The US has intensified strikes against Islamic State (IS) group positions in Syria in retaliation for the attack against US forces in Palmyra on 13 December resulting in the death of two US soldiers, a civilian interpreter, and three Syrian soldiers.
According to the US command CENTCOM, the US struck more than 30 IS targets between 3 and 12 February, bringing the strikes to more than a hundred since that attack.
These operations occurred as the US continues to withdraw from its bases in Syria, handing them over to the Syrian army. The most prominent is the base in Al-Tanf, which the US occupied at the start of its military intervention in Syria a decade ago. The handover was completed in 14 days, with the last US troops retreating to Jordan on 11 February.
The US withdrawal from the Al-Shaddadi base in southern Hasaka is still in progress. An estimated 400 US troops remain in Syria, down from around 2,000 at the peak of the US intervention in the country. Around half of these were stationed in or near Hasaka to train the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to fight IS, while Syrian opposition forces were trained in Al-Tanf.
The reduction of the US military footprint in Syria is proceeding in tandem with the transfer of IS detainees from Syria to Iraq. On 13 February, CENTCOM announced the completion of a 30-day transfer mission of more than 5,700 adult male IS fighters from detention facilities in Syra to Iraqi custody.
The transfer began following a Syrian government offensive against the SDF, which had guarded the detention facilities in Hasaka for years. Numerous prisoners managed to break out during the turmoil. While the Syrian army was able to apprehend most escapees, some remain at large.
The Iraqi authorities have reopened investigations into the cases of over a thousand of the recently transferred detainees. However, many of them are not Syrian or Iraqi nationals, but rather hold other nationalities, including Russian, French, German, Australian, Swedish, and Turkish.
Communications are in progress with these countries to urge them to repatriate their citizens for detention or trial on their own soil. Several European countries continue to refuse to receive their IS-affiliated citizens, fearing the spread of extremist ideology among their own prison populations.
Another camp that was recently taken over from the SDF by the new government in Damascus is Al-Hol in northeastern Syria, primarily to house the wives and children of detained IS fighters. The population of this camp has declined from roughly 84,000 in 2019 to 24,000 in January this year due to Iraqi repatriation efforts.
Since the government took over the camp, complaints have begun to surface concerning deteriorating living conditions and poor services. Some observers also doubt that many families still adhere to IS ideology.
While local residents continue to press for the release of detained relatives from the camp, the Syrian authorities are preparing to transfer the remaining families to other facilities in Aleppo, preparatory to closing the camp entirely. UN humanitarian agencies have suspended their services there after their offices were pelted with stones by camp residents angered by the deteriorating conditions.
Another camp, Roj, remains under SDF control. The primary camp for foreign IS families, the population of this camp has been reduced to less than 2,000 families due to close coordination between the relatives of the detainees and the SDF.
According to the Kurdish news agency Rudaw, 11 Australian families comprising 34 individuals were transferred to their home country after their relatives arrived with newly issued Australian passports.
The resolution of the question of the IS detainees in northeastern Syria is a step towards the integration of SDF forces into Syrian state institutions. In November, Damascus officially joined the Global Coalition to Defeat IS, reflecting Washington’s confidence in the new Syrian authorities’ ability to take over the fight on the ground. This responsibility had previously fallen to the SDF.
Since then, Washington has stood aside as Syrian government forces advanced into the territory controlled by its ally in northeastern Syria. At the height of these engagements, US Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack pressured the SDF into finalising an agreement with Damascus facilitating the integration of the Kurdish forces into the Syrian army and state institutions on Damascus’ terms. This allowed government forces to enter other SDF strongholds in northeast Syria.
Some concrete progress has already been achieved in implementing the agreement. Syrian government forces have assumed control of energy facilities, dams, and other crucial infrastructure in the northeast of the country, while the Kurdish Asayish security forces have been assimilated into the Syrian Ministry of the Interior.
A meeting between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi, and Co-Chair of the Syrian Democratic Council Ilham Ahmed signalled the success of US efforts to advance Kurdish assimilation into Syrian state institutions.
Washington is thus redrawing its map of allies in the fight against IS. Unwilling to bear the costs of sustaining a military presence on the ground now that it is no longer necessary, it wants to designate remaining tasks to trusted partners.
The new authorities in Damascus have proven reliable during close intelligence cooperation in recent months, which made it possible to pinpoint IS locations in Syria enabling the recent US precision strikes. Such successes have increased Washington’s confidence at a time when it is keen to reduce its exposure in the region as it builds up pressure on Iran.
Previous rounds of US attacks against Iran have exposed the vulnerability of US bases in Syria to potential retaliation by Iran or pro-Iranian forces in the region. Closing the bases would deprive Iran of a deterrent should the US decide to resume the offensive if bilateral talks with Tehran fail.
The new Syrian regime has a personal interest in joining US-led efforts to combat IS. According to a recent UN report, Syria’s new leaders, Interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani, and Interior Minister Anas Khattab, were targeted by at least five assassination attempts attributed to IS during the past year.
Given the limited capabilities of Syria’s new security and defence institutions, military and intelligence cooperation with Washington and its allies is indispensable.
The question now is whether this repurposing of the US’ new Syrian ally will be confined to anti-IS operations in Syria. Recent reports suggest that Washington plans to expand the role of the Syrian army to missions beyond Syria’s borders, specifically into Lebanon to fight Hizbullah.
This would entail exploiting the hostility between the anti-Al-Assad opposition militias, which have now been incorporated into the Syrian army, and Hizbullah, which had supported the former Al-Assad regime. Currently, the Syrian army is engaged in security-related tasks along the Syrian-Lebanese border to combat narcotics and weapons smuggling. It is uncertain how Damascus would react to possible US attempts to embroil it militarily in Lebanon.
In early February, the Syrian Interior Ministry announced it had dismantled a terrorist network that it held responsible for attacks in the Mezzeh district of central Damascus. The ministry accused Hizbullah of orchestrating, financing, and arming the group with rocket launchers and drones, accusations that Hizbullah has denied.
However, even if Hizbullah had a hand in these attacks, preventing its interventions in Syria is one thing, while mobilising the Syrian army for offensive operations deep inside Lebanon is another.
Damascus has been coordinating with the Lebanese government to counter cross-border smuggling and attempts to destabilise Syria orchestrated from Lebanese territory. This bilateral mechanism would render a major Syrian military intervention in Lebanon unnecessary for the purposes of self-defence.
Al-Sharaa has also repeatedly stated that he does not intend to confront Hizbullah over its past involvement in the Syrian war but rather seeks to build new Syrian-Lebanese relations on foundations that serve the interests of both countries.
Washington’s thinking may not reflect such considerations. It has designated Hizbullah a terrorist organisation and has long been determined to disarm and politically neutralise the Lebanese resistance movement on behalf of Israel.
It also faults the Lebanese government for not achieving a monopoly on arms, even though it has deployed the Lebanese army across Southern Lebanon in accordance with the terms of the ceasefire agreement brokered by the US in November 2024. As a result, Washington may still be looking for a proxy to take care of unfinished business in Lebanon.
The close alliance that Damascus is forging with Washington, which enabled Syrian forces to expand at the expense of the SDF, may come at a price that Syria will be required to pay through a military adventure across the border.
Will Damascus risk becoming entangled in a controversial intervention in Lebanon to serve the US-Israeli agenda? Observers are waiting to see how the new Syrian authorities handle pressures to accept a mission that could be detrimental to their long-term interests.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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