Within this context, a highly sensitive question emerges from both demographic and economic perspectives: if the war were to become prolonged and Gulf countries continued to be targeted, would it be possible to evacuate the roughly forty million foreign nationals who live and work there?
This question is far more than a theoretical exercise. The member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council represent one of the most migration-dependent regions in the world. In countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, foreign residents constitute the majority of the population, while migrant workers make up a substantial share of the labor force in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. Current estimates suggest that the total number of foreign nationals across the Gulf ranges between thirty-five and forty million people. They come from dozens of countries and are employed across a wide spectrum of economic sectors, from low-skilled manual labor to highly specialized technical and managerial positions.
In purely theoretical terms, evacuating such a vast number of people might appear conceivable if a major war were to threaten the internal security of Gulf states. The practical reality, however, is far more complex. Evacuating forty million individuals is not simply a political decision that can be implemented overnight. It would constitute an immense logistical undertaking requiring extraordinary air and maritime transport capacity, as well as extensive coordination among dozens of countries whose citizens are employed in the region. Even under the most pessimistic scenarios, it is difficult to imagine an operation of this magnitude being carried out within a short period without triggering large-scale humanitarian and economic disruption.
Beyond the logistical challenges lies an equally critical economic dimension. Over the past five decades, the modern economies of the Gulf have been built on a development model that relies heavily on foreign labor, particularly in sectors such as construction, services, transportation, and the oil industry. The sudden departure of tens of millions of workers would effectively bring entire economic sectors to a halt—an outcome that no state could easily absorb, even under wartime conditions. For this reason, governments facing crises often seek to retain the essential workforce required to operate critical infrastructure, including energy production, electricity networks, ports, and healthcare services.
Historical experience reinforces this point. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, followed by the events of the 1991 Gulf War, the region witnessed a substantial outflow of foreign workers. Even then, however, the scale of departure remained far smaller than the scenario currently under discussion. Millions did leave the region, yet Gulf economies continued to rely heavily on migrant labor once the crisis ended, and migration flows gradually returned to their previous levels within a few years.
If the current regional conflict were to intensify, what would likely occur is not a sudden mass evacuation but rather what might be described as a gradual exodus. In most crises, the first departures are voluntary. Foreign families and highly skilled professionals tend to leave areas of tension quickly in search of safety. Multinational companies may evacuate their expatriate employees, and governments may advise their citizens to temporarily depart the region—a process that has already begun for some Western nationals. As economic activity declines, particularly in sectors such as construction and tourism, the demand for foreign labor may shrink, leading to the gradual departure of millions of workers.
Even under conditions of a prolonged conflict, however, it remains unlikely that all foreign residents would leave the Gulf. The structural nature of Gulf economies—rent-based systems centered on energy production and the services surrounding it—requires a minimum level of foreign labor to maintain operational continuity. The most realistic scenario would therefore involve a gradual reduction in the number of expatriates, potentially numbering in the millions, without reaching the point of a comprehensive evacuation of all non-citizen residents.
For countries such as Egypt, where millions of citizens work across the Gulf, such a scenario would carry significant economic and social implications. The sudden return of large numbers of workers could place considerable pressure on domestic labor markets and reduce remittance flows, which represent a critical source of foreign currency. At the same time, the return of migrant workers could also generate positive effects, including the repatriation of savings and the transfer of professional experience accumulated during years of employment abroad.
Ultimately, this hypothetical scenario highlights a fundamental demographic reality: the Gulf today represents one of the largest hubs of temporary migration in the world. Millions of foreign workers are embedded within a deeply interconnected economic and social system. If this region were to experience severe instability, the consequences would not be confined to its geographic borders. Instead, they would ripple outward to dozens of countries whose economies depend heavily on remittances from their workers in the Gulf. The real question, therefore, is not whether forty million foreign nationals could be evacuated from the Gulf, but what would happen to the global economic system linked to labor migration if this strategically vital region were to experience a prolonged geopolitical shock. Migration, as historical experience repeatedly demonstrates, is not merely the movement of people across borders; it is a complex web of economic and social relationships that cannot easily be dismantled—even under the most extreme circumstances.
*The writer is a Population and Migration Studies Expert.
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