The process reportedly began with a visit to Cairo, followed by an expanded meeting in Doha that brought together states either willing or proposed to participate in such a force. This initiative emerges at an exceptionally sensitive juncture in the conflict, situated within a regional and international landscape shaped by the intricate overlap of political, security, and humanitarian dynamics. From the perspective of Egyptian interests, the force cannot be understood as a merely technical or security arrangement. It is, fundamentally, a political instrument that may either contribute to opening a credible pathway toward ending the war and advancing a political process, or become a renewed mechanism for crisis management that entrenches the status quo.
Egypt’s governing premise is clear: any stabilization support force must be inseparable from a defined political trajectory anchored in explicit timelines. This position is consistent with President Trump’s own framework, as reflected in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803 adopted last November.
The ultimate objective must be a permanent ceasefire capable of enabling the launch of a serious political process leading to the two-state solution. Central to this vision is the preservation of the territorial unity of Palestinian lands and the rejection of any formula that would institutionalize a lasting separation between Gaza and the West Bank.
Cairo further emphasizes that international legitimacy constitutes the foundational pillar of any arrangement of this nature. The envisaged force must rest upon a clear and precise mandate issued by the United Nations Security Council—one that rigorously defines its mission, authorities, and operational limits, while subjecting its performance to periodic review.
International legitimacy is not a procedural formality but the essential safeguard against mission drift. It ensures that the force operates within the framework of international law rather than fragile political understandings or shifting bilateral arrangements. Such legitimacy is also indispensable to preventing the force from evolving into a permanent presence or a parallel entity that could dilute Palestinian sovereignty.
Egypt also maintains that the force should be civilian and police-oriented in character. Its mission must focus on protecting civilians, securing vital infrastructure, supporting humanitarian arrangements, and assisting in the restoration of essential services. Transforming the force into a combat formation or introducing a new military actor into an already volatile theatre would risk further militarizing a deeply fragile environment. The logic of stabilization requires de-escalation and civilian protection, not the expansion of armed engagement. Within this framework, Egypt unequivocally rejects any direct or indirect Israeli participation in the force—whether in leadership, planning, intelligence-sharing, or oversight. Such involvement would undermine the force’s credibility among Palestinians and risk converting it into an extension of the occupation. Equally, Israel must not retain any residual security jurisdiction over Gaza or any right of intervention.
The history of the conflict offers lessons too consequential to ignore. Over decades, the region has witnessed numerous temporary security arrangements. While some achieved short-term reductions in violence, they failed to address the structural drivers of instability. The result has been recurring and often more destructive cycles of confrontation. From this standpoint, the real danger lies not in the absence of a stabilization support force, but in the creation of one devoid of a credible political horizon—an instrument that mitigates immediate pressures without treating the underlying causes of conflict.
Another indispensable requirement, in Egypt’s assessment, is the articulation of a transparent and publicly declared timetable governing the force’s deployment and duration. This must be accompanied by a mechanism for regular review of its mandate and responsibilities. International experience repeatedly demonstrates that missions lacking clear temporal parameters tend to become open-ended engagements, generating political realities that later prove resistant to reversal. In Gaza’s case, any prolonged international or regional presence without a defined political endpoint would, in effect, entrench the separation of the Strip from the West Bank and erode the principle of Palestinian territorial unity.
Among the gravest risks Egypt seeks to avert is the possibility of transferring disproportionate security burdens onto neighboring states—foremost among them Egypt itself. Such risks may arise either through direct security responsibilities within Gaza, pressures along its borders, or the implicit expectation that regional actors assume roles tantamount to administering conditions on behalf of the occupying power. Egypt’s historical role has consistently been that of a supporter of Palestinian rights and an impartial mediator striving to contain and resolve conflict. It is not, and cannot become, a party tasked with managing the consequences of occupation.
With regard to reconstruction, Egypt underscores that this dossier cannot be separated from the political track. Rebuilding what the war has devastated must form part of a comprehensive political settlement designed to ensure that destruction is not endlessly repeated. Reducing reconstruction to a transactional device aimed at purchasing temporary calm—absent a serious effort to address the root causes of conflict—would merely prolong humanitarian suffering and perpetuate instability.
From a broader strategic perspective, Egypt views the proposed Stabilization Support Force as a genuine test of international resolve. It may either serve as an enabling mechanism for a just and durable political resolution, or regress into a tool of crisis management that alleviates pressures on stronger actors while leaving the Palestinian people confined within a closed political horizon.
There is a growing recognition that Gaza has become a proving ground. Success there could open a wider gateway toward addressing the Palestinian question and potentially offer lessons applicable to other conflict zones across the international system.
* The writer is a former Assistant Foreign Minister.
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