Even before US President Donald Trump declared that the coordinated attacks he ordered on Iran this weekend, killing the country’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, are aimed at regime change in Tehran, he had been musing about ousting the Shia-led regime in Baghdad.
The two closely connected Muslim countries are at their weakest points, and removing their leaderships could seal the emergence of a new Sunni-led Middle East order; one that eclipses the shattered Shia “axis of resistance” as sought by Trump’s regional allies.
Yet, Trump seems to be taking a risky bet in the face of two nations that have leaderships entrenched behind a militant Shia ideology built on deeply rooted feelings of injustice, historical trauma, martyrdom, and survival.
For months, Trump has been threatening the Shia ruling coalition in Iraq with a stepped-up embargo that could strangle the country’s economy if it does not sever ties with Iran.
The pressure on the Iraqi Shia leadership comes amidst a heightened political crisis in Iraq over forming a new government, stalled by the failure of the country’s political factions to name a president and prime minister.
The crisis has been worsened by Trump’s vetoing former Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki, a close ally of Iran, from having a new term and his warning that he will end US support for Iraq if Al-Maliki returns to power.
“Because of his insane policies and ideologies, if elected, the United States of America will no longer help Iraq and, if we are not there to help, Iraq has ZERO chance of Success, Prosperity, or Freedom,” Trump declared on his social media page Truth Social.
Among the tools Washington has been applying to force change on Baghdad’s Shia-led government in recent months is using its significant leverage through financial channels, security cooperation, and investment.
Trump’s main goal is to roll back Iran’s regional influence, with his ultimatum targeting the pro-Iran groups in Iraq, primarily the powerful Shia militias, in a bid to curb the Islamic Republic’s influence in Iraq as he seeks to reshape the Middle East in favour of US interests.
The end of the Gaza war with Hamas’ defeat, the decapitation of Hizbullah in Lebanon, and the collapse of the Iran-backed Al-Assad regime in Syria are among the most consequential shifts in a new regional order aspired to by the United States, Israel, and the regional Arab Sunni powerhouses.
Among the key measures taken by the Trump administration in Iraq has been designating several Shia militia groups as foreign terrorist organisations, accusing them of having Iranian ties and targeting American interests in the Middle East.
Several individuals in the Iraqi government and business groups were previously listed as specially designated global terrorists, a classification which carries harsher sanctions and criminal penalties.
Washington has reportedly threatened more punishment on Iraq should the Shia bloc proceed with Al-Maliki’s nomination. It includes sanctions against the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO) and the Central Bank of Iraq, as well as security and diplomatic sectors, in addition to political figures and former and current officials.
These measures could also include restrictions on Iraqi oil sales, limitations on the Iraqi government’s access to US dollars, or sanctions on its banks, all measures that could lead to a near-total halt in foreign trade and severe difficulties in paying public-sector salaries.
Al-Maliki, whose time in office between 2006 and 2014 was marked by sectarian violence in Iraq, has rejected Trump’s threats, commenting that they are a “violation of the country’s sovereignty and its democratic system”.
Trump’s meddling has left the Shia Coordination Framework (CF), the largest bloc in the Iraqi parliament, which has endorsed Al-Maliki for the post of prime minister, facing a critical situation that has left the delicate balance between its numerous factions severely strained.
It has also deepened the political crisis over forming Iraq’s next government more than three months after last year’s general elections. Both the country’s Kurdish and Sunni parties have been reluctant to support Al-Maliki, apparently for fear of angering Trump.
Under Iraq’s constitution, parliament must elect a president within 30 days of its first session, which was held on 29 December. The president then has 15 days to nominate a candidate proposed by the largest parliamentary bloc as prime minister.
The presidency has traditionally been held by a Kurdish figure. The two largest Kurdish groups, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), are competing for the largely ceremonial post, creating another hurdle in the ongoing crisis.
Since the US-led invasion in 2003 that toppled the former dictator Saddam Hussein, Iraq has been hit by crises usually caused by political parties that cannot agree on whom to appoint to key posts and an inability to form a coalition government.
Yet, this time around the crisis is different, as the dramatic intervention by Trump makes it seem almost like another attempt at regime change, or at least an attempt to make the Iraqi ruling oligarchs succumb to his will.
However, Trump’s pursuit of influencing Iraq’s next government in defiance of the guiding principles in its constitution has raised questions about his tactics in applying pressure on Iraq and the momentous choices ahead.
The Trump administration has been targeting the pro-Iran militias operating on Iraqi soil, which Washington says are part of Tehran’s network of proxies in the Middle East and have been assisting the Iranian regime in evading US sanctions, smuggling weapons, and engaging in widespread corruption in Iraq.
The administration has avowedly been pushing the Baghdad government into disarming the pro-Iran militias, with some reports suggesting that Washington even wants the para-military Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF) to be dismantled.
But unlike his successful abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January this year, Trump’s desperate attempt at regime change in Iran in collaboration with Israel has hit a bind in Iraq.
One aspect of Trump’s troubling approach to Iraq is that the world’s most powerful man is now miscalculating his moves in a profoundly complicated country and appearing like a bad gambler overbidding his hand.
Trump does not want to advance democracy or good governance in Iraq, but he does want to humiliate the Iraqi leadership according to a secret agenda aimed ultimately at overturning the Shia empowerment that followed the collapse of the Sunni-led Saddam regime in 2003.
But the reality on the ground in Iraq suggests that ousting the Iraqi Shia leadership will not be a rosy scenario. Trump’s success in removing Maduro from power in Venezuela does not predict what might happen in Iraq. Even Trump’s plans for Cuba’s takeover seem less risky.
With the killing of Khamenei in Iran, the ruling CF coalition in Iraq, which holds an absolute majority of the seats in parliament, could feel that the Shia empowerment in Iraq and their future in the entire Middle East is in danger and will therefore not be cowed by Trump’s threats.
But while the ruling CF may choose to submit to Trump for fear of provoking his wrath, the Shia militias will likely not choose to sit on the fence watching efforts to force them to lay down their weapons and go home.
The Iran-aligned militia groups collectively called “the Islamic Resistance in Iraq” are non-state armed actors who wield enormous power and underscore the Iranian influence within Iraq’s security and political dynamics.
These groups have been integrated into the state security apparatus while simultaneously gaining significant parliamentary influence through the Coordination Framework.
Most significantly, they have been integrated into the formal political process to protect their interests while retaining their weapons, complicating efforts to bring them under state control.
The factions, particularly those within the Popular Moblisation Forces (PMF), are deeply embedded in the Iraqi government, blurring the line between state authority and armed non-state actors.
Many of the militias have significantly increased their political leverage in Iraq’s new parliament, with affiliated parties securing over 50 seats combined, which means they can now influence national decision-making.
Trump’s push to influence Iraq’s internal politics has come simultaneously with his launching of his war on Iran to take out Khamenei and clear the way for regime change in the country.
The simultaneous moves underscore the interconnection between the two neighbouring countries in Trump’s efforts to overthrow their Shia leaderships in order to pave the way for a new Sunni-led Middle East order.
As the United States and Israel began striking Iran and with the death of Khamenei, the tension has risen in Iraq, with fears that the escalating conflict could plunge the country onto an unpredictable path.
A powerful Iran-backed Iraqi armed group, the Kataib Hizbullah, has warned that it will start a war against US interests in the region in case of strikes against Iran. The group is believed to be behind a series of bombings of American assets in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The attacks echo a growing sentiment among the Iraqi Shias against the US strikes on Iran, and the unfolding conflict could be even riskier and take more dangerous turns in the multi-sect and multi-ethnic nation.
It is feared that Trump will now pursue his efforts to shake up the Iraqi Shia-led ruling coalition as he celebrates his military victories and intention to topple the Iranian regime.
But this could be another dramatic fiasco, like the Epic Fury Operation in Iran, which thus far has led to death and destruction but does not appear to guarantee the outcome of regime change.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 5 March, 2026 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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