This basic rule of escalation management is highly relevant to the current standoff between the United States and Iran, and it helps explain why Washington has thus far refrained from resorting to military action against Tehran.
President Donald Trump has left few opportunities unused in attempting to pressure Iran into submission. Beyond assembling a military buildup unprecedented since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, he publicly endorsed protests inside Iran, signaling that American support for demonstrators could be forthcoming. He openly called for regime change, hinted at the possibility of targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and demanded Iran’s “surrender” to his conditions—namely dismantling its nuclear and missile programs and retreating strategically within its own borders.
This zero-sum framework afforded Khamenei little room for maneuver. Viewing what he described as the “current battle” as potentially existential, he chose to stake everything. He rejected Trump’s demands outright and responded to threats of force with warnings of sinking American aircraft carriers and expanding the confrontation into a full-scale regional war. Some clerics even raised the prospect of issuing a fatwa declaring “global jihad against arrogance,” signaling a willingness to frame the conflict in ideological and transnational terms.
None of this obscures the fact that Iran finds itself in a precarious position—arguably the most severe in the forty-seven years since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The regime faces an unprecedented domestic crisis rooted in economic mismanagement, social strain, and political rigidity. Its regional influence, long cultivated at considerable financial and strategic cost, has eroded under sustained blows to its allied networks in recent years. Yet despite these pressures, Khamenei’s ultimate decision was to refuse compliance with Trump’s conditions.
It is at this juncture that Trump encountered his dilemma. From the outset, he appeared to assume that the mere concentration of overwhelming military power near Iran’s borders would compel Tehran to rush toward what he could present domestically as a superior agreement to the 2015 deal concluded under President Barack Obama—a deal he has consistently criticized in American political discourse.
In essence, Trump attempted to deploy the psychological leverage of hard power without necessarily intending to use it. He wagered on the coercive effect of force projection itself, calculating that the symbolic weight of a massive military buildup would suffice to alter Iran’s policy orientation and secure its acquiescence.
When Iran refused to yield—contrary to his expectations—his calculations were unsettled. This was candidly acknowledged by U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff, who is leading negotiations with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Witkoff noted that President Trump had been surprised by Tehran’s resistance. “Why, under this level of pressure, with all this immense naval force there, did they not come to us and say, ‘We declare we don’t want a weapon—here is what we are prepared to do’?” he asked, conceding that “it is somewhat difficult to push them to that stage.”
At that moment, Trump began contemplating the option he had not initially intended to embrace: war. Yet once that threshold was reached, it became evident that military action would be far from straightforward, for at least three principal reasons.
First, the scope of any potential war remains undefined. Would it evolve into a broad campaign aimed at toppling the Islamic Republic, or would it resemble a limited operation—similar to the twelve-day war last June—focused narrowly on degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities?
Second, the contours of Iran’s likely retaliation are uncertain. Would Tehran confine itself to targeting American bases in the Gulf, or would it again strike Israel, threaten maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and activate its regional allies? The possibility of a clerical decree calling for “jihad against arrogance” raises the prospect of asymmetric attacks on U.S. interests worldwide.
Third, there is the question of domestic tolerance within the United States for another potentially costly Middle Eastern conflict. Washington has, in recent years, sought to reduce its direct and intensive engagement in the region’s protracted crises. A large-scale war would run counter to that strategic recalibration and could impose substantial financial and political costs.
Under these constraints, negotiations confined exclusively to the nuclear file emerged as a middle path capable of serving three objectives. First, they offer the prospect of a deal that could at least temporarily avert military confrontation. Second, they buy time for the further consolidation of military assets should force ultimately be deemed necessary. Third, they provide political cover—allowing the administration to argue domestically and to allies that any eventual use of force would be unavoidable, having exhausted diplomatic avenues. Trump’s sensitivity to the domestic dimension was evident when he emphasized that Iran was developing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching American territory.
Difficult choices remain. Reaching a deal continues to face significant obstacles. Although negotiations are ongoing, and the round held in Geneva on February 26 witnessed notable developments—most prominently the participation of International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Rafael Grossi as an observer and preparations for technical meetings at the Agency’s headquarters—the substantive gap between the parties’ positions remains wide.
Complicating matters further are intense Israeli pressures, particularly from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A narrowly focused nuclear agreement between Tehran and Washington would represent a significant setback for him as he prepares for Knesset elections. Before entering the electoral contest, Netanyahu seeks a powerful regional card to strengthen his political standing against rivals, whether in relation to Iran, Lebanon, or Gaza.
Israel’s recent military escalation in Lebanon may signal preparation for two scenarios. One is the collapse of negotiations and the outbreak of war, in which case Israel appears intent on neutralizing potential regional fronts in advance. The other is the success of negotiations, in which case a renewed confrontation with Hezbollah could serve as the strategic card Netanyahu seeks before elections.
Ultimately, what stands out is that Trump appears, perhaps for the first time, to have recognized the limits of power. A favorable balance of forces does not automatically translate into unlimited options in managing escalation. The dilemma thus re-emerges with renewed clarity.
He may accept a deal confined to the nuclear program, one that falls short of his broader demands regarding ballistic missile ranges and Iran’s support for allied networks—a deal that could itself remain vulnerable to Israeli objections.
He may order a wide-ranging war against Iran, with all the attendant costs for the United States and potentially its allies, particularly if the conflict becomes protracted.
He may opt for a limited strike that Khamenei would portray domestically as a victory, echoing the narrative that followed last June’s confrontation.
Or he may retreat from the use of force altogether, postponing it even if negotiations fail—an outcome that could carry consequences for America’s standing as the world’s preeminent power.
* The writer is an Iran Affairs Expert, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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