Old questions, new peace

Hend Elsayed Hani, Wednesday 25 Feb 2026

The first meeting of the Board of Peace, convened by US President Donald Trump on 19 February 2026 in Washington, is seen as an ambitious and controversial attempt to reshape the architecture of international conflict management, with a particular focus on Gaza’s reconstruction after Israel’s genocidal war on the strip.

Old questions, new peace
Old questions, new peace

 

Framed by Trump as a pragmatic alternative to what he has repeatedly described as ineffective multilateral institutions, the Board of Peace debuted with high-profile attendance, substantial financial pledges and bold security proposals, but equally significant absences underscored a deep global scepticism.

The gathering was positioned as the launch of a new diplomatic mechanism capable of mobilising resources quickly and imposing order where traditional forums have stalled. Yet from the outset, questions about legitimacy, representation, and long-term feasibility shadowed the initiative.

The meeting drew representatives from more than 20 countries, many of which have maintained cooperative ties with Trump or share strategic interests in Middle East stability. Trump presided as founding chairman, using the platform to highlight what he characterised as early successes in securing billions of dollars in pledges for Gaza’s rebuilding. Among those present was Edi Rama, prime minister of Albania, whose government is committed to providing personnel for stabilisation efforts. Prabowo Subianto, president of Indonesia, attended, signalling his country’s willingness to play a larger role in Muslim-majority peace initiatives, including potential troop contributions.

From the Gulf, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan represented the United Arab Emirates, while Saudi Arabia sent senior officials including Adel Al-Jubeir. Kosovo, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Uzbekistan also participated, pledging either financial assistance or security forces. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was reported to have engaged in discussions regarding humanitarian coordination, and Vietnam sent senior representation, reflecting the board’s attempt to project a broader, cross-regional coalition rather than a narrow Western bloc.

Some European countries and partners attended in observer capacities rather than as full members. The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and representatives from the European Union were present at various levels, but their limited participation reflected caution. But later top EU diplomats met with Nikolay Mladenov, director of Board of Peace.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas said that the EU wants to contribute to stabilisation and humanitarian work in Gaza. India attended as an observer, signalling interest without endorsement. South Korea sent a special envoy without a formal speaking role. This layered participation illustrated the diplomatic balancing act many governments are attempting: maintaining constructive ties with Washington while avoiding full alignment with an initiative whose long-term implications remain unclear.

Equally telling were the absences. France and Canada declined to join as founding members, and several other NATO countries either abstained or restricted their engagement.

Russia, though reportedly invited, did not attend the inaugural session. China was also absent.

Most striking was the lack of official Palestinian representation. Neither the Palestinian Authority nor representatives linked to Hamas were present. For a body primarily focused on Gaza’s future, the exclusion of Palestinian political actors drew immediate criticism from analysts who argued that reconstruction without political inclusion risks building infrastructure on top unresolved grievances. Belarus claimed visa complications prevented its delegation from attending, a smaller but symbolically inappropriate diplomatic misstep.

The core agenda revolved around reconstruction, stabilisation, funding mechanisms and regional security. Trump announced that more than seven billion dollars had already been pledged for Gaza’s immediate humanitarian relief and rebuilding needs.

Plans outlined during the session included rebuilding hundreds of thousands of homes, restoring electricity and water systems, reconstructing hospitals and schools, and redeveloping sections of Gaza’s coastline to stimulate economic recovery. The rhetoric was ambitious, portraying Gaza not merely as a zone to be stabilised but as a territory that could be transformed economically if security were guaranteed.

Security was the second major pillar of discussion. The board considered the formation of an international stabilisation force comprising thousands of civilian police and tens of thousands of troops contributed by participating states.

Countries such as Indonesia, Morocco, Albania, Kosovo, and Kazakhstan signalled their willingness to provide such personnel. Egypt and Jordan were discussed as potential training partners for local police forces. The concept was to prevent a security vacuum that could allow militant groups to regroup while simultaneously avoiding direct long-term Israeli occupation.

However, details of command structure, rules of engagement, duration of deployment, and legal mandates were sparse. Without a United Nations Security Council resolution, the legal grounding of such a force remains uncertain, raising concerns among European governments wary of creating parallel peacekeeping structures.

Notably, Egypt refrained from committing to providing troops to the proposed Gaza stabilisation force. Analysts attribute Cairo’s absence from participation in the force to the lack of guarantees clearly defining the mission’s mandate, its operational mechanisms and the nature of its engagement with Palestinian factions, in addition to the ambiguity surrounding its role in confronting ongoing Israeli military actions. These concerns reflect Egypt’s long-standing sensitivity to developments on its northeastern border.

A third focus was financial architecture. Discussions included establishing a reconstruction fund potentially managed in cooperation with international financial institutions such as the World Bank to ensure transparency and oversight. There was talk of private-sector involvement and public-private partnerships designed to accelerate infrastructure projects.

The emphasis on rapid mobilisation reflected Trump’s broader transactional approach to diplomacy: secure commitments, deploy capital, and claim measurable progress. Yet development experts caution that post-conflict recovery requires not only funding but also accountable governance, local participation, and institutional reform.

Iran emerged as an additional topic, broadening the meeting’s scope beyond Gaza. Trump reiterated demands that Tehran curb its nuclear ambitions and regional proxy activities, suggesting that broader Middle East stability depends on constraining Iranian influence.

By tying Gaza’s reconstruction to regional deterrence, the board positioned itself not merely as a humanitarian or reconstruction platform but a geopolitical instrument. Critics argue that expanding the mandate risks diluting focus and entangling the initiative in long-standing rivalries that could complicate consensus.

Despite the scale of the pledges and the symbolism of diverse attendance, significant gaps were evident. The absence of Palestinian political actors means that questions of governance in Gaza remain unresolved. Who will administer reconstructed institutions? Under what legal authority? How will civil liberties be protected? There was little clarity on whether a reformed Palestinian Authority would assume control, whether an interim technocratic administration would be installed, or whether some hybrid arrangement would emerge.

Similarly, while Hamas disarmament was mentioned as essential, no concrete enforcement mechanism was detailed. Without a credible pathway to political reconciliation, reconstruction risks becoming a temporary fix rather than a durable settlement.

Another unresolved issue concerns the relationship between the Board of Peace and existing multilateral institutions. Many European governments fear that the board could undermine or bypass the United Nations system, weakening global norms around collective security.

Trump has argued that new mechanisms are necessary because established ones have failed to deliver timely solutions. However, parallel structures can fragment international coordination, duplicate efforts, and erode legitimacy. Whether the board will cooperate with UN agencies or operate independently remains a pivotal question.

In sum, the first meeting of Trump’s Board of Peace was a bold diplomatic spectacle combining financial ambition, security planning, and geopolitical messaging. It succeeded in bringing together a diverse group of countries and generating headline commitments for Gaza’s recovery.

It also exposed fractures in the international consensus, highlighted the risks of excluding key local stakeholders, and left questions about governance, legality, and long-term sustainability unanswered. Whether it becomes a transformative peace mechanism or a short-lived experiment will depend on its ability to translate rhetoric into inclusive, coordinated and durable outcomes on the ground.

* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly

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