime minister (Article 68).
In 2005, new constitutional amendments were adopted following the death of Arafat. These changes focused primarily on reshaping the electoral system in a way that enabled Hamas to participate in the legislative elections, after a national consensus was reached among the Palestinian factions. Among these amendments, the Basic Law also established, explicitly for the first time, a four-year term for both the presidency and the Legislative Council. Prior to this revision, neither mandate had a clearly defined duration, as both were tied to the end of the transitional period stipulated in earlier political agreements.
Against the backdrop of shifting political dynamics, and a growing number of states recognising Palestine in the wake of Israel’s 2008-2009 war on Gaza, alongside the PA’s efforts to secure recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations, Abbas moved in 2011 to reactivate the constitutional drafting committee in order to deliberate on what was described as a fourth and final draft, but one that has not been approved since then.
The committee itself was originally established by a decision by Arafat in November 1999 and was chaired by Nabil Shaath. Its mandate was to prepare a permanent constitution for a future Palestinian state. The committee operated within the institutional framework of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), specifically through the Central Council, which received the third draft on 9 March 2003.
In 2007, following the Palestinian political split, the application of the Palestinian Basic Law came under profound strain. The crisis centred on a series of unresolved constitutional questions: the president’s declaration of a state of emergency, the formation of an emergency government, calls for a popular referendum, the dissolution of the Legislative Council, and the subsequent issuance of presidential decrees carrying the force of law.
Despite the fact that this state of emergency was constitutionally time-bound and unfolded amid the prolonged paralysis of the legislature, both presidential and parliamentary elections were not held in the years that followed. This prolonged constitutional vacuum effectively compelled the PA to reactivate the institutional structures of the PLO in a symbolic manner to confer legitimacy.
CRITICISMS: Key criticisms of the current draft Interim Constitution of the State of Palestine, which is currently open for public comment, include the following.
The first major criticism concerns the composition and provenance of the constitutional drafting committee itself. In theory, such a body should have reflected a careful political balance, particularly in the context of a deep and persistent partisan divide and the absence of a functioning parliament, the only legitimate framework capable of absorbing and managing this kind of fragmentation.
The second criticism is closely linked to political realities. Under the final article of the draft, the adoption of the constitution is ultimately tied to a presidential decision. Concerns on this are further compounded by the absence of any clear timeline for ratifying the constitution, leaving the process open-ended and reinforcing fears that the draft could remain suspended indefinitely, in the light of the complex internal political reality.
The third criticism centres on the draft’s failure to define the territorial boundaries of the Palestinian state, a notable departure from the framework established in the amended Basic Law of 2003, which treated borders as a foundational constitutional principle. This omission is particularly consequential given the relentless expansion of Israeli settlements, alongside increasingly explicit and dangerous official Israeli statements and practices that threaten the future of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In this context, the absence of any territorial definition is not a neutral technical gap, but a substantive constitutional weakness.
The fourth criticism concerns the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the state that would emerge under this interim constitution and the PLO, long recognised as the representative of the Palestinian people. This ambiguity is not new; it has persisted for years. Yet, one of the core purposes of any foundational constitutional document should be to decisively clarify, and legally settle, this relationship.
The fifth criticism relates to the codification of the president’s authority to dissolve parliament, as set out in Article 84 of the draft. While the provision formally requires “consultation”, it nonetheless grants the president sweeping power at the expense of the legislature. This imbalance revives one of the central fault lines behind the prolonged political crisis. Despite the fact that the president’s authority to dissolve parliament was never explicitly regulated in this manner under the Basic Law, rather than correcting a structural defect the draft risks entrenching it within a new constitutional framework.
The sixth criticism focuses on the position of vice-president, a newly introduced office in the draft constitution. Under the proposed text, the president is granted the authority to appoint and dismiss the vice-president, despite the fact that, in principle, both positions should be filled through an electoral process. When this provision is read alongside the second criticism, namely, that adoption of the constitution is tied solely to a presidential decision, with no defined timeline, it opens the door to a highly problematic scenario.
Under such conditions, the incumbent vice-president could potentially ascend to the presidency on the basis of an appointment decree, effectively bypassing the legitimate and electoral mechanism for the transfer of power envisioned in the draft itself and hollowing out its own constitutional logic.
The seventh criticism relates to the president’s expansive external powers, as set out in Article 82 of the draft. This provision grants the president the authority to sign and ratify international treaties, a prerogative that significantly weakens the parliament’s oversight role. In systems already marked by executive dominance and fragile legislative institutions, such concentration of authority risks further entrenching an imbalance of powers at the heart of the constitutional order.
The eighth criticism targets the chapter of the constitution on the judicial authority, which has drawn particularly sharp scrutiny. Much of the criticism centres on curtailing public freedoms, rather than strengthening judicial independence and expanding rights.
The ninth criticism concerns the role assigned to the constitutional court in declaring a vacancy in the office of the president. This provision is especially contentious given the president’s decisive role in appointing the head of the court. Such an arrangement risks drawing the judiciary directly into the political arena at a critical moment, undermining its neutrality.
The tenth criticism concerns the amendment mechanism set out in Article 155 of the draft constitution, which denies the public the right to vote on constitutional amendments if they are passed by a large parliamentary majority. This arrangement weakens popular sovereignty and places constitutional change firmly within elite political control, contradicting the foundational principle that constitutions derive their legitimacy from the will of the people.
Taken together, these criticisms offer only a partial snapshot of the broader concerns surrounding the draft. Yet, they are sufficient to situate it within a wider political context marked by the absence of any clear, time-bound roadmap for holding presidential and legislative elections or for organising a popular referendum on the constitution itself.
In the light of these conditions, it becomes difficult to view the current constitutional initiative as a serious attempt to resolve Palestine’s long-standing constitutional impasse.
The writer is a professor of political science and international relations in Ramallah, Palestine.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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