Only then will it become clear whether this war marks a turning point that divides the region into a distinct “before” and “after,” particularly given that the broader regional firestorm has already been fueled by the cascading consequences of the events of 7 October 2023.
In this context, some observers invoke what has been described as the “wooden houses theory,” which suggests that when flames erupt in one fragile structure, they can quickly spread to neighboring houses built from similarly combustible materials—meaning that instability in one state can easily extend its impact across the wider region.
A preliminary reading of the first four days of the US–Israeli war against Iran suggests that the conflict is already producing a series of ripple effects across the region.
First, the renewed danger of externally driven regime change has returned to the forefront of regional debate. One of the principal objectives of the war, according to the strategic calculations of both Washington and Tel Aviv, appears to be the overthrow of the Iranian regime.
This objective has revived the long-standing argument that dominated political discourse in the region during the first and second decades of the twenty-first century: whether meaningful political transformation should originate from within societies themselves or be imposed through external intervention. The revival of this debate highlights the necessity for states across the region to strengthen internal resilience in the face of external pressure. Political systems that lack broad popular support or that do not possess professional national military institutions become especially vulnerable to external interference and intervention.
In this context, former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu warned on 1 March 2026 that any potential collapse in Tehran would not remain an isolated event. Rather, he argued that it could trigger what he described as a “domino tsunami,” potentially extending its impact to multiple capitals and political systems throughout the region. The fall of a regional center of gravity such as Tehran, he suggested, could unleash a chain reaction of political and security upheavals that would reshape the regional balance of power and open the door to instability that transcends national borders and affects the entire architecture of regional stability.
Second, Iran has effectively shifted from being a potential source of threat to becoming a direct threat to the Gulf states. Relations between Iran and the Gulf countries have entered a new phase characterized by heightened tension and escalation, particularly after Iran’s retaliatory strikes targeted every Gulf state without exception, including Oman, which had served as a mediator in negotiations between the United States and Iran.
The commercial port of Duqm in Oman was reportedly struck by two drones, while the United Arab Emirates—especially Dubai, which represents Iran’s largest trading partner in the region—was also targeted.
Saudi Arabia was also struck despite the Beijing-brokered agreement signed with Iran in March 2023. Other Gulf capitals were also affected, even though Gulf states had spent months attempting to prevent escalation and avert war against Iran. These attacks were widely perceived as crossing clear red lines, particularly since Iran refrained from targeting U.S. bases in other countries such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.
Although Gulf states issued both individual and collective statements condemning these attacks—which violated national sovereignty, targeted radar systems, and threatened economic interests—Saudi Arabia summoned the Iranian ambassador in Riyadh, while the United Arab Emirates withdrew its ambassador and diplomatic mission entirely from Iran.
At the same time, some voices within Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have argued that these responses remain limited and insufficient, calling instead for strengthening indigenous Gulf military capabilities, shifting from a defensive posture toward a more proactive strategic stance, and activating the Peninsula Shield Force to protect the shared interests of Gulf states, including the safety of citizens and expatriates, investments, and critical infrastructure.
Other voices, however, have urged caution and rational deliberation, warning against being drawn into a wider war that could exhaust Gulf resources and undermine development strategies that have been carefully cultivated over many years.
Third, the war has cast doubt on the notion of the “Gulfization” of the Middle East. The conflict has revealed the limitations of the strategic maneuverability available to Gulf states after their sovereignty was repeatedly violated through Iranian attacks. These developments have raised questions about the effectiveness of regional air defense systems and the extent to which massive annual defense expenditures and arms purchases have actually enhanced national security.
While Gulf governments continue to emphasize that “the security situation remains under control” and that their armed forces maintain full readiness to address any threats, images broadcast by international media outlets—showing disruptions to aviation, oil facilities, maritime transport, and even the suspension of educational, recreational, and sporting activities—point to genuine challenges confronting Gulf societies.
Perhaps the most important lesson emerging from the conflict is the necessity of giving security considerations the same degree of attention that has been devoted to economic development. In recent years, some intellectuals described the present period as the “Gulf moment,” reflecting the remarkable achievements of Gulf states in education, healthcare, economic diversification, and income levels. Yet the fires raging across the region are now beginning to reach the gardens of the Gulf itself, bringing threats uncomfortably close.
This concern was indirectly expressed by Dr. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the President of the United Arab Emirates, during the Emirati–Kuwaiti Media Forum on 30 January 2026, when he remarked that sliding toward confrontation would impose heavy costs on all parties, particularly the Gulf states, which would bear a significant share of the economic, security, and reputational consequences of escalation. The central challenge, therefore, is not merely that the Gulf region faces danger, but how it can preserve stability while surrounded by an increasingly volatile strategic environment.
Fourth, the conflict reflects an intensification of Israeli strategic assertiveness in the Middle East. One of the most notable implications of the war is Israel’s growing ambition to shape regional dynamics and to construct what it views as a new Middle East aligned with its long-term strategic interests in the aftermath of the events of 7 October 2023.
Israel has significantly weakened Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon through targeted strikes against their leadership structures, contributed to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, carried out operations against Houthi leadership figures in Yemen, and launched precision strikes against senior commanders within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and military establishment. These actions collectively signal an effort to consolidate Israeli strategic dominance over the region’s evolving security landscape.
At the same time, Israel has conveyed deterrent messages to multiple regional actors, encouraging political and economic normalization while emphasizing the potential costs of continued hostility. Some narratives circulating within regional discourse even suggest that any new political system that might emerge in Iran after the war could eventually establish cooperative or pragmatic relations with Israel. Such ideas reflect what Tel Aviv appears to envision as the emergence of an “Israeli era” in Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Fifth, the military escalation is unlikely to generate stability; rather, it risks deepening and prolonging regional instability. The intensification of armed confrontation tends to divert international and regional attention away from other pressing issues, including the Palestinian question, the strengthening of national state institutions, the challenge posed by armed militias, the fight against transnational terrorism, and the pursuit of negotiated settlements to protracted conflicts.
In contrast, some regional actors—most notably Egypt—have maintained a consistent position supporting diplomatic solutions, continued negotiations, and the avoidance of escalation. Cairo has repeatedly emphasized the importance of pursuing negotiations between the United States and Iran over the nuclear file and seeking political compromises rather than military solutions whose consequences could prove catastrophic for the entire region.
Sixth, the war is likely to inflame internal tensions within several regional states, particularly those that host armed non-state actors aligned with or opposed to the parties involved in the conflict. Lebanon represents a particularly illustrative example.
On 2 March 2026, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced an immediate ban on Hezbollah’s military and security activities, restricting the organization’s role to political participation and calling for the surrender of its weapons to the Lebanese state.
Such measures could potentially trigger confrontations between Hezbollah and Lebanese security institutions, including the army. Meanwhile, the Iraqi arena has also begun to feel the reverberations of the war, as certain political factions and armed groups—such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba—have threatened to target American interests in Iraq. The extension of war dynamics into neighboring countries thus risks deepening and widening regional tensions.
Seventh, the conflict threatens to disrupt maritime navigation and global trade flows. Iran has sought to widen the theater of confrontation by threatening strategic energy corridors and attempting to close critical maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian tactics reportedly include the use of explosive maritime drones and naval mines, actions that have already led to the suspension of shipping routes and flights in several areas.
Traffic through the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb strait has been disrupted, while many vessels have begun avoiding passage through the Strait of Hormuz altogether. This strait represents one of the most important maritime passages in the world, through which approximately 20 million barrels of oil—roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption—pass every day. Since 28 February 2026, maritime traffic through the strait has reportedly declined by between 40 and 75 percent, while oil exports have dropped to around 4 million barrels per day, with nearly 80 percent of those shipments destined for Asian economies.
Additionally, between 20 and 25 percent of global liquefied natural gas trade passes through the strait, meaning that disruptions there create severe shocks for global supply chains. The stability of the Gulf region is therefore not merely a regional matter but a fundamental pillar of global economic stability and maritime commerce.
Eighth, energy infrastructure in the Gulf has become a direct target, producing ripple effects across global energy markets. By attacking oil facilities and threatening production sites, Iran appears to be attempting to increase the global economic costs of the war. Among the incidents reported were strikes affecting energy infrastructure near the Ras Tanura refinery complex in Saudi Arabia, the largest oil refinery and export terminal in both Saudi Arabia and the Middle East.
At the same time, liquefied natural gas prices in European markets surged by more than 50 percent after a major Qatari facility suspended operations following damage to its operational infrastructure. These developments illustrate Tehran’s broader message: the war carries consequences not only for regional actors but also for the global economy, potentially pushing international markets toward recessionary pressures.
Ninth, the war also intersects with the broader geopolitical competition for dominance within the international system, particularly the strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Some strands of strategic analysis suggest that the ultimate focus of the Trump administration is not Iran itself but China, which occupies a central position in the US National Security Strategy of 2026. From this perspective, attempts to reshape the political structure of Iran cannot be separated from a broader American objective of restructuring political systems in countries that have increasingly become strategic partners or economic anchors for China.
The dramatic capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on 3 January 2026 during a joint military-intelligence operation has been cited as a striking example of this emerging pattern. Should the United States succeed in replacing the current Iranian regime with a new political order, one likely consequence would be a reassessment of Iran’s strategic relationship with China, including the scale and direction of its energy exports.
Tenth, the current crisis reflects a broader strategic dynamic often associated with the leadership style of US President Donald Trump, summarized in the phrase “the impossible becomes possible.” Under such circumstances, additional escalation scenarios cannot be ruled out. With Trump in Washington, Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, and ideologically driven leadership circles in Tehran, political decision-making may increasingly reflect a mixture of power politics, ideological conviction, and domestic political calculations.
A scenario in which Iranian attacks strike major strategic targets in the Gulf—such as the U.S. embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Aramco facilities, or energy infrastructure across Gulf states—could dramatically intensify the conflict. If American military forces in the region were subjected to large-scale attacks, the likelihood of forming a broader international coalition against Tehran would increase significantly. Such developments could eventually lead to expanded military operations launched from Gulf territory with the explicit objective of overthrowing the Iranian regime, a scenario that would impose enormous costs on all parties involved.
In conclusion, the US–Israeli war against Iran currently resembles a confrontation that could still evolve into a much broader conflict if it continues for a prolonged period, grows in complexity, and draws additional regional and international actors into the battlefield. Without meaningful reassessments by the parties involved, the war risks deepening global instability and contributing to a wider economic downturn. The history of conflicts in the Middle East repeatedly demonstrates a sobering lesson: wars in the region are often far easier to begin than they are to end.
*The writer is the head of the Arab and Regional Studies Unit at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
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