In the midst of the escalating political crisis in Iraq, a new civic initiative known as “Iraqis” (Iraqioun) emerged on 21 February, warning that the country’s prolonged political deadlock is no longer a temporary dispute among rival factions, but a structural threat to the state itself.
The group, composed of activists, intellectuals, and independent political figures, argues that the continued failure to elect a president and appoint a prime minister for the country is undermining the legitimacy of state institutions and deepening public frustration.
The current crisis is dual in nature. On one level, Iraq remains without a newly elected president, as parliament has repeatedly failed to secure the required two-thirds majority to do so due to disagreements between the two main Kurdish parties over the presidential nominee.
On another level, controversy surrounds the nomination of former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki by the Shiite Coordination Framework as a candidate to head the next government.
Al-Maliki is a central figure in post-2003 Iraqi politics, having served as prime minister from 2006 to 2014. His second term witnessed the collapse of vast areas of Iraqi territory into the hands of the Islamic State (IS) group, including Nineveh, the country’s third-largest province, as well as Anbar, Salaheddin, and parts of Diyala and Kirkuk.
The episode left a deep imprint on Iraq’s political memory and continues to shape perceptions of leadership, governance, and sectarian management.
Yet, describing the present moment merely as one of “political delays” fails to capture its constitutional implications. Under the 2005 constitution, the post-election process in Iraq follows a structured timeline. Parliament must convene within 15 days of the ratification of the election results. A president is then elected by a two-thirds majority of MPs, and the president subsequently tasks the nominee of the largest parliamentary bloc with forming a government within a specified period.
The problem lies not in the absence of deadlines, but in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. The constitution presumes political consensus and offers no decisive remedy in the event of a repeated failure to elect a president.
Since the appointment of a prime minister is contingent upon the election of a president, paralysis at the first stage automatically freezes the entire executive formation process. The result is a constitutional grey zone, where institutions formally exist, yet lack the capacity to renew executive authority. A caretaker government continues to operate, but without a clear political horizon.
The crisis intensified further following a statement by US President Donald Trump warning that the return of Al-Maliki to office could lead to “chaos and poverty” in the country and suggesting that Washington would reconsider its support for Iraq.
Al-Maliki responded by saying that the choice of prime minister is a sovereign Iraqi matter and rejecting foreign interference. The exchange underscored the extent to which Iraq’s internal fragility invites external commentary and pressure.
Domestically, reactions have extended beyond the political elites. Demonstrations in Baghdad and other cities have expressed both popular rejection of foreign intervention and growing anger at the persistence of sectarian power-sharing arrangements.
Sunni political actors have also voiced reservations about Al-Maliki’s candidacy, citing concerns over past governance failures and sectarian polarisation.
At its core, Iraq’s predicament is not simply a dispute over personalities. It is a test of whether the constitutional architecture established after 2005 can function in the absence of a broad political consensus. Mechanisms designed to ensure inclusivity have, under conditions of polarisation, become instruments of obstruction.
In sum, Iraq is confronting more than a routine governmental delay. It is facing a constitutional impasse that raises fundamental questions about institutional resilience. The issue at stake is not only who will form the next cabinet, but whether the current constitutional framework is capable of producing political stability without a recalibration of the rules governing consensus and deadlock resolution.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 26 February, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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